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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This study investigates whether Malaysian family-controlled firms create firm value 
when undertaking corporate acquisitions and which family-specific traits determine 
this value. Event study methodology is employed to examine the announcement-period 
wealth effect of corporate acquisition (cumulative abnormal returns – CAR). Both 
univariate and multivariate statistical analyses are used to examine which family-
specific traits are significant determinants of CAR of Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
Inferences drawn in this study are based on 267-sample corporate acquisition 
announcements performed by publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled firms across a 
10-year sample period from the years 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
The motivation of this study stems from the literature gap (within the literature of 
corporate acquisitions and literature of family firms) where there is no empirical study 
that has specifically examined the relation between family-related traits and CAR. Past 
corporate acquisition studies inferred that acquiring firms essentially experience no 
significant wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements or are worse off with 
significant negative announcement wealth effect. However, when considering the 
effect of family ownership, existing studies found significant wealth effect experienced 
by family firms that are the acquirers (either positively or negatively). Family firm 
research remains a young field, which only began receiving burgeoning attention in the 
1990s. The study of La Porta et al. (1999) reported that family firms are found to be 
prevalent in the global capital markets, as opposed to the version of widely held firms 
by Berle and Means (1932). These organizational structures are found to exert 
substantial influence over the economic landscape of most nations. Family firms in 
  
 II 
 
  
Malaysia, which are prevalent among Malaysian publicly listed firms, wield 
considerable economic power in the country. 
 
 
Given that the ownership structure of the majority of Malaysian family-controlled firms 
is characterized by concentrated shareholdings of controlling owners, the protection of 
minority shareholders becomes inherently critical. However, the real act of 
expropriation is scarcely investigated in the context of Malaysia. Corporate acquisitions 
in this case offer one available direct measure for the real act of possible expropriation 
activities for Malaysian family-controlled firms. Malaysia is in an active position with 
corporate acquisition activities accounting for the highest percentage of total deals and 
transaction value in the Southeast Asian region since 1990. However, no significant 
studies have been conducted to find out if corporate acquisition activities are subject 
to misappropriation behaviour by Malaysian family-controlled firms. There is also no 
study conducted to know the wealth effect experienced by Malaysian family-controlled 
firms and the determinants of the wealth effect. There is also no study conducted to 
find out the wealth effect experienced by Malaysian family-controlled firms and the 
determinants of the wealth effect. 
 
 
The main finding in this study shows that Malaysian family-controlled firms, on 
average, perform value-enhancing corporate acquisitions. Furthermore, this study also 
provides empirical evidence that family-specific traits are important determinants of 
CAR. The findings extend our knowledge and understanding within the corporate 
acquisition literature and family firm literature that family-specific traits should not be 
excluded from consideration when performing similar study on the wealth effect of 
corporate acquisitions for family firms. The family-specific traits that are found to 
exhibit significant relation with CAR in this study are family ownership, family 
management regime (founder-CEO and descendant-CEO), family representatives on 
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the board (relative to independent directors on the board), and family-related CEO and 
chairman on the board. 
 
 
Specifically, this study is the first to show a nonlinear relation between family 
ownership and CAR for Malaysian family-controlled firms and to empirically report on a 
significant positive relation between descendant-CEO and CAR. Consistent with 
previous literature, this study showed a nonlinear relation between proportion of 
family representatives on the board (relative to proportion of independent directors on 
the board) and CAR. This study also provides the first-ever evidence within family firm 
literature and corporate governance literature by finding support that there is a 
significant negative relation between family-related chairman-CEO on the board and 
CAR. This study is also the pioneer in documenting the existence of such family-specific 
practices upheld by Malaysian family-controlled firms. However, whether such practice 
is upheld by family firms in other countries is unknown and not yet empirically 
documented. Overall, these inferences are made within multivariate settings, which 
control for the known determinants of CAR. Robust analyses are also performed for the 
generation of valid inferences. In general, these findings provide significant 
contributions to the literature of family firms, corporate acquisitions, and corporate 
governance. 
 
 
Additionally, the findings of this study also have policy implications for policy makers, 
practitioners, and investors in the industry. First, restrictions on the level of family 
ownership held by the controlling family in publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled 
firms need to be put in place. Evidence reveals that the optimum level of family 
ownership should not exceed 50% to maximize family firm value. Second, it is 
recommended that currently, corporate governance practices should consider 
restricting participation of family members on the board of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms. This leads to the third policy implication in this study. Policy makers need to 
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consider setting a new mandatory ratio of independent directors on the board, 
specifically for Malaysian family-controlled firms. In particular, in the case of Malaysia, 
there should be a balanced voicing power on the board of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms between family representatives and the independent directors. With the 
empirical results of this study as basis, policy makers are advised to incorporate a 
mandatory 1:1 ratio (for the best practices of corporate governance in Malaysia) of 
family representatives to independent directors on the board of Malaysian family-
controlled firms. Empirical evidence in this study suggests that this 1:1 ratio allows 
Malaysian family-controlled firms value maximization. Fourth, current generally 
accepted corporate governance practices should consider restricting the appointment 
of family-related CEO and chairman on the board. Evidence in this study documented 
the first-ever finding that such family-specific practices are detrimental to family firm 
value. This finding also has policy implications for corporate governance policy makers 
worldwide that such family-specific traits need to be taken into account; they may 
need to be restricted and be applied to family firms in other countries. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In the present complex and turbulent environment, to gain a position with competitive 
advantage is often difficult for companies. Identification of factors that improve 
companies’ performance allows better utilisation of resources to secure a better future 
for firms (Mazzi 2011). Among various factors that are significantly related to firm 
performance, ownership structure in firms remains a highly contentious issue. 
 
 
Among numerous types of ownership structure, family owners, as an ubiquitous form 
of corporate governance structure, are found to be prevalent in the global capital 
markets worldwide; this contrasts with the findings of Berle and Means (1932), who 
found widely held corporations1 to be a more common form of ownership structure. 
This type of family ownership dominates the ownership structure of publicly traded 
firms not only in the US (Anderson and Reeb 2003b) and Western Europe (Faccio and 
Lang 2002; Maury 2006) but also in the emerging economies. These corporations under 
the domination of family ownership are found to exert substantial influence over the 
economic landscapes of most nations (Astrachan and Shanker 2003; Alderson 2011; 
Poza 2009; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). Empirical evidence also reveals that family 
firms significantly differ from nonfamily firms across different dimensions. These 
dimensions include corporate governance structure of family firms (Siebels and Dodo 
2012), family goals, family culture, transgenerational feature, and the way strategic 
business decisions are made. 
 
Given the importance of family firms and the influence of the controlling family, the 
field of family business research has received increasing scholarly attention in recent 
                                                          
1
Widely held corporations refer to corporations that have no controlling shareholders with block ownership. 
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years. A considerable number of studies have been directed toward family firms after 
the astounding findings presented by La Porta et al. (1999), followed by Claessens et al. 
(2000) and Faccio and Lang (2002). Consequently, the performance of family firms has 
gained burgeoning attention in the literature on business strategy and financial 
economics (Mazzi 2011). 
 
 
Studies found that in comparison with nonfamily firms, the performance of family firms 
worldwide vary because of the diverse social practices, economic conditions, and 
institutional background of each country. For example, the performance of Japanese 
family firms is maintained through assimilation of capable managers into the family in 
the form of adoptions or marriages; in fact, these firms outperform the professionally 
managed family firms (Mehrotra et al. 2013). In Thailand, family firms perform 
marriages that add value to family firms, when the partners are from either prominent 
businesses or political families (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). On the other hand, studies 
on Italian family firms showed that Italian family firms are bad performers when the 
management of family firms persists within the same family for the next generation, 
instead of passing the managerial role to nonfamily professionals (Cucculelli and 
Micucci 2008). Other studies suggested that family firms performed better than 
nonfamily firms in the US (Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Lee 2006; Miller et al. 2007), 
Europe (Barontini and Caprio 2006), France (Sraer and Thesmar 2007), Japan (Saito 
2008), Italy (Cucculelli and Micucci 2008), Canada (Villalonga and Amit 2006), Belgium 
(Hamadi 2010), and Chile (Martínez et al. 2007). In contrast, there were also evidence 
that found no relation between family ownership and firm performance, as reported by 
Chang and Shin (2007) for Korean Chaebols and Sacristán-Navarro et al. (2011) for 
Spanish listed firms. 
 
 
Inferences about the effect of descendants’ ownership on the performance of the 
family firms under their management also have been inconclusive. Some researchers 
found family firms performed better solely because of the founder effect (Cucculelli 
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and Micucci 2008; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Miller et al. 2007; Saito 2008). Conversely, 
Sraer et al. (2007) discovered that the good performance of family firms persisted for 
descendants’ owned and managed family firms. These past findings on the effect of 
family ownership and management on firms’ performance have been inconclusive. 
Overall, understanding how family contributes to family firm performance remains one 
of the main challenges faced in the area of research on family business (Basco 2013). 
These studies examining family firm performance are based on the accounting 
performance of family firms. 
 
 
Agency framework has been frequently proposed to explain the link between family 
ownership and firm performance. It is a stylised fact that ownership structures affect 
the nature of agency problem between managers and shareholders (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu 2013). The inherent feature of owner-manager position and concentrated 
family ownership in family firms intrinsically mitigate conflicts between the owner and 
the manager, which leads to better firm value (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). This follows 
the notion of neoclassical agency theory proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), 
which is also known as the principal-agent conflict theory or Agency Problem I. 
Concentrated family ownership in addition to family managerial role becomes an 
inherent internal corporate governance mechanism that is beneficial to shareholders of 
family firms. 
 
 
Despite the potential advantages of family ownership, the inherent feature of family 
owner-manager position and concentrated family ownership in family firms may also 
create a second potential conflict between the large, controlling family and the 
minority shareholders. This is also known as the principal-principal conflict theory 
(Agency Problem II) in family firms. Agency Problem II posits that concentrated family 
ownership at a certain level may lead to entrenchment of family owner-manager, 
resulting in the expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth (Fama and Jensen 
1983a; Morck et al. 1988; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). The aim of maximising family 
  
 20 
 
  
utility may dominate the aim of maximising the overall shareholders’ wealth (Bertrand 
and Schoar 2003), through the realisation of private benefit of control. 
 
 
As such, minority shareholder expropriation continues to be one of the corporate 
governance issues which attract extensive attention in emerging markets (Claessens 
and Yurtoglu 2013). The activities of expropriating the minority shareholders can be 
extensive, especially in emerging countries with low investor protection, weak 
corporate governance, and owners who have concentrated ownership stake (La Porta 
et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004). It has been a continuous 
effort from policymakers and regulators worldwide to be concerned with the design of 
a corporate governance framework that can protect minority investors from the 
misbehaved and self-interested controlling shareholders and managers of the company 
(McCahery and Vermeulen 2013). 
 
 
One available direct measure for the real act of possible minority shareholder 
expropriation activities is corporate acquisitions, which constitutes one stream of 
literature. Corporate acquisitions provide the advantage as a direct measure for 
evidence of agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Faccio and Stolin 2006).2  
Specifically, the market performance of family firms are examined when family firms 
execute corporate acquisitions (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012; Caprio et al. 2011; Shim 
and Okamuro 2011; Bauguess and Stegemoller 2008; Bouzgarrou and Navatte 2013). 
These market performances of family firms subsequent to the announcement of 
                                                          
2
Past studies (Claessens and Unit 1999; La Porta et al. 1999; Barontini and Caprio 2006; Carney and Child 2012) 
employed an indirect measure of expropriation to examine possible expropriating behaviour of companies 
worldwide through the ratio of cash flow rights and voting rights. Based on the measure of cash flow rights and 
voting rights, investors are claimed to be easily exposed to expropriation by the controlling owners because of 
the control enhancement mechanisms used by companies. (Cash flow rights reflect the level of financial stakes 
of the controlling families in a family-controlled firm. Control rights are taken to be the proportion of 
outstanding shares through which voting power can be exercised directly or indirectly by the controlling 
families.) However, there are concerns over deriving the precise quantum of a controlling shareholder’s voting 
rights (Lemmon and Lins 2003; Claessens et al. 2000; Carney and Child 2012; Song et al. 2007; Lee et al. 2012). 
An important concern about these pre-existing studies is the reliance of the indirect measure—the ratio of cash 
flow rights and voting rights to infer the possibility of minority shareholder expropriation habit of the 
controlling owners. 
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corporate acquisition activities are also termed the wealth effect of corporate 
acquisitions on family firms. 
 
 
The undertakings of corporate acquisitions are often used by self-interested insiders 
(manager-owner) to the detriment of outside shareholders (Jensen and Ruback 1983; 
Roll 1986; Andrade et al. 2001). The self-interested owner-manager expands the firm 
through corporate acquisitions beyond its scope of activity, which result in higher 
salary for the owner-manager, higher controlling power (Murphy 1985), or 
diversification of human capital risk (Amihud and Lev 1981b). The expropriation 
behaviour of the controlling owners has been shown in Korea (Bae et al. 2002) and 
India (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). These nations are known for their weak corporate 
governance system. However, not all controlling owners in other nations with weak 
corporate governance system are self-interested and behave in such a way that 
expropriates the wealth of the minority shareholders. Related findings for the case of 
Belgium (Buysschaert et al. 2004) and Sweden (Holmen and Knopf 2004) reject this 
expropriation hypothesis. 
 
 
Recent studies of wealth effect of corporate acquisitions for family firms reveal a 
contrastingly different interpretation when compared with past corporate acquisition 
studies (which do not consider specifically the effect of family owners). Past corporate 
acquisition literature suggests that acquiring firms (the acquirers) generally experience 
insignificant or negative wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. These 
studies jointly conclude that corporate acquisition decisions of the acquirers do not 
result in significant changes to the acquirers’ market value. However, this is not the 
case when family firms are the acquirers. Studies show that acquirers that are family 
firms experience significant changes in firm market value, either positively or negatively 
when announcing their corporate acquisition decisions (As discussed in the 
forthcoming Chapter 3). 
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A dominant framework, known as agency theory, is employed by these studies to 
explain the phenomenon of significant announcement-period wealth effect 
experienced by family firms in the aforementioned corporate acquisition studies. 
Studies concluded that family firms perform value-enhancing corporate acquisitions, 
which is consistent with the notion of neoclassical principal-agent agency theory 
(interest alignment hypothesis) (Holmen and Knopf 2004; Ben-Amar and André 2006). 
The interests of family owners are well aligned with those of other nonfamily 
shareholders. However, some studies have found evidence that family firms perform 
value-destroying corporate acquisitions, whereas the controlling family gains private 
benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders, which is consistent with the 
notion of Agency Problem II—the expropriation hypothesis (Bae et al. 2002; Bauguess 
and Stegemoller 2008; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). Subsequent studies continue to 
examine the wealth creation of corporate acquisitions within the context of family 
firms, with varied outcomes (as discussed in Chapter 3). 
 
 
Malaysia, in this case, offers a suitable and unique setting for studies to be conducted 
to extend the understanding of family firms and family firm behaviour when it comes 
to corporate acquisitions. Malaysian family-controlled firms are both prevalent and 
notable among Malaysian publicly listed companies (World Bank Group 1999; 
Claessens et al. 2000; Carney and Child 2012) that wield considerable economic power 
in the country (Ngui 2002; Fan, Tan, et al. 2011; Claessens et al. 2000; Forbes 2012). 
Concentrated family ownership in addition to involvement in the management of the 
company is a common feature of Malaysian family-controlled firms. Minority 
shareholders under such conditions have little say in the management, ethics, and 
practices of these types of organisations (Reed 2002). Furthermore, Malaysia is in an 
active position with corporate acquisition activities. The country has accounted for the 
highest percentage of total deals and transaction value in the Southeast Asian region 
since the year 1990 among other examined Southeast Asian countries (Metwalli and 
Tang 2009, 2002). Unfortunately, no significant studies have been conducted to find 
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out if corporate acquisition activities are subject to misappropriation and abusive 
behaviour by Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
 
 
Given that the ownership structure of the majority of Malaysian publicly listed firms is 
characterised by concentrated shareholdings of controlling owners, the protection of 
minority shareholders becomes inherently critical. In the year 1997, one of the well-
known cases involving expropriation of minority shareholders in Malaysia was devised 
by the high-profile Ekran Bhd under the controlling owner Ting Pek Khiing (Gabriel 
2010). During the year of economic crisis in 1997, Ekran Bhd had advanced RM 713 
million “refundable disbursement sum” to Ting Pek Khiing through a related party 
transaction. The transaction was later terminated, but the payment was not fully 
settled, resulting in Ting Pek Khiing owing some RM 408 million to Ekran Bhd. Ting had 
gradually cut his stake in Ekran Bhd from over 30% in 2002 to 20% in 2006 and to 1.7% 
in 2009. The recoverability of that debt owed by Ting Pek Khiing continued to remain 
unresolved. He was declared a bankrupt on 28 October 2010 by the Kuala Lumpur High 
Court. Subsequent recurring cases suggest that Malaysian family owners performed 
activities and strategies, which have placed the minority shareholders in a 
disadvantaged position. Moreover, these cases happen even after the establishment of 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG). 3  However, the real act of 
expropriation through corporate acquisitions is scarcely investigated empirically for the 
case of Malaysia.4 
 
 
The aforementioned recurring events in one way or another suggest the negative 
relation between Malaysian family owners and firm value because of expropriation 
activities by the controlling family. However, beyond these anecdotes, there are little 
empirical evidence on the relevance of Malaysian family ownership and minority 
shareholders. This study intends to fill this gap of knowledge for the case of Malaysia. 
                                                          
3
MSWG was established as a government effort in the year 2000 to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders through shareholder activism. 
4
One study has investigated if related party transactions in Malaysia are value destroying to shareholders’ 
wealth (Wahab et al. 2011). 
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Unlike those in other nations, Malaysian family-controlled firms are situated in unique 
government and institutional settings. As a previous territorial member of the British 
Empire before the year 1957, Malaysia differs significantly from other former British 
colonies. Malaysia is now a federal constitutional monarchy and an Islamic nation, 
comprising multi-ethnic and multi-cultural communities with four main ethnic groups: 
Malays, Chinese, Indians, and other indigenous people. 
 
 
Operating in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural community, Malaysian family firms 
embrace the culture of rent seeking as encouraged by the government (Gomez and 
Jomo 1999). Malaysia has been claimed to be the only country known in the world with 
racial discrimination explicitly written in its constitution, which results in the 
emergence of Bumiputera (“Son of Soil”) ideology (The Economist 2003).5 Malaysia has 
taken an unusual step by undertaking an affirmative action program—the New 
Economic Policy (NEP), in the year 1971 with the aim of reducing ethnic economic 
inequality (Snodgrass 1995). Since the implementation of the NEP in the year 1971 
(Kennedy 2002), the privileged status of Bumiputera has been extended to the listing 
requirements of Bursa Malaysia.6 Adhering to the listing requirements, all firms listed 
on the Malaysian stock exchange must have at least 30% of Bumiputera ownership of 
equity. However, in April 2009, the 30% Bumiputera equity requirement was removed 
for 27 service subsectors to stimulate economic growth and to attract more foreign 
direct investments (Chang 2009). 
 
 
The NEP program favours government-linked companies or state agencies by awarding 
and approving businesses to fulfil the political objective of achieving economic parity 
                                                          
5
The Bumiputera interests and special positions are safeguarded by the King of Malaysia (also known as Yang di-
Pertuan Agong) as granted by Article 153 of the Constitution of Malaysia. 
6
Previously known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. 
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between the Bumiputera and other ethnics (Gomez and Jomo 1999). Consequently, 
family firms that are not government linked or state agencies have to build closer ties 
with the government to obtain businesses and award of projects for business survival 
(Gomez and Jomo 1999). Such distortions do not have such a significant effect to deter 
the growth process of the country (Rasiah and Schmidt 2010). However, these rents or 
favours obtained from the government or government-linked corporations may 
encourage expropriation behaviour of family firms. Family firms who receive favours 
from the government or government-linked corporations may use these rents and 
favours in an inefficient manner to serve the private benefits of the controlling family 
such as for empire building purposes (Gomez and Jomo 1999; Johnson and Mitton 
2003). 
 
 
Given that the ownership structure of the majority of Malaysian publicly listed firms is 
characterised by concentrated shareholdings of controlling owners, the protection of 
minority shareholders becomes inherently critical. The Malaysian government has been 
continuously putting in effort to set up an effective investor protection system and 
corporate governance system for the country’s capital market. Different from other 
East Asian countries, the Malaysian market has been the only emerging market of East 
Asia in which the government has institutionalised shareholder activism through the 
establishment of Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) in the year 2001 
(Azizan and Ameer 2012).7 This has resulted in the Malaysian institutional investors 
emerging as influential entities that play a significant role in corporate governance. 
Malaysia has also proven to be a regional leader in corporate governance within the 
Asian region, as reported in Corporate Governance Report on Observance of Standards 
and Codes 2012 (World Bank 2012). In terms of investor protection regime, Malaysia 
continues to receive positive reports on its corporate governance practices; Malaysia 
retained its fourth position in terms of investor protection for the sixth consecutive 
                                                          
7
MSWG represents the five largest institutional funds in Malaysia, which are the Employee Provident Fund, 
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, Lembaga Tabung Hajis, Social Security Organization, and Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad. 
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year (World Bank 2009, 2011, 2012), which still requires further improvement (The Star 
2013b). 
 
 
Overall, Malaysia has strongly defined formal legal rights, creditor rights, minority 
shareholders’ legal protection, and disclosure requirements of listing corporations that 
are far better than those of most advanced countries (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013). 
However, similar to other emerging countries, the degree of enforcement of legal 
rights still falls behind those of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand but better 
than Indonesia (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013). With the weak external corporate 
governance (poor market for corporate control) and lack of legal protection of 
shareholders and creditors, a major agency problem may arise (Lins 2003; Claessens 
and Yurtoglu 2013; Claessens et al. 2002; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
 
 
In view of the Malaysian government’s continuous effort in improving the corporate 
governance system of Malaysia, such effort may hinder the controlling families of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms from engaging in minority shareholder expropriation 
activities. An empirical question naturally arises as to whether the current corporate 
governance framework in Malaysia and the government’s effort (with the formation of 
the MSWG) are effective in hindering Malaysian family firms from activities that 
expropriate the minority shareholders. Hence, the motivation to conduct this study 
arises from this literature gap. This is followed by the construction of the relevant 
research objective and research questions to extend the existing empirical evidence 
and knowledge within the literature of corporate acquisition, family firms, and also 
Malaysia.  
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1.2 Research Objectives 
 
 
The objective of this study is to identify family-related traits that are important 
determinants of the market value changes in Malaysian family-controlled firms during 
corporate acquisitions. 
 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
 
 
Research Question 1:  Do Malaysian family-controlled firms undertake value-enhancing 
or value-decreasing corporate acquisitions? 
 
Research Question 2:  Is family ownership an important corporate governance 
characteristic to determine whether Malaysian family-controlled firms perform value-
enhancing or value-decreasing corporate acquisitions? 
 
Research Question 3:  Are family-related traits important determinants of the market 
value changes in Malaysian family-controlled firms when undertaking corporate 
acquisitions? 
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1.4 Research Significance 
 
 
Family owners were found to affect family firm value differently depending on the legal 
environment, culture, and regulation of the region (Faccio et al. 2001; Maury 2006). 
Hence, to seek deeper understanding about family business issues from the 
standpoints of multiple cultures as well as a wide variety of social and economic 
systems around the world is important (Strike 2012; Astrachan 2010). This can be done 
through focused-country studies for family firms, which offers more advantages than 
cross-country studies (Miller et al. 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Fan, Wei, et al. 
2011). Researchers can control data quality and analyse the impacts of key institutional 
factors on various issues, while holding constant other factors that might be difficult to 
disentangle in cross-country studies (Fan, Wei, et al. 2011). 
 
 
Notwithstanding the evidence of preliminary studies (as discussed in Chapter 3), 
several gaps in the existing body of knowledge are identified in this study. Overall, the 
findings in this study contribute to the scholarship, policy, and practices while 
answering the research questions mentioned earlier. 
 
 
First, the recurring events, as discussed earlier, suggest a negative relation between 
Malaysian family owners and firm value because of expropriation activities by the 
controlling family. However, beyond these anecdotes, there are little empirical 
evidence on the relevance of Malaysian family ownership and minority shareholders. 
Hence, an empirical question arises: Do Malaysian family-controlled firms perform 
minority shareholder expropriation activities through corporate acquisitions? Evidence 
within the context of Malaysian family firms in this field is non-existent to date. This 
study is the pioneer in exploring knowledge about the wealth effect of corporate 
acquisition activities of Malaysian family-controlled firms. Unlike its counterparts in 
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Asia, Malaysian family-controlled firms, on average, have been found to perform value-
enhancing corporate acquisitions. 
 
 
Second, the prevalence of concentrated family shareholdings raises a corporate 
governance question as to whether it is harmful or beneficial to firm performance, 
which remains theoretically and empirically ambiguous. Few studies in the field have 
recent proposed and provided empirical evidence of a nonlinear relation between 
family ownership and firm performance (Isakov and Weisskopf 2014; Villalonga and 
Amit 2006). However, these current studies have used data from the developed 
markets. Given the significant existence of concentrated family ownership in the 
emerging economies, country-level studies are necessary for better understanding of 
this topic (Fan, Wei, et al. 2011). This study is the first to show that a nonlinear relation 
exists between family ownership and firm performance, within the context of 
Malaysian family firms. Evidence raise concerns among policy makers that restrictions 
are needed to limit the total ownership level of the controlling family in Malaysian 
family-controlled firms. Findings reveal that the value-maximising total family 
ownership should be no more than 50%. 
 
 
Third, within corporate acquisition literature, there have been very little attention 
given to empirically documenting the impact of family-related traits on the wealth 
effect of corporate acquisitions  to date (Bouzgarrou and Navatte 2013). Only few 
studies incorporated family-related traits within the study of corporate acquisition. It is 
empirically unknown whether specific family-related traits are the main contributors to 
the wealth effect of corporate acquisitions. There is only a study by Ben-Amar et al. 
(2006) that considers the situation where family-CEO (CEO who is family-related to the 
family owner) is present in the family firms. Their family firm sample comprised firms in 
Canada, a developed Western economy. This study fills the literature gap by being the 
first to incorporate more comprehensive family-related traits, which have not been 
examined within the literature of corporate acquisition studies. These family-related 
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traits include family-CEO, family representatives on the board, founder-CEO, 
descendant-CEO, and family-related chairman and CEO on the board. 
 
 
Fourth, this study is the first that showed unstudied family firm features, which have 
yet to be identified or examined within the literature of family firms. It is common to 
observe the presence of CEO and chairman who are family related on the board of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms. However, such fact has never been documented or 
examined within family firm literature. This study is the first that documents such fact 
regarding this special board structure of family firms in Malaysia. 
 
 
Fifth, this study is the first that provides empirical evidence and new insight that family-
related CEO and chairman are a significant determinant of the announcement-period 
wealth effect of corporate acquisition for family firms, based on the sample of 
Malaysian family firms. More precisely, the presence of family-related CEO and 
chairman exhibits a significant negative relation with the announcement-period stock 
returns of Malaysian family-controlled firms. The evidence has furthered our 
understanding on the significant role of family-related CEO and chairman on family firm 
value. Whether such relation and finding remain applicable to family firms from other 
economies is empirically unknown. Whether such practices are upheld by family firms 
from other economies is also empirically unknown. However, the findings provide an 
important implication within the corporate governance literature and for policy 
makers. Specifically, it has been generally accepted to have the role of chairman 
separated from that of the CEO on the board for better corporate governance practices 
and better independence of the chairman on the board. Nonetheless, when the roles of 
CEO and chairman on the board are separated, and if they are family related, the 
independence of the chairman on the board and its corporate governance function are 
somehow lost. The findings provide new insight that there is a need to further examine 
the current corporate governance practices, where family-related CEO and chairman 
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on the board should be avoided. Such family-specific feature is shown in this study to 
be a value-destroying feature of Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
 
 
Sixth, this study is also the first that empirically shows that descendant-CEO is an 
important determinant of the announcement-period stock returns of family firms, 
within the literature of corporate acquisitions. The findings reveal a significant positive 
relation between descendant-CEO and the stock returns of family firms during the 
period of corporate acquisition announcements based on the sample of Malaysian 
family-controlled firms. This implies that descendants are actually capable of making 
good investment decisions that create value for Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 
act of choosing family members to take over management positions has been generally 
recognized as an altruistic behaviour of family owners or the Fredo effect (Kidwell et al. 
2013), which is known to be detrimental to the company (Chua et al. 2009; Bertrand 
and Schoar 2006). However, the findings in this study provide further clarification on 
current unwavering issues in family firms of whether to pass ownership (and 
managerial role) to descendants, which would be beneficial to the practitioners and 
investors (Deloitte Growth Enterprise Services 2013; Poutziouris et al. 2013; KPMG 
2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012), within the context of Malaysia specifically. 
 
 
Seventh, this study is also the first to document a significant nonlinear relation 
between family representatives on the board (relative to independent directors on the 
board) and announcement-period stock returns of Malaysian family firms, within the 
literature of corporate acquisitions. The presence and domination of family members 
on the board is one of the common features observable in family firms, which currently 
remains understudied (Collin and Ahlberg 2012; Jameson et al. 2014). The findings 
further strengthen our current knowledge available in corporate acquisition literature, 
where a nonlinear relation between family representatives on the board and firm value 
exists. The findings have policy implications for policy makers, where restricting 
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participation of family members (relative to independent directors) on the board of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms is needed. 
 
 
Furthermore, this finding has important policy implications for the existing corporate 
governance practices in Malaysia for family firms. According to the current 
recommended corporate governance practices in Malaysia, it is mandatory to have one 
third of the total number of directors on the board of publicly listed firms as 
independent directors. Evidence in this study provides a feasible benchmark applicable 
specifically to family firms of Malaysia. Evidence reveal that the proportion of family 
members on the board relative to the proportion of independent directors on the 
board is an important factor when considering the required proportion of independent 
directors on the board. Policy makers should consider that there must be a balance 
between the number of independent directors on the board and the number of family 
representatives on the board for Malaysian family-controlled firms. Results suggest 
that a ratio of 1:1 is the ideal ratio of independent directors on the board to family 
representatives on the board. 
 
 
Eighth, this study empirically showed a negative relation between the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and wealth effect of corporate acquisitions for 
Malaysian family-controlled firms. This is the first evidence documented within the 
context of Malaysian family-controlled firms that high proportions of independent 
directors on the board are detrimental to family firms. Existing Malaysian studies 
report a nonsignificant relation between the proportions of independent directors on 
the board and Malaysian firm value as a result of no specific consideration given to the 
influence of family owners. The findings shed further light on our understanding about 
the governance role of independent directors for Malaysian family firms. 
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1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the 
institutional background and characteristics of Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical framework and literature review related to the 
short-term wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements, within the context 
of family firm studies. Chapter 4 discusses the hypotheses development and displays 
the conceptual schema for the developed hypotheses. Chapter 5 presents the 
methodology used to examine the hypotheses. Chapter 6 presents the results and 
analyses. Chapter 7 presents the conclusion, limitations, and suggestions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 2 MALAYSIAN FAMILY-CONTROLLED FIRMS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
Family firms are ubiquitous worldwide (Poza 2009). Many people have the perception 
that family-controlled firms are small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which are 100% 
owned and managed by the owners and their related family members. It is also 
generally perceived that widely-held corporations are a common form of ownership 
structure (La Porta et al. 1999). The landmark study of La Port et al. (1999) has 
fundamentally revised this conventional perception to a new level of knowledge. 
Publicly listed firms in both developed and developing countries are found to be 
prominently controlled and owned by families. Studies further demonstrate that the 
controlling families of these publicly listed family-controlled firms constitute a 
persistent and prevalent class of large, concentrated shareholders (Claessens et al. 
2000; Lins 2003; Carney and Child 2012).  These substantial group of family owners and 
family-controlled firms play dominant role in countries around the world, in terms of  
their significant economic contribution to the countries (Siebels and Dodo 2012).  
 
 
More than half of the East Asian publicly listed companies are family-controlled, with 
controlling families remaining the largest group of dominant owners of Malaysian 
publicly listed companies (Carney and Child 2012; Claessens et al. 2000; World Bank 
Group 1999).8  Significant corporate wealth in East Asia9 has been found to concentrate 
                                                          
8
 The minimum threshold for the percentage of ownership of the controlling owners is at 20%.  At the minimum 
threshold of 10%, the reported statistics for the controlling families become higher.  
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among only a few families.  The contribution of these Asian family businesses to the 
overall economic growth is predicated on their ability to grow successfully (Tong 2009).  
Managers of these closely held firms were also found to be relatives of the controlling 
shareholders’ families (Claessens et al. 2000; Thillainathan 1999; Lins 2003; World Bank 
2005; Carney and Child 2012). Even when family-controlled firms are transferred to 
publicly listed vehicles, the controlling owners and family members remain as the 
major shareholders of the company while dominating the senior managerial roles in 
these publicly listed companies. The prevalence of family-controlled firms worldwide as 
the dominant controlling owners in the capital markets around the world, with 
substantial influence over the economic landscape of most nations is indisputable 
(Carney and Child 2012; Astrachan and Shanker 2003; Alderson 2011; Poza 2009)   
 
 
Understanding how family contributes to family firm value remains as one of the main 
challenges faced by the family business study (Basco 2013).  In this study, the value 
creation of family firm is examined through a specific context by examining the relation 
between family ownership and valuation effect (wealth effect) of corporate acquisition 
activities.  Similar studies have been examined earlier for family-controlled firms of 
developed and western countries (Bae et al. 2002; Ben-Amar and André 2006; Bigelli 
and Mengoli 2004; Buysschaert et al. 2004; Faccio and Stolin 2006; Feito-Ruiz and 
Menéndez-Requejo 2010; Holmen and Knopf 2004). These studies have been 
undertaken for family firms in developed countries, each with its different culture, 
corporate governance, legal protection, social norm and ownership mechanism. No 
consensus has been reached whether corporate acquisition activities of family-
controlled firms are value-enhancing or value-decreasing.  
 
 
Overall, these studies have attributed the influence of family ownership on the wealth 
effect of corporate acquisition activities to two possible rationales – Interest alignment 
                                                                                                                                                                   
9
 The examined East Asian countries include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand. They define concentrate shareholdings based on the shareholdings of the 
controlling shareholders at the minimum 20% threshold.  
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hypothesis or the expropriation hypothesis. The neoclassical Interest alignment 
hypothesis predicts that managers who own larger equity blocks in a company are less 
likely to take actions that reduce the value of their shares (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Family controlled-firm provides such unique platforms to examine the consolidation 
effect of family ownership and managerial role on firm value due to its unique features 
which are non-existent in other profit-making organisations.10 
 
 
On the contrary, finance literature highlights the potential conflicts of interests 
between the controlling owners and firms’ minority shareholders – expropriation 
hypothesis, which results in owners opting for investment strategies that have value-
destroying effects on the wealth of minority shareholders (Villalonga and Amit 2006; 
André et al. 2012; Croci and Petmezas 2010). Previous studies for developed countries 
posit that controlling families of the family firms use their power and influence to make 
skewed corporate acquisition decisions in order to extract personal or private benefits 
from the family-controlled firms (Faccio and Stolin 2006; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Bae 
et al. 2002).  
 
 
Malaysian family-controlled firms offer a unique platform to explore the countervailing 
notions of interest alignment hypothesis and expropriation hypothesis.  Several features 
distinguish Malaysian family-controlled firms from family-controlled firms of other 
countries, in terms of corporate ownership structures, corporate governance structures 
and institutional settings. The discussions of these features are the focus of this chapter 
in Section 2.2. Bearing all these factors in mind, we need to answer an important 
empirical question in the corporate scene of Malaysia: when Malaysian family-
controlled firms embark on corporate acquisition activities, do they expropriate the 
wealth of minority shareholders or do they enhance the wealth of all the shareholders? 
                                                          
10
 Chapter 3 discusses these features in relation to agency problem. Mazzi (2011), Anderson and Reeb (2003), 
Schulze et al. (2001) and Chrisman et al. (2004) also offer detailed discussions on the beneficial and non-
beneficial features of family-controlled firms.  
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The findings could be different from those found in family-controlled firms in 
developed countries, which extend previous conflicting international evidence. 
 
 
2.2 Background of Malaysia 
 
 
As a previous territorial member of the British Empire before the year 1957, Malaysia 
differs significantly from other former British colonies. Malaysia is now a federal 
constitutional monarchy and an Islamic nation, comprising multi-ethnic and multi-
cultural communities with four main ethnic groups – Malays, Chinese, Indians and 
other indigenous peoples. Malays have always constituted the dominant ethnic group 
of the country. Recent census estimated the Malaysian population to be 26.13 million, 
consisting of Malays (55%), Chinese (24%), Indians (7%) and others (14%) (Economic 
Planning Unit - Ministry of Finance & Department of Statistics 2013).  All the ethnic 
groups have their own distinct languages, cultures and religions, with Bahasa Malaysia 
as the national language.  The Malays of the country and the indigenous peoples from 
the states of Sabah and Sarawak are collectively known as Bumiputera (“Son of Soil”). 11  
 
 
Malaysia has been claimed to be the only country known in the world with racial 
discrimination explicitly written in its constitution, which results in the emergence of 
Bumiputera ideology (The Economist 2003). The Bumiputera ideology reflects the 
continuous efforts of the Malaysian government to equalise the prevalent economic 
disparities among different ethnic groups in Malaysia. This social engineering has been 
undertaken through adoptions of different programmes to achieve social cohesion, 
stability and order in the country. The above-mentioned societal restructuring was 
initiated by the Malaysian Government in response to the extended racial violence 
against the Chinese Malaysians as a result of the 13 May 1969 incident. One of such 
                                                          
11
 The Bumiputera interests and special positions are safeguarded by the King of Malaysia (also known as Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong) as granted by Article 153 of the Constitution of Malaysia. 
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restructuring efforts was the implementation of New Economic Policy (NEP) since the 
year 1971; the main intention was to reduce the economic gaps among the different 
ethnic groups in Malaysia (Kennedy 2002).  
 
 
In spite of the Government efforts, statistics revealed that at the end of the 25-year 
NEP period in the year 1995, the proportion of the Chinese corporate equity ownership 
over other ethnic groups remained high, constituting a total of 40.9% (Gomez 1999). 
Through the governmental interventions, preferential treatments have been given to 
the Bumiputera in many aspects, including the corporate sector. Notwithstanding the 
foregoing, the Malaysian Chinese, who make up less than 30% of the national 
population, command a huge presence in the corporate sector.  
 
 
The Malaysian-Chinese influence on the economy is also mirrored by the significant 
number of Chinese-controlled publicly listed companies among the top 100 publicly 
listed companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange12, based on the information 
from KLSE Annual Companies Handbook 1996 (Gomez 1999). As high as 40% of these 
publicly listed companies are in the hands of Malaysian Chinese who hold majority 
ownership.  After more than a decade, the Malaysian Chinese-controlled listed firms 
retained the dominant positions among the top publicly listed Malaysian companies in 
the year 2012. Among the top 100 publicly listed Malaysian companies, ranked 
according to market capitalisation as at 31 October 2012, 30 of them were Chinese-
controlled family firms. These statistics again provide valuable insights that as of today, 
Malaysian Chinese remain a force to be reckoned with in the Malaysian economy as 
well as the capital market. 
 
 
                                                          
12
 It is currently known as Bursa Malaysia since 14 April 2004. 
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2.3 Features of Malaysian Family-Controlled Firms 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
 
This research work defines Malaysian family-controlled firms as a company where 
management as well as the largest equity stake are both held by a controlling family. 
This is in accordance to the highlights in past family firm studies that one of the 
identical features associated with a family firm is the double role of the controlling 
family as the owner(s) and the manager(s) in a company (Claessens et al. 2000; 
Thillainathan 1999; Lins 2003; World Bank 2005; Carney and Child 2012; Cucculelli and 
Marchionne 2012). Furthermore, in line with Miller et al. (2007) and claims of other 
previous family firm studies (Bauguess & Stegemoller, 2008; Mehrotra & Morck, 2013; 
Villalonga & Amit, 2006) true family businesses include more than one family member 
as major owners or managers. Bursa Malaysia listing requirement also specifically 
requires the disclosure of any family relationship of the director and chief executive 
with any director and/or major shareholder of the listed company, pursuant to Main 
Market Bursa Listing Requirements – Chapter 9 Continuing Disclosure, Section 9.19.  
The definition of the term family is also specifically defined by Bursa Listing 
Requirements- Chapter 1, Part A Section 1.01. In short, the term family refers to an 
individual who is in relation to a person as spouse, parent, child (including adopted 
child and step-child) and spouse of the child, brother or sister and spouse of the 
brother or sister. 
 
 
To be precise, this research identifies Malaysian family-controlled firms based on five 
main aspects. To qualify as a Malaysian family-controlled firm, the controlling family of 
the company must: (i) have ownership of the firm; (ii) manage the firm (as proxied by 
the holdings of any position on the board); (iii) have intergenerational successions, if 
any; (iv) be a publicly listed company on the Main Market 13 ,14 of Bursa Malaysia 
                                                          
13
 The Main Market was previously known as Main Board before 3 August 2009.  
14
 The reason for choosing publicly listed companies is due to the ease of obtaining publicly available 
information when conducting studies on Malaysian family controlled firms; another reason is availability of 
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(previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange before 14 April 2004); (v) be the 
largest shareholder of the company. 15   
 
 
More precisely, a publicly listed company with a single controlling owner-manager is 
not considered as a Malaysian family-controlled firm (Villalonga and Amit 2006; 
Bauguess and Stegemoller 2008; Mehrotra and Morck 2013). A controlling single 
owner-run firm such as AirAsia in Malaysia is not a family firm in any meaningful sense 
of the term. A similar case of a USA firm is Microsoft, Facebook, Google or Berkshire 
Hathaway. The controlling individual owner may plan to cash out in the future instead 
of transferring the ownership and control to the immediate descendants; the owner 
may also decide to liquidate the shareholding when there are no heirs apparent. 
 
 
2.3.2 Presence of Malaysian Family-Controlled Firms in Malaysia  
 
 
In addition to the significant presence of Malaysian Chinese in the corporate sector and 
other domains of the national economy, publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled 
firms are both prevalent and notable among Malaysian publicly listed companies. 
Among the top 100 publicly listed Malaysian companies, ranked according to market 
capitalisation as at 31 October 2012, the Malaysian family-controlled firms constituted 
32% (32 companies). 16  Additionally, based on a detailed examination of 758 publicly 
listed companies on the Main Market of Bursa Malaysia, the finding revealed that 
Malaysian family-controlled firms made up 33.59% of the total market capitalisation of 
the 758 publicly listed companies. This figure works out to RM 309,060.25 million for 
family firms over the total of RM 919,881.91 million for the 758 listed companies as at 
                                                                                                                                                                   
documented significant presence and the impact of these companies on the country’s economy, as 
aforementioned. 
15
 This is to ensure the absolute control of the dominant family over the family-controlled firms, in terms of 
ownership and management of the business. Family ownership is treated as the total corporate equity 
ownership held by all related family members. Hence the total family ownership is accumulated among those 
that are held by related family members. 
16
 The 32 Malaysian family-controlled companies are listed in the Appendix A1 Table A1.1. 
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5 December 201217, which is more than a quarter of the total market capitalisation.  
Research conducted by the World Bank Group (1999) also disclosed that the majority 
of publicly listed companies were controlled by a small group of related parties. The 
five largest shareholders of the ten largest companies by market capitalisation were 
found to own 60.4% of the total outstanding shares, with 67.2% of shares in the hands 
of families. Similarly, Claessens et al. (2000) also disclosed that 67.2% of the 238 
samples of Malaysian publicly listed companies were family-controlled firms.  
According to Claessens (1998), in 1996, the top five Malaysian families controlled 17.3% 
of total market capitalisation; the top ten families controlled 24.8% of total market 
capitalisation; and the top 15 families controlled 28.3% of total market capitalisation of 
the Malaysian publicly listed companies. 
 
 
The significant presence of Malaysian family-controlled firms in terms of market 
capitalisation also demonstrates that family firms wield considerable economic power 
in the country. Ngui (2002) documented that Malaysian family-controlled firms 
contributed more than half of Malaysia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This is further 
supported by subsequent report of Credit Suisse 18  that the total market capitalisation 
of Malaysian family firms ended year 2010 accounted for 67% of the country nominal 
GDP (Fan, Tan, et al. 2011). Research of Claessens et al. (2000) revealed that the 
market capitalisations of the top 15 publicly listed Malaysian family firms covered 
76.2% of the country’s GDP.  In comparison, the wealth of the top 15 American families 
in the year 1998 covered only 2.9% of the country’s GDP. These figures further suggest 
that a relatively small number of families effectively control the country’s economy.  
Recent list of Malaysia’s 40 Richest by Forbes (2012) revealed that the controlling 
Malaysian families of the publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled firms supplied 23 
out of the 40 richest Malaysians (57.5% of the 40 richest Malaysians in the year 2012). 
This revelation again shows the immense influence of the controlling families of the 
publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled firms on the country’s economy. 
                                                          
17
 Data sourced from database CapitalIQ. 
18
 The Credit Suisse Group is a global financial services company advising clients in all aspects of finance. 
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2.3.3 Ownership Characteristics  
 
 
Another feature of Malaysian family-controlled firms is the concentrated ownership of 
the controlling families in Malaysian family-controlled firms. Findings of past studies 
show that the equity stakes of the controlling families in Malaysian family-controlled 
firms, on an average, are in excess of 40% (Amran and Ayoib 2010). This figure far 
exceeds the generally perceived minimum threshold of 5% shareholdings held by a 
blockholder. Studies by Amran and Ayoib (2010) documented family ownerships over 
the 2003–2007 period; they recorded an average of 42.79% shareholding for the 
sample firms, with the maximum shareholding hitting a high of 84.13%. Similarly, based 
on a study done by Ibrahim and Samad (2011a) from the years 2002 to 2011.  The 
outcome showed that the shareholdings of controlling families in family firms were on 
average more than 40%; the maximum controlling family ownership was 88.55%.  
Again, these valuable data reveal that ownership by controlling families in Malaysian 
family-controlled firms are highly concentrated, which can reach as high as 80% of 
shareholding in a company. 
 
 
The owner-manager structure is another significant feature observable in Malaysian 
family controlled firms. In the Malaysian setting, the owners, the board of directors and 
the senior managerial positions19 are often assumed by the same individuals or a group 
of related family members. Additionally, the management groups (and their family 
members) of the companies of emerging markets, including Malaysia, have frequently 
been found to be the largest shareholders of family-controlled companies (Lins 2003). 
The active involvement of controlling families in the management of family firms have 
been documented in extant studies (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio 
and Lang 2002; Lins 2003; Thillainathan 1999; Carney and Child 2012; World Bank 
Group 1999). Specifically, Claessens et al. (2000) documented that 94.6% of Malaysian 
family-controlled firms maintained an owner-manager structure based on ownership 
                                                          
19
 Senior managerial role refers to the position of CEO, managing director or chairman. 
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data of the year 1996; Carney et al. (2012) recorded 70.9% based on more recent 
ownership data of the year 2008. 20  
 
 
The controlling family members have both the majority equity stakes in the Malaysian 
family-controlled firms, and they are also involved in the management of the 
companies. Specifically, the involvement of a controlling family in the management of a 
family-controlled firm is observed via the holding of managerial positions on the board 
as CEO, chairman, or executive directors. This overall picture signifies the controlling 
position of a family in owning and managing a family-controlled firm, even though the 
publicly listed family-controlled firm is no longer 100% owned.  In the case of only one 
individual owning and managing the company, this individual must be the descendant 
of the previous controlling owner(s). 
 
 
The sharing of ownership and managerial role by a controlling family in Malaysian 
family-controlled firms is a common observable practice. There are cases when parents 
(or uncles/aunties) normally own the largest equity stakes in Malaysian family-
controlled firms while the children (or nieces/nephews) hold managerial positions in 
the company as proxies through their positions on the board. 21  In many cases, the 
parents also hold senior managerial positions in the company. There are also cases 
when brothers and sisters or husbands and wives together own equity stakes of a 
company22, with at least one or two or more of them taking the managerial roles.   
 
 
                                                          
20
 Even though recent findings revealed a decreasing trend of Malaysian family-controlled firms dominance in 
the corporate sector, family ownership have continued to remain as the dominant form of ownership in 
comparison to others (Carney et al. 2012) 
21
 Examples of such Malaysian family-controlled firms include the YTL group, Chee Wah Corporation Bhd, 
Berjaya Group, etc. 
22
 Examples of such Malaysian family-controlled firms include The Store Corporation, Kwantas Corporation Bhd, 
Supermax Corporation Bhd, etc. 
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Another observable practice among Malaysian family-controlled firms is this: one 
family member holds a senior managerial role while another related family member 
owns the largest equity stakes in the company. 23  For such cases, one of the parents 
(uncle) normally holds the largest equity stake in the company and at least one of the 
children (nephew/niece or son-in-law) assists the family with managing the Malaysian 
family-controlled firms. Furthermore, it is commonly found one or more of the family 
members to be the founder(s) of a publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled firm. 24 
Such information is disclosed in the Profile of Director section of the annual report.  
 
 
2.3.4 Mandatory Disclosures of Equity Ownership in Malaysia  
 
 
When determining family ownership in a family firm, past studies (La Porta et al. 1999; 
Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002; Lins 2003; Faccio and Stolin 2006) 
considered both direct and indirect shareholdings held by all related family members of 
the controlling family.  Accordingly, these studies have applied a minimum threshold of 
total family shareholdings either at 10% or 20%, with the rationale that these levels of 
shareholdings provided significant extent of control over the company.  La Porta et al. 
(1999) mentioned that it is common for most countries to implement mandatory 
disclosure of 10% equity ownership or even lower, allowing the regulatory authorities 
to examine such information. In France, Germany and Spain, owners of firms holding a 
minimum of 5% equity must disclose their identities. The threshold of mandatory 
disclosure of shareholdings in Italy is 2% while that of the United Kingdom is 3% (Faccio 
and Lang 2002). 
 
 
                                                          
23
 Examples of such Malaysian family-controlled firms include the Genting Group, the Lion Group, Cahya Mata 
Sarawak Berhad, etc. 
24
 Examples of such Malaysian family-controlled firms include Press Metal Bhd, Supermax Corporation Bhd, 
Fiamma Holdings Bhd, DKLS Industries Bhd, etc. 
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In Malaysia, the threshold of mandatory disclosure of shareholdings in all publicly listed 
companies is a minimum of 5%, which is the aggregate of direct and indirect interests.  
The identities of the shareholders and the actual total shareholdings in excess of 5% 
are to be disclosed in the company annual reports, in pursuance of Chapter 9 – 
Continuing Disclosure Section 9.25 of Bursa Listing Requirement. These shareholders 
are deemed to be substantial shareholders of the publicly listed firms. The definition of 
substantial shareholder is given in Section 69D of Companies Act 1965: a substantial 
shareholder can be an individual or a corporation (whether listed or unlisted) who 
holds no less than an aggregated 5% of total voting rights in a company. Publicly listed 
Malaysian family-controlled firms also need to comply with this mandatory disclosure.  
 
 
Consequently, this requirement of mandatory disclosure in conjunction with Section 
134(12)(c) of the Companies Act 1965 facilitates studies of publicly listed Malaysian 
family-controlled firms, since data of aggregated family ownership among related 
family members become available from company annual reports. In precise, Section 
134(12)(c) of the Companies Act 1965 requires that the total indirect equity stakes of 
substantial shareholders that are held by other related family members in the family-
controlled firm are mandatory to be disclosed. The details of aggregated family 
ownership can be obtained from the Shareholdings Analysis section of the company 
annual report, which is publicly accessible. 
 
 
2.3.5 Ownership Mechanisms and Structures 
 
 
It is important to understand the mechanisms through which Malaysian families 
broaden and strengthen their control over publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled 
firms. As aforementioned, the controlling families normally hold equity stakes in 
Malaysian family-controlled firms via direct shareholdings, indirect shareholdings or a 
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combination of both.  The cumulated direct and indirect ownerships among related 
family members gives rise to the large combined equity stakes held by the controlling 
family. Past studies have treated these cumulated large equity stakes among related 
family members as the total family ownership (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 
2000; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Claessens et al. 2002)25.  
 
 
In addition to direct shareholdings, the controlling families indirectly own family-
controlled firms through private firm(s), publicly listed firm(s) or direct equity stakes 
held by other related family members.  The mandatory disclosures of a substantial 
shareholder’s indirect shareholdings in a company through private or publicly listed 
firms is only applicable when the substantial shareholder is deemed to be interested in 
the private firms or the publicly listed firms mentioned. In more precise words, the 
substantial shareholder is deemed to have indirect interest in the company through 
either private or publicly listed firms when that substantial shareholder’s total equity 
stakes in these private or publicly listed firms are not less than 15%. This is in 
accordance with Section 6A(4) of the Companies Act 1965 in Malaysia.   
 
 
In East Asian countries, control of publicly listed family firms is harnessed through 
various ownership mechanisms, including pyramiding, cross-holdings or different 
classes of shares with superior voting rights (Claessens et al. 2000; La Porta et al. 1999; 
Claessens et al. 2002; Carney and Child 2012). These ownership mechanisms have also 
been referred to as control enhancing mechanisms, which lead to discrepancy of the 
controlling owners’ cash flow rights26  and control rights27 (voting rights) in a publicly 
listed company. To be precise, the cash flow rights of controlling families are diluted 
due to the presence of multiple intermediate firms along the chain of ownerships. As a 
result of these complex ownership structures, it is near impossible to identify the 
                                                          
25
 This study also follows previous studies by considering the cumulated ownership among related family 
members as the total family ownership. 
26
 Cash flow rights reflect the level of financial stakes of the controlling families in a family-controlled firm. 
27
 Control rights are taken to be the proportion of outstanding shares through which voting power can be 
exercised directly or indirectly by the controlling families (Carney and Child 2012). 
  
 47 
 
  
ultimate owners of the Malaysian family-controlled firms via immediate ownerships. 
Instead, it is only possible to identify the ultimate controlling families by tracing the 
chain of ownerships through which they own and control the publicly listed Malaysian 
family-controlled firms. 
 
 
The systems of various classes of shares with superior voting rights are implemented in 
many countries around the world, but Malaysia practices only the one-share-one-vote 
system (Thillainathan 1999). Under such voting system, the ownership of one share 
entitles the owner of the share to one vote. The one-share-one-vote system is 
applicable to all Malaysian publicly listed companies, including publicly listed Malaysian 
family-controlled firms. Consequently the separation of cash flow rights and voting 
rights are normally noticeable in Malaysian family-controlled firms as a result of 
complex ownership structures by way of pyramiding or cross-holdings. 
 
 
Cross-holdings refer to an ownership pattern where a company somewhere along the 
chain of control has some shares in another company in its chain of control 
(Thillainathan 1999; Claessens et al. 2000). Cross-holdings are a phenomenon involving 
horizontal and vertical ownership among related corporations; these linkages enable a 
controlling shareholder to further tighten the grip on the controlled company. Unlike 
business groups in Korea where it is common to have ownership and control in a 
controlled firm through cross-holdings (Bae et al. 2002), cases of cross-holdings of 
publicly listed companies in Malaysia are rare. In general, there is very little evidence of 
cross-holdings among Malaysian publicly listed firms (Carney and Child 2012; Claessens 
et al. 2000).  
 
 
It is a common practice that a controlling family owns publicly listed Malaysian family-
controlled firms via indirect equity stakes through multiple private and publicly listed 
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firms, which result in discrepancy between cash flow rights and control rights in the 
companies. Such ownership structure is known as pyramiding. More precisely, 
pyramiding refers to an ownership pattern which involves a controlling owner holding a 
majority equity stake in one corporation, which in turn holds a majority equity stake in 
another company; this process of chain ownership can be repeated a number of times 
(Thillainathan 1999; Claessens et al. 2000).  
 
 
Based on the diagram in Figure 2.1 , a controlling owner is said to indirectly own Firm A 
(the family-controlled firm) through pyramiding, by having certain indirect percentage 
of shares in Firm A; the owner directly controls Firm C, which in turn controls Firm B (or 
a sequence of firms leading to Firm B), which in turn controls Firm A. In addition, there 
is at least one publicly listed company among this sequence of firms which leads to 
Firm B or Firm A (La Porta et al. 1999). The pyramiding ownership structure is 
illustrated in Figure 2.1, as shown below28. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 1: Pyramiding Ownership Structure (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000) 
  
                                                          
28
 The study by Claessens et al. (2000) revealed that 39.3% of their Malaysian sample firms are owned and 
controlled by the controlling owners via pyramiding.  
Controlling Family 
Firm C 
Firm B 
Firm A 
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In a simple illustration taken from previous studies (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 
2000; Carney and Child 2012), the derivation of precise quantum of the controlling families’ 
indirect shareholdings in Firm A is possible. Previous studies revealed that the separation of 
controlling owners’ control rights and cash flow rights in the companies have been found to 
negatively affect a firm’s value (Claessens et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2002; Lins 2003). 
These authors have considered this measure as a proxy for possible expropriation of 
minority shareholders by the controlling owner of the companies. However, there are 
studies that also stated that the relation of the separation of voting rights and cash flow 
rights with a firm’s value does not necessarily constitute a linear association for the publicly 
listed companies of Malaysia and other East Asian countries (Lins 2003; Driffield et al. 
2007).  
 
 
Specific to the case of Malaysia, ownership by a controlling family in publicly listed 
Malaysian family-controlled firms is commonly achieved through multiple private firms. 
This results in the difficulties to derive the precise quantum of a controlling family’s control 
rights in Malaysian family-controlled firms. These concerns have been continuously 
highlighted in previous studies (Lemmon and Lins 2003; Claessens et al. 2000; Carney and 
Child 2012). These studies have contended that it is impossible to recognise the identities 
of the ultimate shareholders in publicly listed companies; this is particularly true when the 
largest shareholders of the companies are revealed as private companies or in the form of 
a nominee accounts. The derivation of voting rights may not be appropriate for Malaysian 
publicly listed firms which are owned indirectly by controlling owners via a chain of 
privately held firms (Song et al. 2007; Lee et al. 2012).  
 
 
On this issue, Claessens et al. (2000) have treated the private firm with the largest total 
equity stakes in a listed company as the controlling shareholder. The methodology of 
Claessens et al. (2000) does not affect the way a publicly listed Malaysia company is 
determined as a family-controlled firm. However, it does cause imprecise measure of cash 
flow rights and voting rights of a controlling owner in the company, especially when the 
ownership structure of the controlling family involves multiple private firms. Such 
difficulties are further demonstrated in Figure 2.2, as shown below. 
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Figure 2. 2: Ownership Structure via Multiple Private Firms  
 
 
For the case of Malaysia family-controlled firms as illustrated in Figure 2.2, the 
controlling family owns Firm A via multiple private firms, which they are deemed to 
have interest in29. In keeping with the principles of Claessens et al. (2000), the 
determination of voting rights based on the weakest link becomes infeasible. Concerns 
regarding measurement of control rights through the weakest links are also raised in 
subsequent studies for corporations of Western countries (Edwards and Weichenrieder 
2009). This is due to the fact that the indirect shareholding of the controlling family in 
Firm A is frequently reported in the form of aggregated shareholdings in the annual 
report. The controlling family’s separated percentage of ownerships of Firm D, Firm C 
and Firm E in Firm B are not reported in the company annual report. These concerns 
are more clearly illustrated by analysing an actual Malaysian family-controlled company 
as exhibited and illustrated in Appendix A2 Figure A2.1. 
 
 
                                                          
29
 The controlling family is deemed to have interest in the private firms with no less than 15% of ownership in 
the private firms, pursuant to Section 6A(4) of the Companies Act 1965. 
Controlling Family 
Private Firm C 
Private Firm B 
Firm A 
Private Firm D Private Firm E 
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For the purpose of illustrating the infeasibility of deriving precise measure of cash flow 
rights in deviation from voting rights of the Loh family in Oriental Holdings Berhad 
(OHB), the ownership structure is shown in Appendix A2 Figure A2.1. Appendix A2 
Figure A2.1 shows that OHB is owned by the Loh family via multiple private firms. The 
ownership data were obtained from the fiscal year end 2010 annual report, using all 
the reported ownership figures. The Loh family has interests in all the private firms30 in 
the second and third tiers of the hierarchical structure, as disclosed in the annual 
report. These private firms hold a total of 54.58%31 interests in OHB.  
 
 
As shown in Appendix A2 Figure A2.1, the shareholdings of the Loh family in the 
private firms are not disclosed, as it is not disclosed in the annual report. First, this has 
induced one of the issues of infeasibility of deriving precise cash flow rights and voting 
rights of the Loh family in OHB. Second, separated ownership in each of these private 
firms by the Loh family is also not reported; the ownerships are in aggregated form, 
which again demonstrates the infeasibility of deriving the precise measures of the Loh 
family’s cash flow rights and voting rights in OHB through multiple private firms. 
 
 
Such scenario does not only apply to OHB, but remains as a common aspect among 
publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled firms that are owned by the controlling 
families via multiple private firms. Overall, the illustration demonstrates the 
impossibility of deriving precise cash flow rights and voting rights of the controlling 
family in a publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled firm when the ownership 
structure of the family-controlled firm involves multiple private firms. The main issue is 
this: in frequent cases, the precise figures of ownership stakes that exist at certain 
junctures along the chain of ownerships in the companies are not reported in the 
company annual report.  
                                                          
30
 As aforementioned, the disclosure of the Loh family indirect interest in OHB through the private firms is only 
mandatory when the Loh family equity stakes in these private firms are not less than 15%, in accordance with 
Section 6A(4) of the Companies Act 1965. 
31
 = 1.56% + 9.92% + 43%, based on the reported figures in the annual report and as displayed in Appendix A2 
Figure A2.1  
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In the case of Malaysia, only widely held firms are found to have measurable 
separation between cash flow rights and voting rights; however, this system is not 
frequent among family-controlled firms (Claessens et al. 2000). This study hence adopts 
the approach of Bae et al. (2002) and Cheung et al. (2009) by seeking another direct 
measure of possible expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
Malaysian family business owners – the wealth effect of corporate acquisition activities 
of Malaysian family-controlled firms.  As mentioned by Faccio and Stolin (2006) as well 
as Shleifer et al. (1997), the evidence of possible expropriations of minority 
shareholders have been clearly exhibited via corporate acquisition activities. Through 
the corporate acquisition announcements of Malaysian family-controlled firms, 
relevant data are available, which can be analysed to answer this question: do 
controlling Malaysian families undertake corporate acquisitions which are detrimental 
to the wealth of minority shareholders? 
 
 
2.3.6 Board Features  
 
 
Apart from looking at the corporate governance effect of family ownership, the board 
structure of family firms – one of the important internal corporate governance 
mechanism of family firms, has also been widely studied and discussed (Bammens et al. 
2011).  The monitoring role of boards has been the focus of extensive corporate 
governance research (Adams et al. 2010; Johnson et al. 1996; Dalton et al. 2007).  With 
fiduciary obligations to the vast shareholders and the essential role to determine the 
strategic direction of the company and monitoring, the role of board of directors in the 
governance of the corporation is imperative (Gillan 2006; Licht 2013). Different from 
non-family firms, existing family firms studies empirically demonstrate that in 
comparison to the corporate governance function of the board, takeover market, 
institutional investors and even incentive compensations provide less governance 
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function in family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2003; Kole 1997; Shivdasani 1993). 
Consequently, this further highlighted the importance of strengthening the corporate 
governance function of the board in family-controlled firms.  
 
 
Corporate governance literature has continuously indicated that the composition and 
structure of the board of director is an important element in affecting the strategic 
direction and performance of the company, which ultimately affect the wealth of the 
shareholders (Arena and Braga-Alves 2013; Black et al. 2012; Li and Srinivasan 2011; 
Rosenstein and Wyatt 1997). Studies have demonstrated that preferences and 
practices of family firms, in terms of board composition and board structure, are 
significantly different from those of non-family firms (García-Ramos and García-Olalla 
2011). These are especially the case when the presence of founders and heirs are 
considered. Family-controlled firms in developed countries have been found to be 
more likely to deviate from the best standard practices of corporate governance (Arcot 
and Bruno 2012; Anderson and Reeb 2004; Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera 2012; Schulze 
et al. 2001). Similar to family firms of other nations, the board structures of Malaysian 
family firms are also quite different from those of other Malaysian non-family firms, a 
few of which have been duly documented.   
 
 
In Malaysia, the study carried out by Amran and Ahmad (2009) is one of the few which 
documented the differences between the board structure of publicly listed Malaysian 
family-controlled firms and the board structure of non-family-controlled firms. They 
investigated this governance mechanism of Malaysian publicly listed companies in 
terms of board independence, leadership structure and board size. Their findings 
revealed that Malaysian family-controlled firms favour the good practise of dual 
leadership structure where CEO and chairman of the board are vested in two separate 
individuals. Additionally, the board independence of Malaysian family-controlled firms 
is also found to be in lower degree.  
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Ibrahim and Samad (2011a) supported the findings of Amran and Ahmad (2009) that 
independent directors and duality are treated differently by Malaysian family-
controlled firms. Their overall evidence revealed that Malaysian family-controlled firms 
do not need independent directors to monitor the board in order to reduce agency 
conflict with shareholders.  These findings further show that Malaysian family-
controlled firms are similar to family-controlled firms examined by Anderson and Reeb 
(2004) as well as Chen and Nowland (2010) in US and East Asia respectively; the 
controlling families often seek to minimise the presence of independent directors and 
are reluctant in the adoption of monitoring practices.  
 
 
However, such preferences do not affect the interests of the shareholders. Chen and 
Nownlad (2010) have provided evidence that moderate levels of board monitoring for 
East Asian family-controlled firms32 are sufficient to satisfy the minority shareholders. 
In actual fact, their studies revealed that at a higher level of monitoring, the marginal 
benefit of reducing the agency problem between controlling family and minority 
shareholders has been found to be outweighed by the cost of wealth destruction for all 
shareholders of the family-controlled firms.  
 
 
Such low preferences of Malaysian family-controlled firms for outsider monitoring is 
also supported by study of Ibrahim and Samad (2011b), which is reflected through  the 
lower usage of debt (in comparison with Malaysian non-family firms). A report by 
Credit Suisse also supports the lower preference of Malaysian family firms over debt 
usage with the net financial gearing of the family firms remain below the broader 
market  (Fan, Tan, et al. 2011). As mentioned by Jensen (1986) and Grossman and Hart 
(1982),  high debt may be used as a disciplinary device on managers, which results in 
                                                          
32
 Malaysian family-controlled firms are examined as well. 
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positive effect on the value of the firm. 33   The findings of Ibrahim and Samad (2011b) 
are similar to debt preference of family-controlled firms in other countries, as reported 
by González et al. (2012). The findings of González et al. (2012) revealed that 
Columbian family-controlled firms that are managed by the family tend to have lower 
debt levels. They have suggested that such finding demonstrates the risk-averse nature 
of family directors.  
 
 
Apart from the low preferences for outsider monitoring by Malaysian family-controlled 
firms, study by Amran and Ahmad (2009) found no significant difference between 
family and non-family-controlled companies in terms of board size.  These are also 
supported by later studies (Ibrahim and Samad 2011b, 2011a). Results of studies 
carried out by Ibrahim and Samad (2011b) showed that the board sizes for family and 
non-family Malaysian publicly listed firms are on an average of 8 persons.  
 
 
 In terms of family members on board, studies have documented the dominance of 
related family members of the controlling family on corporate boards of Malaysian 
family-controlled firms, with an average of 40% of the total number of board members 
(Ameer and Abdul Rahman 2009). In comparison with those found in US studies, 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) documented only an average of 20% family directors on 
board, which is considerably lower than those documented for Malaysian family firms.  
 
 
Overall, previous studies have revealed that the corporate governance practices, in 
relation to the board structure of family-controlled firms, are different from other 
types of organisations, including Malaysian family-controlled firms. Few rationales have 
been proposed to justify such corporate governance preferences and practices of 
family firms (Arcot and Bruno 2012). First, family owners are in a better position to play 
                                                          
33
 The findings of San Martin-Reyna et al. (2012), on the other hand, revealed that debt level negatively affects 
the performance of family-controlled firms. 
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the monitoring and advisory roles of the board as compared with the application of 
standard corporate governance practices. They stated that lower governance standards 
in family firms are not necessarily associated with lower firm performance. This 
argument again supports the contention of Chen and Nowland (2010). The 
empowerment of the board of directors with monitoring roles is not very relevant in 
family firms, since the controlling family will naturally protect their firms from any 
malpractices.  
 
 
The second reason may be due to entrenchment from the family shareholders, for 
having the incentives to expropriate minority shareholders or entrench themselves in 
managerial positions (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Unlike non-family-firms, family-
controlled firms endogenously opt for optimal governance structure which does not 
conform to standard governance practices that are recommended by the respective 
law and regulations (Arcot and Bruno 2012). As a result, the entrenched family 
shareholders may opt for corporate governance practices that facilitate extraction of 
private benefits. In terms of possible expropriation of minority shareholders 
(expropriation hypothesis), studies have documented its existence among Malaysian 
family-controlled firms (Liew et al. 2011). In a study by Liew et al. (2011), related party 
transactions have been found to be one of the tools employed by Malaysian family-
controlled firms for expropriation of minority shareholders. They have documented 
that such activities reduce the value of Malaysian family-controlled firms.  
 
 
The nature of the ownership structure of Malaysian family-controlled firms, in which 
ownership is gained through pyramidal and cross-holdings structure with concentrated 
shareholdings, further renders governance on family firms difficult (Azizan and Ameer 
2012). The boards of Malaysian family-controlled firms are also dominated by members 
of the controlling families who are also the major shareholders of the companies 
(Ameer and Abdul Rahman 2009).  Studies by Azizan and Ameer (2012) have also 
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revealed entrenchment of the controlling families in Malaysian family-controlled firms 
when the equity stakes of the controlling families in the companies are more than 40%. 
 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance System in Malaysia  
 
 
Family firms are a common feature of business in Malaysia (Claessens et al. 2000; 
Carney and Child 2012). The activities of expropriating the minority shareholders by 
owners with large ownership stake can be extensive, especially in emerging countries 
with low investor protection and weak corporate governance (La Porta et al. 2000; 
Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004). The common occurrence of concentrated 
ownership in a company can be attributable to weak investor protection (La Porta et al. 
1998). This shows that controlling owners with concentrated ownership can potentially 
extract private benefits from the company. It has been a continuous effort from 
policymakers and regulators worldwide to be concerned with the designing of a 
corporate governance framework that can protect minority investors from the 
misbehaviours and self-interested controlling shareholders of the company (McCahery 
and Vermeulen 2013).  
 
 
Among other emerging countries, it has been a continuous effort from the Malaysian 
government to maintain strong corporate governance systems with good investor 
protection system.  The effort from Malaysian government has made the corporate 
governance setting of Malaysian in which Malaysian family firms operate differ from 
other Asian nations.  Malaysia has proven to be a regional leader in corporate 
governance within Asia region, as reported in Corporate Governance Report on 
Observance of Standards and Codes 2012 (World Bank 2012). In terms of investor 
protection regime, Malaysia continues to receive positive reports on its corporate 
governance practices; Malaysia retained its fourth position for investor protection for 
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the sixth consecutive year (World Bank 2009, 2011, 2012).  However as highlighted by 
Mallin (2011) and OECD (The Star 2013a), poor enforcement remains an issue in 
Malaysia due to poor allocation of resources, lack of regulatory autonomy and 
transparency, enforcement powers, corruption within civil services and shortage of 
political will to affect a wholesome reform.   
 
 
Different from other East Asian countries, the Malaysian market has been the only 
emerging market of East Asia in which the government has institutionalised the 
shareholder activism, through the establishment of Minority Shareholders’ Watchdog 
Group (MSWG) (Azizan and Ameer 2012). Such effort may hinder the controlling 
families of Malaysian family-controlled firms in opting for minority shareholder 
expropriation activities. The MSWG assists with the creation of awareness among the 
minority shareholders to seek information, voice opinions and seek redress in the case 
of discovering any questionable minority shareholder expropriation misconducts. 
Studies have revealed the insignificant effect of MSWG, especially when the 
shareholdings of the controlling family in Malaysian family-controlled firms are highly 
concentrated (Azizan and Ameer 2012). However, studies revealed that the 
management of the Malaysian family-controlled firms are entrenched34 and reluctant 
to change their value-decreasing operations even when concerns are raised by MSWG.  
 
 
Overall, Malaysia is categorized as having strongly defined formal legal rights, creditor 
rights, and minority shareholders legal protection and disclosure requirements of listing 
corporations that exceed those of most advance countries (Claessens and Yurtoglu 
2013), which still in need of further improvement (The Star 2013b). 
 
                                                          
34
 for controlling families with shareholdings of more than 33%. 
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2.5 Summary 
 
 
Families represent a unique group of long-term owners (James 1999; Morikawa 2013), 
holding substantial equity stakes and vital managerial positions in family-controlled 
firms. In contrast to other organisations, family-controlled firms view business from a 
longer-term perspective due to the intention of passing interests and benefits to future 
generations (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006). Such attitude towards business is also 
reflected in their investment behaviour. Family-controlled firms are found to invest 
more prudently and efficiently than non-family-controlled firms (1999), exhibiting 
higher levels of personal sacrifice, social sensitivity, employee continuity, business 
continuity and objectives (Donnelly 1964)35. Despite their significant presence and 
unique characteristics, the influence of families on firm value has only recently 
attracted burgeoning attention in the academic literature, with no consensus reached 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Driffield et al. 2007; Barontini and Caprio 2006; Miller and 
Le Breton-Miller 2006; Chang and Shin 2007; Sacristán-Navarro et al. 2011).  
 
 
The review of literature on Malaysian family-controlled firms in this chapter shows that 
the presence of Malaysian family-controlled firms is significant in the Malaysian capital 
market. Statistics revealed the continuous significant economic contribution of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms to the national economy. Some valuable studies 
discovered that the equity stakes of Malaysian families in Malaysian family-controlled 
firms are highly concentrated. Furthermore, even when Malaysian family-controlled 
firms are publicly listed, the controlling families maintain their majority ownership 
stakes and pivotal managerial positions in the family-controlled firms.  
 
 
                                                          
35
 Anderson and Reeb (2003), Mazzi (2011) and Chisman et al. (2004) provide detailed description on features 
of family-controlled firms. 
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Another important issue concerning family firms is discussed in this chapter: the 
difficulty of deriving precise measurement of control rights and cash flow rights of the 
controlling families. Because of this problem, it is infeasible to conduct studies by using 
the separation of control rights and cash flow rights as a proxy measure for the 
possibility of minority shareholder expropriation. Past studies have found negative 
correlation of the separation of control rights and cash flow rights with firm value. 
Hence another approach is sought, which allows direct measurement of possible 
minority shareholder expropriation by the controlling families. Following previous 
studies (Bae et al. 2002; Cheung et al. 2009), the wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
activities undertaken by Malaysian family-controlled firms are evaluated in order to 
assess the possibility of minority shareholder expropriation.   
 
 
The board structure of family firms play vital role as an internal corporate governance 
mechanisms. Existing family firms studies empirically demonstrate that in comparison 
to the corporate governance function of the board, takeover market, institutional 
investors and even incentive compensations provide less governance function in family 
firms (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2003; Kole 1997; Shivdasani 1993). Malaysian family-
controlled firms, like family-controlled firms in other countries, have a board structure 
which is quite different from other non-family firms.  
 
 
In the context of Malaysian family-controlled firms, the controlling Malaysian families 
were found to prefer lower levels of governance and monitoring; this regulatory 
aversion reflects the tendency of the controlling families to indulge in minority 
shareholder expropriation activities for private benefits. The boards, on average, 
comprise higher percentage of family members with lower percentage of independent 
directors; such imbalanced board compositions exacerbate the entrenchment of the 
controlling families in committing minority shareholder expropriation activities. Debt 
structure can be important disciplining factors in limiting free cash flow and thereby 
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reduction in private benefits extraction. However, Malaysian family-controlled firms 
were found to prefer lower debt levels, thereby avoiding monitoring from outsiders.  
 
 
In general, the structure of Malaysian family-controlled firms, with concentrated 
shareholdings and lower preference for governance in terms of board structure, may 
frequently undertake activities that do not add value to the wealth of minority 
shareholders.  A few examples of minority shareholder expropriation activities 
conducted by Malaysian family-controlled firms have been discussed in Chapter 1; 
these cases further support the possibility of such exploitative notions. However, better 
investor protection may prevent minority shareholders from expropriation and 
consequently reduce private benefit extractions by the controlling families (Holmen 
and Knopf 2004).  
 
 
In terms of investor protection regime, Malaysia has continued to receive positive 
reports on its corporate governance practices; Malaysia retained its fourth position for 
investor protection for the sixth consecutive year (World Bank 2009, 2011). The 
formation of MSWG is one of the governmental efforts to protect the interests of 
minority shareholders.  Malaysia also has proven to be a regional leader in corporate 
governance within Asia region, as reported in Corporate Governance Report on 
Observance of Standards and Codes 2012 (World Bank 2012).  In summary, is current 
corporate governance framework and government effort are sufficient to hinder 
minority expropriation by Malaysian family-controlled firms? As mentioned, the 
activities of expropriating the minority shareholders by owners with large ownership 
stake can be extensive, especially in emerging countries with low investor protection 
and weak corporate governance (La Porta et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck and 
Zingales 2004). Unfortunately, there is no empirical evidence which shed further light 
or provides implications to Malaysia policymakers if further commitment of resources 
and effort is needed to improve the investor protection system in Malaysia. 
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CHAPTER 3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter reviews past studies relevant to three streams of literature. The first 
stream pertains to the wealth effect (or valuation effect) of corporate acquisition 
announcements for the acquiring firms (the acquirers). The second stream discusses 
existing studies on the relation between ownership and firm value. The third stream 
comprises discussion on the agency problem.  All these reviews focus specifically on 
family firm studies.  
 
 
The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 begins with discussions on the 
underlying theoretical framework and notions that predict the effects of family 
ownership on the value creation of corporate acquisition announcements, which are 
the neoclassical principal-agent agency problem (interest alignment hypothesis) and 
principal-principal agency problem (expropriation hypothesis).  Focus is given to 
relating these agency theories to family-controlled firms, the operations of which are 
under the influence of features specific to family-controlled firms. Section 3.3 discusses 
prior literature covering the role of family firms as company acquirers and the wealth 
effect of these corporate acquisition announcements.  
 
 
Section 3.4 focuses on discussing existing prominent studies that have provided 
empirical evidence on the determinants of the wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
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announcements (the announcement-period stock returns of the acquiring firms when 
releasing corporate acquisition announcements). Relevant findings from the strand of 
literature in family firm studies, if any, are also discussed as family firms carry 
distinctively different features and characteristics vis-à-vis those of nonfamily firms.  
Overall, the reviews in Section 3.4 provide further insight and predictions on the 
possible relationship between the determinants discussed and the returns of the 
announcements specifically for family-controlled firms. Section 3.5 concludes the 
chapter based on these discussions.  
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3.2 Agency Theory Framework:  Family Ownership 
 
 
Empirical researches on corporate governance are based on the theoretical framework 
of agency theory (Fama 1980; Fama and Jensen 1983a; Jensen and Meckling 1976).36 
Better corporate governance induces favorable outcomes to company stakeholders, 
better firm performance, better access to financing and lower cost of capital for firms 
in emerging markets (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013).  The importance of corporate 
governance especially in emerging markets of Asia is undeniable whilst continuously 
receives attention from policy makers, market practitioners, institutions and pertinent 
decision makers (La Porta et al. 2000; OECD 2011, 2012a). Dependent on types of 
ownership structures, the nature of corporate governance varies (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu 2012). 
 
 
In Asia, one of the dominant types of ownership structures are family ownership 
(Carney and Child 2012; Claessens et al. 2000). Unlike others, firms under family 
ownership exhibit unique characteristics in terms of ownership structure, corporate 
governance settings, family goals, family culture and trans-generational feature as well 
as the influence on the way business strategic decisions are made (Anderson and Reeb 
2003b; Chua et al. 2009; Sharma et al. 2012; Lin 2012; Chrisman et al. 2012; Aguilera 
and Crespi-Cladera 2012; Sirmon and Hitt 2003). The worldwide prevalence of family-
controlled firms as dominant players in the global capital markets is undeniable; these 
family firms exert substantial influence over the economic landscapes of most nations 
(Astrachan and Shanker 2003; Alderson 2011; Poza 2009).   
 
 
                                                          
36
 As discussed in the forthcoming Section 3.2.1. 
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In family firm studies, agency theory has been the dominant theoretical principle 
examined (Pieper 2010; Nordqvist et al. 2014). The resultant main concern is whether 
family ownership creates or destroys value (Villalonga and Amit 2006). One side of the 
proposition posit that family ownership induce value enhancement for firm value due 
to the notion of the neoclassical interest alignment hypothesis. The notion of an 
interest alignment hypothesis typically assumes that greater owner-manager 
shareholdings leads to better corporate governance and consequentially better firm 
value (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Hence typically in a family-controlled firm, interest 
alignment hypothesis is intrinsically mitigated, which in turns create shareholder 
wealth under the presence of large family blockholders. This is due to the inherent 
natural alignment of owner(s) and manager(s) interests in a family firm which 
consequentially decrease the need for formal supervision of agent (the manager) and  
elaborate corporate governance mechanisms (Poza 2009; Ang et al. 2000).  Existing 
findings on family firms repeatedly reveal family firms to be more profitable and 
(Nordqvist et al. 2014)have a higher valuation than non-family firms (Isakov and 
Weisskopf 2014; Anderson and Reeb 2003b). These findings provide further support to 
the notion of interest alignment hypothesis that family ownership might be a way to 
reduce agency costs between the managers and the shareholders, which then 
contribute to value creation of family firms.  
 
 
Conversely, existing empirical findings also provide evidence that at high level of 
owner-manager shareholdings managers become entrenched, resulting in a decrease 
of firm value (Morck et al. 1988; Hermalin and Weisbach 1991), which fosters the 
misallocation of company resources and attempt to block takeovers (Jensen and 
Ruback 1983). Taken a further step, within the agency framework in family firm studies, 
family-controlled firm intrinsically leads to this second type of agency conflicts known 
as the Expropriation Hypothesis (principal-principal conflict of interests) or Agency 
Problem II (Villalonga and Amit 2006; André et al. 2012; Croci and Petmezas 2010) that 
differ in nature from those in non-family firms (Chrisman et al. 2004). In essence, as 
family ownership increases, conflicts may arise between family owner(s) and minority 
shareholders due to family entrenchment. Henceforth, section 3.2.1 and section 3.2.2 
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provide further discussions on both Interest Alignment Hypothesis and Expropriation 
Hypothesis in family-controlled firms.  
 
 
3.2.1 Interest Alignment Hypothesis  
 
 
Smith and Rogers (1869) presented a practical discussion of an inherent problem 
among joint stock companies – the impact of owners appointing others as stewards of 
their wealth. He suggested that managers of other people’s wealth cannot be expected 
to watch over it with the same anxious vigilance one would expect from the owners. 
Hence, negligence and profusion would often prevail in the management of such 
companies. This is a phenomenon that is also known as the neoclassical agency-
principal problem or Agency Problem I (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  Preceding the 
study by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Alchian and Demsetz (1972) had also analysed 
the similar problem of managerial shirking. 
 
 
The key insight offered by Jensen and Meckling (1976) was to model the relation 
between the managers and the owners (shareholders) akin to those between principals 
and agents.  The owners appoint the managers to perform the management tasks of a 
company, giving managers control over company resources. As both parties’ main 
purpose is to maximise their own utility and self-interest, conflict of interest naturally 
arises between both parties. The contracted managers are conjectured to have the 
incentive and the ability to consume perquisites at the expense of the company 
resources in consequence of the control over company resources granted by the 
owners.   
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As a result of the conflict of interest between the principals (owners) and the agents 
(managers), agency costs are incurred (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  These agency 
costs consist of (i) monitoring costs by the principal (owners); (ii) bonding costs by the 
agent (managers); and (iii) the residual loss. Monitoring costs are incurred by the 
principals (owners) throughout the process and activities that limit the agents 
(managers) from taking any harmful actions. The bonding costs are spent by the agents 
(managers) to ensure the principals (owners) do not take certain actions against the 
agents. Despite the optimal monitoring and bonding costs incurred by the principals 
and agents, losses still arise as a result of the agents’ (managers) decisions that diverge 
from the principals’ (owners) interests. These losses are referred to as the residual loss.  
 
 
Analysis on the occurrence of agency costs in a company begins with the assumption 
that company equity is owned 100% by the manager. When the manager owns 100% of 
the equity, optimal pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits are reached as the owner-
manager bears all the costs of the actions. Non-pecuniary benefits can include having 
larger office space, using branded office furniture, shirking from work or overstaffing of 
personal assistants.  Agency costs then naturally arise for the case when the owner-
manager owns less than 100% of equity in the company. Accordingly, agency costs 
occur in consequence of their own-utility-maximisation behaviour by the self-
interested owner-managers, while bearing only a fraction of the costs at the expense of 
the company resources.  
 
 
In simpler terms, owners (shareholders) of a company have claims over the company’s 
net wealth. However, very often, not all owners run the company, but hire managers to 
manage the company on behalf of the owners.   When the interests of hired managers 
are not aligned with those of the owners, it is possible that no productive work has 
been done by the managers despite enjoying private benefits and perquisite 
consumption, which may be detrimental to the value of the company.  
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Family-controlled firms in this case offer advantageous family-specific-features that 
naturally align the interests of principal-agent. Unlike widely-held corporations and 
non-family firms, family-controlled firms offer a distinctive type of insider ownership 
that naturally aligns the interests of managers and shareholders. Inherently, the 
positions of top management of family-controlled firms are often held by the 
controlling owners themselves or related family members (Claessens et al. 2000; Lins 
2003; Carney and Child 2012); these managerial posts can be passed on through 
generations (Chrisman et al. 2012; Schulze et al. 2003), along with intrinsically high 
concentration of family ownership (Faccio and Lang 2002; Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013; 
Claessens and Fan 2002). These traits in family-controlled firms allow strong control by 
the controlling families, with the intention of retaining ownership and control 
throughout generations.  
 
 
Additionally, family owners carry further incentives, attributes and human attributes 
different from other types of dominant owners, which directly benefit family-controlled 
firms and their stakeholders. First, for the purpose of passing down wealth throughout 
generations, family-controlled firms tend to view business and investment from a long-
term perspective (Bertrand and Schoar 2006). Consequently, family-controlled firms 
execute better investment decisions and thus avoid managerial myopia in the decision-
making process (Stein 1989). Second, unlike other types of controlling owners or large 
shareholders, family owners often possess thorough understanding of the business and 
its underlying processes, which reduces the information asymmetries between the 
owners and managers of the firm (Miller and Miller 2005).  Third, since a controlling 
family typically holds a concentrated stake in a single firm, the financial well-being of 
the family often depends on the performance and financial strength of the firm. As 
such, a controlling family is more motivated than other types of owners in monitoring 
the operation of business (Anderson and Reeb 2004). Fourth, family reputation is also 
strongly linked to the success of a family firm (Déniz and Suárez 2005; Dyer 1994). The 
strong relation between family reputation and a family firm’s success tends to increase 
the level of family owner’s commitment as an effective monitor.  
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Family-controlled firms also are found to invest more efficiently than non-family firms 
(James 1999), which further enhance value of the family business. Additionally, family-
controlled firms favour strong relationship with their stakeholders, patient capital and 
parsimony in scarce environment, which instigate continuous prosperity of family 
business (Tokarczyk et al. 2007). The inherent family commitment and close 
relationship to family businesses also generate sustainable competitive advantage and 
encourage managers to behave in the best interest of the organisations (Eddleston and 
Kellermanns 2007). As the well-being and reputation of the controlling families are 
directly tied to the welfare of the family-controlled firms, family owners have further 
incentives in mitigating Agency Problem I and improving firm performance to create 
long-lasting economic consequences (Anderson and Reeb 2003b).  
 
 
Lastly, when it comes to monitoring, the controlling family naturally assumes the 
supervisory role in a family firm similar to the function of large shareholders in 
overseeing the performance of publicly listed firms. Compared to shareholders with 
diminutive shareholdings, large shareholders have stronger incentives in monitoring 
managers due to their large stake of investments in the firms and relevant claims over 
larger portions of company net resources, thereby reducing agency problems and 
improving firm values (Demsetz and Lehn 1985; Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Chang 2004).  
The substantial shareholdings of family owners also enable the controlling family 
owners to garner enough voting power. Consequently, family owners are able to 
address the agency-principal agency problems since they have sufficient control over 
the assets of the company to have their vested interests protected (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997).  
 
 
The aforementioned discussions overall reveal that families as large blockholders have 
substantial economic incentives in maximising firm values; they possess strong 
influence and substantial power for enforcement in order to achieve their purposes.  
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Such notion of family positive impact on firm value is supported by existing empirical 
findings. Existing empirical findings showed the benefits of family owners leading to 
better firm performances when compared to non-family firms (Andres 2008; Villalonga 
and Amit 2006). The interests of owner-manager are inherently aligned in family firms, 
which induce better firm performance (Ang et al. 2000; Anderson and Reeb 2003b; 
Ben-Amar and André 2006; Chrisman et al. 2004). The greater the family ownership, 
the more aligned the interests of managers are with those of the owners as described 
by the principal-agent agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
 
 
3.2.2 Expropriation Hypothesis  
 
 
Empirical literature has also documented the detrimental effects of high levels of 
insider ownerships.  In 1988, Morck et al. (1988) recorded that for large US firms in 
1980, the interests of managers and shareholders were satisfactorily aligned when 
managers held 5% or less of the company shares. The resulting effect is improved firm 
performance.   However, when managerial shareholding is between 5% and 25%, the 
insider ownership becomes detrimental to firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s 
Q.  Such situation is also traditionally known as the managerial entrenchment (Morck et 
al. 1988) which fosters the misallocation of company resources and attempt to block 
takeovers by the managers (Jensen and Ruback 1983). Within the context of family 
ownership, the inherent natural alignment of family owner-manager in a family firm 
may yield family entrenchment. 
 
 
Consistent with the findings of Morck et al.(1988), subsequent studies have 
documented the nonlinear relation between family ownership and family firm 
performance, for family firms of the S&P500 in US (Anderson and Reeb 2003b; 
McConnell and Servaes 1990), Poland (Kowalewski et al. 2010), Canada (Ben-Amar and 
  
71 
 
  
André 2006) and Europe (Maury 2006). As the level of family ownership increases, the 
adoption of non-economic objective of the controlling family becomes more likely 
(Chrisman et al. 2012).   
 
 
Specifically, family ownership leads to conflicts of interest with other non-family 
shareholders (the minority shareholders), which can result in deviation from the 
objective of profit maximisation. This is a consequence of the inherent nature of 
concentrated shareholdings in a family-controlled firm, leading to possible destructions 
of the minority shareholders’ wealth (Aguilera and Crespi-Cladera 2012; Morck and 
Yeung 2003; La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013; Claessens et al. 2000). 
Family owners normally have sufficient control and power to ensure that the family-
controlled firms pursue activities and corporate strategies that favour family’s interest, 
which do not necessarily favour the interests of the minority shareholders (Allen and 
Sharon 1982). The controlling families can continue to pursue maximization of firm 
performance, while creating conflicts over wealth distribution among the shareholders 
(Ditmar et al. 2003). 37  Such entrenchment from the controlling family owners is also 
known as the expropriation hypothesis, Agency Problem II, principal-principal agency 
problem or principal-minority principal agency problem (Villalonga and Amit 2006; 
André et al. 2012; Croci and Petmezas 2010). Existing literature reveals few 
interpretations on such conflicting behaviour of family owners in relation to 
concentrated family ownership, which are family-firm-specific peculiarity. 
 
 
First, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) explain that increased insider ownership has 
the consequence of two opposing effects on managerial incentives. In addition to the 
benefit of having a claim over company net resources, the managers are given more 
voting power.  When the voting power becomes greater, the managers become harder 
to be displaced and hence become more entrenched.  As discussed earlier, the 
controlling families who own a large block of shares in family-controlled firms also 
                                                          
37
 Ditmar et al. (2003) found that insider with large shareholdings retain excessive cash within the firm, which 
allows the possibility of resources exploitation by the insiders to their private benefit. 
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commonly dominate the top management positions. Consequentially, the 
concentrated family ownership allows self-interested family owners-managers to go 
unchallenged, either by the board internally or takeover bids from the market 
externally. The inherent position of the controlling family as the controlling owner and 
manager allows the family to gain an effective reign in the family-controlled firm; the 
family has the power to determine how the company is run. The controlling families 
who own a large proportion of shareholdings may exercise their majority voting right to 
block a hostile takeover even if the takeover has positive effects on firm value (Stulz 
1988). It is extremely difficult to mitigate the negative effects of agency conflicts 
between family owners and minority shareholders due to concentrated family 
ownership; the predicament cannot be resolved even through the traditional functions 
of the board of directors (Fan and Wong 2005).  
 
 
Second, the possibility of entrenchment from the controlling family is even greater 
when the family’s voting rights38 exceed the cash flow39 claims over the company 
(Carney and Child 2012; Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002) which result in 
comparably higher value deterioration in family-controlled firms (Bennedsen and 
Nielsen 2010).  Specifically, the deviation of family’s voting rights from cash flow rights 
are normally achieved via few control-enhancing mechanisms, which include 
pyramiding, cross-holding and shares with superior voting rights. Consequentially, the 
separation allows controlling family owners to bear only a small fraction of the costs 
resulting from their value-deteriorating actions; at the same time, high voting right 
empowers controlling family owners to opt for manoeuvres which may expropriate the 
wealth of minority shareholders (Bebchuk et al. 1999).  
 
 
Third, trans-generational control of ownership and management, one of the key 
features of family-controlled firms, may be detrimental to the long-term prosperity of 
                                                          
38
 Voting rights are taken to be the proportion of outstanding shares through which voting power can be 
exercised directly or indirectly by the controlling families. 
39
 Cash flow rights reflect the level of financial stakes of the controlling families in a family-controlled firm. 
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family-controlled firms (Chrisman et al. 2012; Schulze et al. 2003). Particularly, such 
altruistic behaviour of family owners or the Fredo effect (Kidwell et al. 2013) may be 
detrimental to the company when incompetent family members are chosen to take 
over the management position (Chua et al. 2009; Anderson and Reeb 2004; Bertrand 
and Schoar 2006). Findings assert that when corporate control transfers from highly 
able entrepreneurs to the next generation, these heirs are likely to be less competent 
than the successors (Morck and Yeung 2003). Similar arguments have been offered. 
When the strategic goal of the controlling families is to continue maintain the company 
under family control instead of transferring control to professional outsider managers, 
successions in the management of family-controlled firms are less effective (Burkart et 
al. 2003; Chua et al. 2009; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Smith and Amoako-Adu 1999).  
 
 
Fourth, the controlling families with large and undiversified ownership are risk averse 
(Anderson et al. 2012). The controlling families prefer to pursue risk reduction 
strategies that are in the interest of the controlling families, but not necessarily in the 
interest of other shareholders. Anderson et al. (2012) showed that controlling families 
restrict research and development spending and shorter-horizon investments.  This is 
due to the undiversified nature of controlling families’ ownership.  
  
 
Fifth, apart from the possible value-destroying behaviour from controlling families due 
to large family ownership and family altruistic manners, family ownership also leads to 
conflict of interest with other minority shareholders due to the existence of private 
benefits of control (also known as control-oriented benefits) (Aguilera and Crespi-
Cladera 2012).  Minority shareholder expropriation by controlling shareholders for 
private benefits can be extensive, especially in emerging countries with low investor 
protections and weak corporate governance (La Porta et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; 
Dyck and Zingales 2004). This has been one of the corporate governance issues which 
continues to attract extensive attention particularly for emerging market (Claessens 
and Yurtoglu 2013). Furthermore, the comprehensive understanding of the business 
  
74 
 
  
has stationed the controlling family in a stronger position to pursue their private goals 
due to the accumulation of knowledge passed down from the founders of the family-
controlled firms (Block 2012).  
 
 
Numerous studies have examined the extent to which controlling owners extract 
private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders around the world (La Porta et 
al. 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004; Barclay and Holderness 1989). Findings have 
essentially concluded that concentrated ownership is associated with higher private 
benefits of control, particularly in less developed capital markets (Dyck and Zingales 
2004).   The private benefits of control for controlling family owners can be in two 
forms, pecuniary or non-pecuniary. Specifically, the non-pecuniary form of private 
benefits of control can be in a form of an intuitive value that some shareholders treat 
simply to being in control (Harris and Raviv 1988); or amenities associated with social 
reputation or egos that are fostered with the ability to waste money or influential 
political power of a family (Ehrhardt and Nowak 2003).  The non-pecuniary form of 
private benefits can also be attained via perquisites, in terms of gratification through 
excessive management compensation or association with luxury goods that can be 
enjoyed by the top management at the expense of company resources (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).   
 
 
For private benefits of control in pecuniary form, Dyck and Zingales (2004) and Johnson 
et al. (2000) offered few paradigms, which the controlling family owners can potentially 
extract using company’s resources at the expense of minority shareholders.  In the case 
of weak law enforcement, corporate resources can be expropriated by the controlling 
owners through outright theft, misappropriation of investment resources, asset 
stripping and transfer pricing.  The controlling owners who acquire valuable 
information due to their privileged role in the company may abuse the information for 
their own benefits. Such opportunities can be exploited through another company they 
own or are associated with via related-party transactions that enhance family owners’ 
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wealth; however, the value of these transactions is nil or are detrimental to minority 
shareholder wealth. Numerous cases from the industries have already demonstrated 
involvement of family-controlled firms in such minority shareholder expropriation 
behaviour (Bae et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 2000). 40 
 
 
Sixth, family-controlled firms are prompt to greater transactions occurrence with other 
companies that are also owned by the same controlling family (Faccio et al. 2001), 
which permit the wealth of minority shareholders expropriation.  The controlling 
mechanisms employed by the controlling family owners (through pyramiding or cross-
holdings), resulting in affiliated companies which form business groups prompt the 
controlling families to carry out value-destroying inter-firm transactions. The 
controlling owners have greater incentive to perform inter-firm transfer of resources 
within the same business groups that may be detrimental to the wealth of minority 
shareholders as a consequence of the pyramidal structure of ownership (Djankov et al. 
2008; Riyanto and Toolsema 2008).  One of such inter-firm transactions identified 
among the family business groups is tunnelling (Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009; 
Bae et al. 2002; Friedman et al. 2003; Kali and Sarkar 2011) which refers to related-
party transactions involving transfer of resources from the lower-level firm to the 
higher-level firm of the pyramidal chain in the same business group. 41 Such activities 
can take the form of outright theft or fraud or dilutive share issues that discriminate 
against minority shareholders. The pyramidal structure of the business groups 
consequentially induces opportunities enabling the controlling family to siphon 
resources out from firms at the lower end of the pyramidal chain to those at the higher 
end of the pyramidal chain (in which the controlling family holds a higher claim on cash 
flow).   
                                                          
40
 Cases of related-party transactions of Malaysian family-controlled firms have been discussed in Chapter 1. 
41
 Another form of frequently examined related-party transactions are propping, which were found to be value-
enhancing (Cheung et al. 2006; Cheung et al. 2009; Bae et al. 2008). In contrast to tunnelling, the controlling 
families sacrifice their wealth to prop up poorly performing firms, which benefits minority shareholders of these 
firms.  This is to preserve the controlling families’ options to expropriate profits of these firms in the future. 
Direct acknowledgement of such activities may be difficult; hence, Bae et al. (2008) employed indirect measure 
of proxy for such activities.  
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3.3 Family Firms and Short-Term Wealth Effect of Corporate 
Acquisitions  
 
 
Family-controlled firms exhibit different features than non-family firms (Siebels and 
Dodo 2012).  These features also extend to investment behaviour and preferences of 
family firms. Studies have revealed that the investment strategies and behaviours of 
family-controlled firms differ from those non-family firms (Chen and Hsu 2009; 
Anderson et al. 2012; Block 2012). Some studies have reported specifically on the 
corporate acquisition behaviour of family-controlled firms, which are different from 
those of non-family-controlled firms (Miller et al. 2010). 42 These studies found that 
family-controlled firms perform fewer acquisitions in comparison with non-family firms 
without negatively affecting the growth of the companies (Franks et al. 2012; Caprio et 
al. 2011; Bauguess and Stegemoller 2008), are more risk-averse (Faccio et al. 2011; 
Anderson et al. 2012) and follow conservative policies (Zhou et al. 2011).  
 
 
Recent studies have found that family is an important determinant of value creation in 
corporate acquisition activities. The value creation of corporate acquisition activities 
through the stock returns of the acquiring companies during corporate acquisition 
announcements periods were consecutively examined, but no consistent inferences 
were reported. 43 This field of research hitherto remains limited.  
 
 
Numerous studies have been conducted to examine the wealth effect (the change in 
market value of the acquiring firms during the announcement period) of corporate 
acquisition announcements  for both acquirers and targets (Campa and Hernando 
                                                          
42
 Family owners are found to desire lower business risk; hence, inverse relation of family ownership with the 
number of acquisitions and dollar volume of acquisitions have been reported.  
43
 Overall reviews based on past corporate acquisition studies for the case of family-controlled firms are 
provided in the forthcoming section 3.3.2. 
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2004; Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007; Alexandridis et al. 
2010). The overall empirical evidence suggested that target firms (the acquired firms) 
on average experienced significant positive wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
activities, whereas the acquiring firms (acquirers) experienced insignificant wealth 
effect.  Consequently, this result in the premise that corporate acquisition activities do 
not create wealth for the acquiring firms (acquirers). However, past studies find family 
firms experience significant corporate acquisition announcement-period wealth effect, 
when the influence of family owner is considered. 
 
 
Reviews in this section and the forthcoming section 3.3.1 overall reveal the non-
consensus inferences on the relations of family ownership with the wealth effect of 
corporate acquisition activities specifically for the case of family-controlled firms from 
different capital markets.  The non-consensus inferences could be due to the examined 
samples (the family-controlled firms) that are from different capital markets of 
different countries under the influence of a different set of legal systems, investor 
protection systems, corporate governance systems, economic development and social 
norms. The non-consensus inferences further emphasize the importance of studies to 
be conducted specifically for each individual capital market. As highlighted by Fan et al. 
(2011) and Jameson et al. (2012), focused-country studies are more advantageous than 
cross-country studies. Researchers can control data quality and analyse the impacts of 
key institutional factor on various issues in depth, while holding constant other factors 
that might be difficult to disentangle in cross-country studies. Similar reasoning that 
encourage focused-country studies is also emphasized by Miller et al. (2007) and 
Cucculelli and Micucci (2008). They lay emphasis on the fact that the applicability of 
past empirical findings in family firm studies may not apply to all countries, due to 
dissimilar institutional and economic settings.  The applicability of past inferences on 
the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements also may not be applicable 
to emerging markets (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012; Netter et al. 2011), which generally 
oversample large publicly traded companies (for both acquirers and the targets) from 
the developed economies with stronger investor protection system and legal system in 
comparison to those of the developing countries. 
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Within the context of family firms, there can be two possible outcomes from the 
wealth effect of corporate acquisitions. On one hand, the interest alignment hypothesis 
predicts that the inherent alignment of interest of the family owners who are also the 
managers with other shareholders induces better value-enhancing corporate 
acquisitions (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012).  
 
 
On the other hand, the concentrated family ownership may induce entrenchment from 
the controlling family. The controlling family may opt for value-decreasing corporate 
acquisitions that are detrimental to the minority shareholders, which in turn earn the 
controlling family private benefits (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). 44 Such behaviour is 
relevant to the notion of the expropriation hypothesis. Minority shareholder 
expropriations by controlling shareholders for private benefits can be extensive,  
especially in emerging countries with weak corporate governance and a lack of legal 
institutions (La Porta et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004). 
Corporate ownership structure (La Porta et al. 1999) and legal origins (La Porta et al. 
2000) also play vital role in determining the extent of minority shareholder 
expropriations by the controlling owners. The concern of minority shareholder 
expropriation continues to be one of the corporate governance issues that attracts 
extensive attention (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013).  
 
 
Two streams of literatures have attempted to examine the effect of minority 
shareholder expropriation activities on firm value under the influence of concentrated 
family ownership. The first stream examines the indirect measure of minority 
                                                          
44
 Existing studies have offered few rationales for such value-destroying behaviour of family owners. In the case 
when the owners-managers are entrenched, the owners-managers would intend to make themselves as 
valuable to shareholder and costly to replace by venturing into investments that are only valuable under the 
incumbent managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1989), for empire building (Lang et al. 1991; Morck et al. 1988) or for 
wealth transfer among family-controlled firms within the same business group (Bae et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 
2000). 
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shareholder expropriation activities through different proxies for the extent of possible 
minority expropriation, which are found to affect firm value. Some studies employ legal 
system, particularly investor protection system as a proxy for likelihood of 
expropriation (La Porta et al. 1999; La Porta et al. 2000). Others employ the deviation 
of cash flow rights from control rights of the controlling shareholder in the controlled 
companies (Claessens et al. 2000; Lemmon and Lins 2003; Faccio and Lang 2002; 
Claessens and Unit 1999).  
 
 
One stream of studies seeks direct measures through examination on specific activities 
that may suggest minority shareholder expropriations by controlling shareholders, 
which negatively affect the value of the company they control. Specific means of 
minority shareholder expropriation include corporate acquisition activities (Bhaumik 
and Selarka 2012; Bae et al. 2002; Basu et al. 2009; Holmen and Knopf 2004; André et 
al. 2012; Ben-Amar and André 2006; Holmen and Nivorozhkin 2007). In the case when 
the controlling family owners are self-interested, they can make suboptimal investment 
decisions. One of these suboptimal investment decisions is corporate acquisitions.  
Through corporate acquisitions, family owners are able to perform over-expansion of 
the company, which increase the socio-political influence of the controlling family at 
the expense of the minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000).  
 
 
The overall results have been contradicting; some found corporate acquisition activities 
carried out by family-controlled firms as benefiting to the shareholder wealth of family 
firms. On the other hand, family firms perform value-destroying corporate acquisitions 
as a mean to attain private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
 
 
In the case of Korea, Bae et al. (2002) specifically examined investors’ reaction to 
merger events between affiliated firms belonging to the same Korean business group 
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(chaebol), with the intention to find out whether such mergers were used for 
expropriation of minority shareholders.  Chaebols are family dominated conglomerates 
of businesses with an irregular father-to-son succession scheme, which is typical of the 
chaebol in Korea.  Cross-shareholdings rather than pyramidal structures are a more 
significant ownership structure of a chaebol, which further increase the possibility of 
minority shareholder expropriation. As stated by the authors, corporate governance 
system in Korea is not well established. Furthermore, ownership of a chaebol firm is 
heavily concentrated in the hands of an owner-manager, who has almost complete 
control over all other member firms of a chaebol.   
 
 
With 107 mergers examined between 1981 and 1997 for companies listed on Korea 
Stock Exchange, Bae et al. (2002) found that the chaebol bidders recorded significant 
negative announcement returns, even for those with good past performance prior to 
the mergers. Results also revealed negative relation between the concentrated 
shareholdings of owner-manager with the announcement returns for the chaebol 
acquirers. Their overall findings suggested the existence of minority shareholder 
expropriations by controlling families of the chaebols through intergroup merger 
activities. 
 
 
Holmen and Knopf (2004) identified 121 Sweden mergers that occurred during the 
1992–1995 period for companies listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange. Unlike other 
countries, Sweden civil law legal system is at the world average, ranking below 
common law countries; it has strong extra-legal protection (organised labour, the 
press, social norms, etc.) but weak corporate governance system. Sweden practices 
dual-class shares system, with a one-share-one-vote A share and a 1/10-vote per B 
share. A typical Sweden company has high degree of separation of ownership from 
control through pyramids, dual-class share and cross-holdings, which increase the 
potential for minority shareholder expropriations. Holmen and Knopf focused on the 
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wealth effect of related-party mergers, where the owners of the acquiring companies 
and target firms are the same.  
 
 
The findings of Holmen and Knopf (2004) supported the beneficial effect family 
ownership; the stock returns (as measured by cumulative abnormal returns around the 
event announcement period) of acquiring firms were positively and significantly related 
to family owners. 45  Further evidence revealed that Swedish merger activities are not 
performed for the purpose of minority shareholders expropriation as those found for 
Korean family-controlled business groups (Bae et al. 2002). 46 Holmen and Knopf (2004) 
specifically examined only publicly listed acquirers and public listed targets. Hence, the 
results may be a manifestation of specific samples employed (Netter et al. 2011) and 
hence the inferences may not be applicable in general.  
 
 
Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) investigated the effect of family ownership on stock 
performance (as measured by cumulative abnormal returns) of the acquiring 
companies during corporate acquisition announcements period for Canadian publicly 
listed firms. Canadian stock market practices dual-class voting shares and pyramid 
structures that result in the separation of cash flow rights and control rights in 
Canadian family-controlled firms.  Unlike the US, Canada retains a weaker governance 
setting. Nevertheless, Canada does offer a strong legal protection regime for minority 
shareholders (André et al. 2012). Overall, their findings showed greater positive 
abnormal returns (announcement period stock performance) experienced by Canadian 
family-controlled companies which carried out corporate acquisition activities. 47  
                                                          
45
 As measured by a dummy that equals to one if the dominant family owner is the largest shareholder of the 
family-controlled bidding firm, zero otherwise. 
46
 Similar studies carried out by Faccio and Stolin (2006) for European family-controlled firms also found no 
evidence that corporate acquisitions activities are used for minority shareholders expropriation.   
47
 Furthermore, their evidence also suggested nil effect of the separation of voting rights and cash flow rights in 
explaining the stock returns of the acquiring companies during announcement period; this is also supported by 
the findings of Bouzgarrou and Navatte (2013) for French family-controlled firms. The findings do not support  
studies of Claessens et al. (2002) and Lins (2003), which demonstrated a significant negative correlation 
between the deviation of cash flow and voting rights and firm value for companies in Asian countries.   
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In general, findings of Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) support the notion that Canadian 
family-controlled firms are involved in value-enhancing activities through corporate 
acquisition activities. This is consistent with the interest alignment notion of interest 
alignment hypothesis whereby the resultant effect of large family blockholdings 
induces better strategic decisions specifically on corporate acquisitions. This evidence is 
also consistent with the findings of Holmen and Knopf (2004) for Swedish family-
controlled firms but is not in agreement with those of Bae et al. (2000).  
 
 
The studies of Basu et al. (2009) yielded contradictory findings, which demonstrated 
entrenchment of family owners with low levels of ownership in the acquiring firms 
(acquirers) and better alignment of interests with other minority shareholders at high 
levels of ownership. Different from previous studies, they examined the influence of 
family managerial ownership on value creation in mergers of new publicly listed US 
firms during the period 1993–2000. A less stringent ownership threshold is also 
employed in defining a family firm: founders or their descendants holding at least 5% of 
a firm’s equity or are actively involved in the management of the firm.   
 
 
Additionally unlike other studies, Basu et al. (2009) examined the wealth effect of 
corporate acquisitions of family-controlled acquirers, specifically on cash-financed 
acquisitions. They posited that since cash-financed acquisitions do not alter family 
ownership in the family-controlled firms, the stock performance of the acquiring 
companies can be easily and clearly observed. In essence, the stock performance is not 
affected by any value adjustments resulting from equity dilution via stock-financed 
acquisitions. Results demonstrated a nonlinear relation between the market reaction 
(as measured by cumulative abnormal returns) and family ownership for cash-financed 
acquisitions. The findings of the nonlinear relation between family ownership and stock 
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performance during the acquisition announcement period is consistent with findings of 
Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) as well as Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010).  
 
 
These findings of Basu et al. (2009) demonstrate that for acquirers with low levels of 
family ownership, entrenchment effect prevails over the incentive alignment effect. In 
contrast, for acquirers with high levels of family ownership, the incentive alignment 
effect prevails over the entrenchment effect. This study suggests the importance of 
family ownership in explaining the stock performance of the acquiring firms (the 
acquirers) during corporate acquisition announcement period. It also demonstrates 
that the finding is consistent with the prediction of the neoclassical interest alignment 
hypothesis when the acquirers are with high level of family ownership. Family with high 
ownership stake in the company is prompted to perform value-enhancing corporate 
acquisitions.  
 
 
Studies by Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo (2010) dealt with the effect of different 
legal environments on  the stock returns of acquiring companies during corporate 
acquisition announcement period. The research covered publicly listed firms from 23 
European countries. Their results exhibited positive and significant stock returns 
experienced by family-controlled firms during the corporate acquisition announcement 
period. The evidence support the notion that on average, European family-controlled 
firms are involved in value-enhancing corporate acquisition activities. They also showed 
that stronger legal and institutional environments in the country where corporate 
acquisitions take place have positive influence on the wealth effect of corporate 
acquisition activities. In essence, the existence of controlling families as major 
shareholders of the companies was found to be a significant positive factor in 
explaining the stock performance of the acquiring companies during the corporate 
acquisition announcement period.  
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Similar to studies by Ben-Amar and Andre (2006), Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo 
(2010) examined the possibility of nonlinear influence of family ownership on an 
acquiring firm’s returns. Results showed significant negative effect of family ownership 
on stock returns of an acquiring firm when the ownership percentage level reached 
32.11%. This suggests the possibility that large family owners of European companies 
are not acting in the interests of other shareholders when family ownerships exceed 
the concentrated level of 32.11% or more for the case of European family-controlled 
firms. It also supports the earlier findings of Morck et al. (1988) for US listed firms, 
which affirmed the nonlinear relation between insider ownership and firm 
performance.  
 
 
In a recent study, Bhaumik & Selarka (2012) specifically examined the wealth effect of 
corporate acquisition deals performed by Indian family-controlled firms and business 
groups. The aim of this study is to enhance understanding of the behavioural 
differences between family-controlled firms in emerging and developed economies, as 
emphasised by Fan et al. (Fan, Wei, et al. 2011); it has been suggested that such 
regional comparative study is one of the key directions for future research. Indian 
family-controlled firms provide a platform for the study of two countervailing agency 
problems. In this emerging market economy with a weak system of governance, 
ownership concentration by controlling families and business group affiliations are 
ubiquitous.  They propose that strategic decisions such as merger and acquisitions that 
transfer resources away from disbursement back to all shareholders may lead to 
unobservable benefits to controlling owners. The minority shareholders in this case 
may not have an equal share on the resultant benefits from this strategic decision. 
 
 
Bhaumik & Selarka (2012) examined 228 corporate acquisition activities of Indian 
family-controlled firms during the period 1995–2004. Results revealed that family-
controlled firms (the acquirers) experienced positive and significant wealth effect 
during the event announcement period of corporate acquisition activities (as measured 
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by cumulative abnormal returns). This result indicates that family ownership 
concentration in the hands of family managers improves the wealth effect of corporate 
acquisition activities on Indian family-controlled firms (the acquirers).  However, the 
author has also highlighted that cautious interpretation on the results is necessarily. 
They have stated that the benefit of concentrated ownership in reducing manager-
owner conflict may be replaced by principal-principal conflict.  Concentrated ownership 
may not necessarily improve the outcomes of the acquisitions.  
 
 
Recent studies by Bouzgarrou and Navatte (2013) for French family-controlled firms 
considered 239 acquisitions undertaken by French listed companies during the period 
1997–2006.  The French capital market offers a favourable context to study the wealth 
effect of family-controlled firms’ corporate acquisition activities. The French capital 
market is dominated by companies with concentrated stock ownership, where French-
controlling families are the major group of owners. In comparison with the strong 
investor protection in the US, the French regulatory system offers weak investor 
protection to the stock market players; meanwhile, greater protection is given to 
financial institutions such as banks.  Overall, the results of Bouzgarrou and Navatte 
(2013) showed that French family-controlled firms outperformed nonfamily-controlled 
firms. French family-controlled firms realised significantly higher abnormal returns than 
nonfamily-controlled firms around the periods of corporate acquisition 
announcements.  
 
 
The corporate acquisition literature suggests that most merger and acquisition 
activities do not significantly produce wealth effect for the acquiring firms (Campa and 
Hernando 2004; Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007; 
Alexandridis et al. 2010). However, reviews on these existing studies for the case of 
family firms demonstrate that when the specific roles of family ownership are 
considered, acquiring firms do experience significant wealth effect of corporate 
acquisition activities, either positively or negatively.  
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As mentioned by Faccio and Stolin (2006) as well as Shleifer et al. (1997), the evidence 
of agency problem have been exhibited from corporate acquisition activities. Hence in 
the case when family ownership and managerial position satisfactorily aligns along 
principal-agent interests, the family owner-manager would opt for value-maximizing 
corporate acquisitions that increase the overall shareholders wealth. Consequentially, 
the wealth effect (stock performance during corporate acquisition announcement 
period) of corporate acquisition activities of family-controlled firms becomes 
significantly positive.  
 
 
Conversely, concentrated family ownership may also result in value-destroying 
behaviour of family owners, which would be reflected in the negative stock 
performance of family-controlled firms (the acquirers) during the announcement 
period of corporate acquisition activities. In this case, the stock depreciation is the 
reflection of investors’ disapproval of the value-decreasing corporate acquisitions 
carried out by family-controlled firms. The investors interpret the corporate exercise as 
a means to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders by the controlling families 
(Bhaumik and Selarka 2012).  
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3.3.1 What Is Learned From Past Existing Findings? 
 
 
Past studies have revealed few important aspects in relevance to the literature of 
family firm and the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. First, family 
is an important determinant to the wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
announcements across both emerging economies and developed economies. Studies 
consecutively documented empirical evidence of the significant wealth effect of 
corporate acquisitions that are experienced by family firms – the acquirers. These 
findings have challenged the traditionally perceived notion that corporate acquisitions 
do not create wealth to shareholders of the acquirers.  
 
 
Second, family across different economies confer different significant wealth effect of 
corporate acquisition announcements, either positively or negatively. Studies that find 
positive wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements support the notion of 
interest alignment hypothesis that family firms conduct value-enhancing corporate 
acquisitions.  The interests of family owners-managers are well aligned, which result in 
better family firm value.  
 
 
Conversely, studies that find negative wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
announcements support the notion of expropriation hypothesis that family owners-
managers with concentrated shareholdings are entrenched. The entrenched controlling 
families conduct value-destroying corporate acquisitions at the expense of the minority 
shareholders, whilst the family gain in terms of private benefits. Studies have provided 
rationales of such value-decreasing behaviour from the controlling owners-managers. 
When the interests of the family owners-managers are not well aligned with other 
nonfamily shareholders, corporate assets may be deployed to serve the benefits and 
interests of the family owners-managers rather than the nonfamily shareholders 
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(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Morck et al. 1988, 1990). The benefits and interests of the 
family owners-managers encompass pursuit of non-value-maximizing objectives such 
as empire building (Morck et al. 1988), wealth transfer from the minority shareholders 
to the family owners (Bae et al. 2002)48 or entrenching the position of family owners-
managers to be more valuable and irreplaceable to other nonfamily shareholders 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989). 49   
 
 
Existing findings overall suggest that family firms from different economies around the 
world exhibit different corporate acquisition behaviour and preferences. Their choices 
of corporate acquisition activities can be value-enhancing to shareholder wealth or 
value-destroying to the minority shareholders wealth. Different internal or external 
factors inducing these varied outcomes have been proposed, which can be due to the 
corporate governance system and legal environment of the country, social value and 
the controlling family ownership structure (as discussed in previous section 3.3). 
 
 
Third, evidence reveals that there is a nonlinear (concave) relation between family 
ownership and the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. The 
increasing level of family ownership inflicts significant positive wealth effect of 
corporate acquisitions. However, when family ownership stake increases to a certain 
point, the high level of family ownership inflicts significant negative wealth effect of 
corporate acquisitions. Past studies suggested that the increasing family ownership is 
beneficial to shareholders of family firms. The dominant family owners inherently carry 
the incentive to perform value-enhancing corporate acquisitions. However, when 
family ownership reaches to a certain concentrated level, the family become 
                                                          
48
 This strong evidence is supported by Bae et al. (2002) for the case of Korean Chaebol, when the activities of 
corporate acquisitions are performed among companies within the same business groups. Wealth is found to 
be transferred from the subsidiaries at the lower-end of the business group pyramids to higher-end of the 
business group pyramids, at the expense of the minority shareholders. This activity is also referred as 
tunnelling. 
49
 The family owners-managers entrench themselves by making it costly for any potential replacement, gaining 
more freedom in action. When the investments make the family owners-managers valuable to the 
shareholders, they enable family owners-managers to raise their own compensation. 
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entrenched and perform corporate acquisitions for family interests and private benefits 
at the expense of the minority shareholders. The nonlinear relation between family 
ownership and firm value is also consistent with the findings of Morck et al. (1988).  
 
 
Fourth, previous studies employed family firms that originated from various countries, 
each constitute a unique dataset.  These unique datasets demonstrate the basis of 
different impact of family ownership on wealth effect of corporate acquisitions across 
different capital markets. Family firms from the developed economies may be hindered 
from conducting minority shareholder expropriation activities through corporate 
acquisitions due to the strong legal system. Family firms from the developing 
economies may be prompted to conduct minority shareholder expropriation activities 
through corporate acquisitions due to weaker legal system. This is consistent with the 
notion as highlighted in past studies that the activities of expropriating the minority 
shareholder can be extensive, especially in emerging countries with low investor 
protections, weak corporate governance and owners with concentrated ownership 
stake (La Porta et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004).  
 
 
Fifth, these studies have generally overlooked one important element that constitutes 
family firm studies, which is family-related characteristics. 50 As highlighted across 
Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, family firms have been documented to differ significantly 
from non-family firms across varied aspects. These aspects include board structure of 
family firms, managerial role of the controlling family, the existence of founder in 
owning and managing the family business, and the role of the descendants. Past 
findings have empirically documented the significance of these aspects in affect the 
value of family firms. Unfortunately, studies performed on these are scarce in the 
literature of corporate acquisitions. This study intends to provide further discoveries on 
the role of family-specific traits in determining the wealth of the shareholders, within 
                                                          
50
 Only study of Ben-Amar et al. (2006) has looked into few of the family-related characteristics which 
determine the wealth effect of corporate acquisitions for the study of family firms. 
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the context of corporate acquisitions and family firms. A discussion in relation to past 
findings on various family-related traits to family firm value is provided in Section 3.4.1.  
 
 
3.4 Determinants of Family Acquirers Stock Market Returns 
 
 
Existing studies have continuously examined relation between various factors and firm 
value.  Consequently, the relation between these various factors and firm value is also 
extended to the strand of literature in association with the wealth effect of corporate 
acquisition announcements in previous studies. These examined explanatory factors 
cover different categories, which include firm characteristics of the acquiring firm, 
board characteristics, deal characteristics and family firm specific characteristics. 
 
 
Hence, this section focuses mainly on reviewing existing prominent studies that have 
provided empirical evidence on the relation between these various explanatory factors 
and the wealth effect of corporate acquisitions for the acquirers. The section overall is 
organized as follows. In each of the following subsections, the review begins with 
family-specific traits and other found determinants in the literature. These findings are 
then compared and relate with those from the strand of literature in family firm 
studies, if any. These reviews provide further insight and predictions on the possible 
relation between these determinants and wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
announcements for family-controlled firms.  
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3.4.1 Family-Related Features 
 
 
This section discusses existing family firm studies that have provided empirical 
evidence on the relation between specific family-related characteristics and firm value. 
Review of these existing studies provides further insight and support to the predictions 
on the relation between these family-related characteristics and the wealth effect of 
corporate acquisition announcements (within the context of family firms). 
 
 
3.4.1.1  Family CEO 
 
 
The active involvement of controlling families in the management of family firms in 
Asia has been a common feature of family-controlled firms (La Porta et al. 1999; 
Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002; Lins 2003; Thillainathan 1999; Carney and 
Child 2012; World Bank Group 1999).  Studies on the influence of active family 
management on family firm value through the role of CEO have been examined.  
 
 
Advocate of agency theory argues that family CEOs are beneficial to family firm value.  
Family members are able to exchange their knowledge and skills from different 
dimensions with one another over a long horizon, which leads to better monitoring and 
disciplining (Fama and Jensen 1983b). In comparison with professional managers, 
family CEOs also have better access to resources, which can be acquired through 
informal and private networks (such as business groups). This is especially the case for 
family firms of emerging economies with weak market-supporting institutional settings, 
where access to resources is often not available through normal channels (such as 
banks) (Peng and Jiang 2010). Empirical evidence support the beneficial effect of active 
family management through the role of CEO on family firm value (Maury 2006; Sraer 
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and Thesmar 2007). 51 However, care must be exercised when generalising the notion 
that family CEO is beneficial to firm value, as these studies are performed on family 
firms from different countries with different cultural backgrounds and institutional 
settings. As highlighted (Fan, Wei, et al. 2011), these uncontrollable external factors 
can induce varied relation between specific family features and family firm value.  
 
 
On the other hand, there are studies that documented the negative impact of family 
CEO on family firm value, particularly for the case of Danish family firms (Bennedsen et 
al. 2007).  This is because family CEOs may deviate from the effort of maximising 
shareholders’ wealth when no strict discipline is in place (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2003). 
Family CEOs may have incentives to adopt investment policies that only benefit the 
controlling families, while reducing the payout to other nonfamily shareholders 
(McConnell and Servaes 1990). 
 
 
3.4.1.2  Founder CEO 
 
 
Founder in general refers to a specific individual who is the pioneer in establishing a 
company (Mehrotra et al. 2013).  An individual is also recognised as a firm’s founder 
who is responsible for the firm’s early growth and development into the business that 
it later becomes known for (Villalonga and Amit 2006). 52  
 
 
Prior research conjectures that founders add value to the company corollary to their 
specialised knowledge, long-term ownership and non-pecuniary ties to the company in 
                                                          
51
 Studies of Maury et al. (2006) and Sraer and Thesmar (2007) are performed for family firms from Western 
Europe and France respectively. 
52
 Villalonga and Amit (2006) specifically deduce that a founder need not be the same individual who starts and 
incorporates the company, nor the one who bring the company into public listing status.  
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terms of reputational and emotional ties (James 1999; Demsetz and Lehn 1985).  
Additionally, founder is inherently a careful steward of the company in consequence of 
the incentive to monitor the business closely due to the great deal of their fortune and 
family future prosperity invested in the company (Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Villalonga 
and Amit 2006). The investment behaviour of founder is also found to differ from 
others.  Block (2012) specifically discovers founder investment preference for high risk 
and high return investments compared with others, which are gauged by research and 
development activities. 53  
 
 
Empirical evidence, while mixed, overall leans in favour of a positive effect of founder 
on firm value when different aspects are considered and examined (Anderson and 
Reeb 2003b; Sraer and Thesmar 2007; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Fahlenbrach 2009; 
Miller et al. 2007; Adams et al. 2009; Saito 2008; Lee 2006; Andres 2008; Cucculelli and 
Micucci 2008; Pérez-González 2006; McConaughy et al. 1998). Miller et al. (2007) also 
emphasise that past findings of better family firm performance vis-à-vis nonfamily firm 
performance is due to the effect of lone founder.  
 
 
Different factors have been highlighted in existing studies explaining the potential cost 
of founder to firm value. In particular, large founder with block ownership may derive 
greater benefit from pursuing firm growth, technological innovation, or firm survival, 
instead of enhancing overall shareholder value (Anderson and Reeb 2003b). With 
substantial equity stakes, founders have the incentives and influence to opt for 
activities that benefit themselves at the expense of firm performance  (Aguilera and 
Crespi-Cladera 2012).  Founders with large proportion of shareholdings may also 
exercise their large voting rights to block a hostile takeover even if the takeover brings 
a positive effect on firm value (Stulz 1988). Altruistic behaviour also exists among 
founders with the intention to pass down their ownership and control in the company 
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 To be precise, their results reveal that ownership of founder has a positive effect on research and 
development intensity and level of research and development productivity. 
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to the next generations, an action which may be detrimental to firm performance 
(Chua et al. 2009; Anderson and Reeb 2004; Bertrand and Schoar 2006). 
 
 
Past studies also suggest the significant positive effect of founder on firm value due to 
founder’s active involvement in managing the company54 (Li and Srinivasan 2011; Gao 
and Jain 2011; Fahlenbrach 2009; Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Villalonga and Amit 
2006). These studies have highlighted the fact that companies under the management 
of founder-CEO perform significantly well compared with those managed by either 
successor-CEO or professionally hired CEO. 
 
 
Fahlenbrach (2009) specifically highlights several aspects that distinguish a founder-
CEO from other types of CEO. Various inherent factors encourage the founder-CEO to 
pursue strategies that optimise shareholder wealth. To be precise, founder who is also 
the CEO of the company is less likely to be removed from the company in comparison 
with others. Specifically, these founders often consider establishment of the company 
as a life achievement. In consequence of their equity stake and entrepreneur status, 
founder is granted greater influence and decision-making power in the company. The 
considerable equity stake also further mitigates possible agent-principal problem, 
which results in improvement in firm value.  
 
 
Firms with founder-director, instead of a founder-CEO, also exhibit different 
characteristics that are beneficial to the value of the firm.  Past studies have specifically 
examined whether the performance of a family-controlled firm is influenced by the 
active involvement of the founder in running the business. Specifically, Li et al.’s (2011) 
findings reveal that hired CEOs of founder-director firms receive lower pay than CEOs in 
non-founder firms. Their findings also disclose that hired CEOs in the founder-director 
                                                          
54
 The involvement of the founder in the management of the company is gauged by the holding of the position 
as CEO. 
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firms have higher pay-for-performance sensitivity than hired CEOs of non-founder 
firms. They have interpreted the result as better governance of the company with the 
presence of founder-director, consistent with the claim of Core et al. (1999). 
Additionally, their results also exhibit that hired CEOs in founder-director firms are 
more likely to be replaced for poor performance compared with those of non-founder 
firms. 
 
 
Within the context of corporate acquisition studies, André et al.’s (2012) findings 
support the significant positive correlation between the founder and the 
announcement-period-returns of the acquiring firms for Canadian family-controlled 
firms. Their corporate acquisition announcements cover 215 announcements for the 
period from 1996 to 2006.  Specifically, the findings suggest CEO-founder performs 
significantly better corporate acquisitions vis-à-vis CEO descendants of founder or hired 
professional CEO.  The findings overall support the notion that founder imposes 
significant positive effect on firm value. This inference is consistent with those of 
previous studies that support the notion of founder performing better value-added 
corporate acquisition decisions vis-à-vis other counterparts (Li and Srinivasan 2011; 
Fahlenbrach 2009).  
 
 
Although prior studies generally suggest that founder-CEO can lead to good 
performance of a company, there are studies that have found that founder can also 
exert negative effect on firm value. Particularly, an event study has been performed to 
examine reaction of the stock market upon the sudden death of a founder (Bruce 
Johnson et al. 1985). The results demonstrate that the sudden death of founder CEO is 
associated with an increase in stock price, suggesting that founder-CEO hinders good 
firm performance.   
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3.4.1.3  Descendant CEO 
 
 
It has been generally emphasised in past studies that inherited control is linked to poor 
family firm performance (Kidwell et al. 2013). The findings of Villalonga and Amit (2006) 
and Pérez-González (2006) state that when descendants serve as CEO, the firm value is 
destroyed. They examine specifically family-controlled firms in the US. Other studies 
also empirically showed that descendant-managed family firms exhibit poor financial 
performance in Canada (Morck et al. 1998), Thailand (Bertrand et al. 2008), Germany, 
the UK and the US (Bloom and Van Reenen 2006), Italy (Cucculelli and Micucci 2008) 
and Denmark (Bennedsen et al. 2007).  
 
 
A notable exception is the findings by Sraer et al. (2007) revealing that French family-
controlled firms continued to outperform nonfamily firms under the management of 
descendants. Additionally, a more recent study on Japanese family-controlled firms 
also reveals that inherited control improves family firm performance (Mehrotra et al. 
2013), which is also consistent with a previous Japanese family firm study (Saito 2008). 
Notably, Japanese family-controlled firms that are under the management of non-
blood heir (from arranged marriages or common adult adoption practices in Japan) 
outperform those under the management of blood heirs. For the case of Thailand, 
family firms perform marriages that add value to family firms, when the partners are 
from either prominent businesses or political families (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013).  
 
 
These findings demonstrate an important implication. The above mentioned findings 
overall proves that the past inferences for family firms of the examined economies do 
not necessarily apply to those of other economies due to dissimilar cultural, legal and 
economic settings as emphasised in previous family firm studies (Miller et al. 2007; 
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Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Faccio et al. 2001; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). 55 Within 
the context of family firms, the behaviour of family owners whether to act in the 
interests of the shareholders or act against the interests of the shareholders is 
dependent upon the legal and regulatory institutional environment of the country (La 
Porta et al. 2000; Peng and Jiang 2010).  Existing studies demonstrate that family firms 
across different nations have their own set of practices and behaviours towards the 
strategic direction of family-controlled firms, which directly affect the future 
performance of family-controlled firms (Mehrotra et al. 2013; Bunkanwanicha et al. 
2013).  
 
 
In terms of corporate acquisition and family firm value, Sraer et al.’s (2007) evidence 
contrastingly reveals that descendant-CEOs of French family firms do not make better 
acquisitions. Specifically, the post-acquisition market value of the French family firms 
(the acquirers) is significantly lower than that of the French firms under the 
management of professional CEOs. The incapability of descendant-managed family 
firms in opting for significant value-added corporate acquisition activities is also evident 
among Canadian family firms. Specifically, André’s (2012) study demonstrates that 
descendant-managed Canadian family firms do not experience any significant changes 
in market value when announcing corporate acquisition decisions of the companies.  
 
 
Highlights from past family firm studies may explain the non-performance of 
descendant-managed family firms, in terms of firm value or non-value-added 
investment strategy. To be precise, family owners as highlighted earlier generally have 
incentives different from those of other types of dominant owners, which directly 
benefit family-controlled firms and their stakeholders. Specifically, for the purpose of 
passing down wealth throughout generations, family-controlled firms tend to view 
                                                          
55
 Unlike developed countries with a strong investor protection system, concentrated ownership is necessary 
for owners from nations with a weak investor protection system (Lins 2003). Owners seek to protect 
themselves by becoming the controllers of the company. The domination of concentrated ownership in nations 
with weak investor protection system is well documented (La Porta et al. 2000; Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and 
Lang 2002; Carney and Child 2012).   
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business and investment from a long-term perspective (Bertrand and Schoar 2006). 
Consequently, family-controlled firms execute better investment decisions and thus 
avoid managerial myopia in the decision-making process (Stein 1989). However, 
concerns arise if heirs are unable to maintain these customs.  
 
 
It has been highlighted in past family firm studies that transgenerational control of 
ownership and management may be detrimental to the long-term prosperity of family 
businesses (Chrisman et al. 2012; Schulze et al. 2003). This is due to the altruistic 
behaviour of family owners or the alleged Fredo Effect (Kidwell et al. 2013) when 
incompetent family members are chosen to take over the management position (Chua 
et al. 2009; Anderson and Reeb 2004; Bertrand and Schoar 2006).  Specifically, altruistic 
parents are willing to sacrifice efficiency of managing corporate resources when 
passing down the control and ownership of firm resources to later generations, instead 
of seeking competent non-heir professional managers (Chami 2001; Morck and Yeung 
2003). Consequently, the controlling family continues to keep the company under 
family control (Burkart et al. 2003; Chua et al. 2009; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Smith 
and Amoako-Adu 1999).  
 
 
However, a recent study conducted for Japanese family firms reveals an entirely 
different notion of firm performance of inherited Japanese family firms (Mehrotra et al. 
2013) from the conventionally perceived family curse that wealth does not last over 
three generations (Lee and Li 2009). Such contentious issue surrounding inherited 
control in a family firm has been continuously highlighted and examined (Amore et al. 
2011; Cucculelli and Marchionne 2012) even decades earlier (Beckhard and Gibb Dyer 
Jr 1983) that maintaining the prosperity of businesses in a family firm over time has 
been difficult.  Nonetheless, Japanese family firms (Suzuki, Suntory, Matsui Securities, 
etc.) have persistently proven their permanent existence worldwide, breaking the 
decree against declining family dynasty (The Economist 2012). Japanese firms are 
found to adopt unique practices to ensure the sustainability and prosperity of family 
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businesses via adult adoptions, arranged marriages and son-in-law successors  
(Mehrotra et al. 2013). These practices ensure both continuous acquisition of a 
talented pool of family members in managing the family businesses and also incessant 
family control over the family businesses (in terms of ownership and management). 
The authors further mention that these findings for Japanese family firms are at odds 
with those found in other developed economies in terms of the notion that inherited 
control erode family firm performance (Morck et al. 1998; Pérez-González 2006; 
Bennedsen et al. 2007).  
 
 
3.4.1.4  Family Directors on Board 
 
 
Grounded in agency theory, the governance role of the board is to deter the manager 
from engaging in an opportunistic behaviour that serves the manager’s personal 
interests at the expense of the owner(s) of the company (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
Studies continue to highlight the composition and structure of the board as an 
important element affecting the strategic direction and performance of the company, 
which ultimately affect the wealth of the shareholders (Arena and Braga-Alves 2013; 
Black et al. 2012; Li and Srinivasan 2011; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1997).  
 
 
Ideally, the governance role and functions of the board of a family firm should not 
differ from those of the others. Different from nonfamily firms, the corporate 
governance function of takeover market, institutional investors and even incentive 
compensations provide less governance function in family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al. 
2003; Kole 1997; Shivdasani 1993). This further emphasises the pivotal role of the 
board in family firms to govern the behaviour and actions of the controlling family 
owners. As emphasised by Anderson and Reeb (2004), the boards of family firms can be 
possible mechanisms to limit expropriation of shareholder wealth by family owners 
with large shareholdings. 
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However, a study (Anderson and Reeb 2004) has revealed that family-controlled firms 
often seek to minimise the presence of independent directors and are reluctant in the 
adoption of monitoring practices (Chen and Nowland 2010), which may inevitably harm 
the shareholders’ wealth if the actions of the board are not effectively monitored.  
Recent research has further found that the board of a family firm tends to be 
dominated by family members (García-Ramos and García-Olalla 2011), which 
negatively affects family firm corporate governance practice and in turn firm value 
(Cheung et al. 2013; Anderson and Reeb 2004). Nonetheless, specific studies on the 
relation between the boards of firms with controlling shareholders (specifically 
families) and firm valuation remain scant (Collin and Ahlberg 2012; Cheung et al. 2013).  
 
 
The important question that needs to be answered is whether the board with family 
directors continues to act in the interest of all the shareholders. From an agency 
perspective, if the board of family firms continues its governance role, the investment 
decision of family-controlled firms would be value-adding to the firm’s wealth. Studies 
have investigated the influence of family representatives on the board on firm 
valuation, with a concluded negative influence for Hong Kong public listed family firms 
(Cheung et al. 2013). Anderson and Reeb’s (2004) study specifically showed the poorer 
performance of US family-controlled firms when the number of family representatives 
exceeded those of the independent directors on the board. Their findings further 
suggest that the board of family-controlled firms functions well in mitigating the 
conflict of interests amongst shareholders (expropriation hypothesis) with increased 
board independence.  However, within the context of corporate acquisitions, no 
studies have been done if the domination of family members on the board significantly 
affects these investment decisions of the family-controlled firms, which in turn affect 
the value of the family-controlled firms.  
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3.4.1.5  Related-Party Corporate Acquisitions  
 
 
For the case of companies with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders can 
expropriate wealth from the minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000; Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997). For instance, controlling owners can extract cash by selling company 
resources through self-dealing transactions; conduct transfer of assets from their 
controlled listed companies to other companies under their control; and increase their 
control by acquiring additional shares at a preferential price (Johnson et al. 2000). 
Existing expropriation literature concluded the expropriation behaviour of controlling 
owners based on the indirect measure of cash flow rights and voting rights ratio 
(Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002; La Porta et al. 1999). However, constant 
concerns arise with the derivation of the precise quantum of a controlling family’s 
control rights (Lemmon and Lins 2003; Claessens et al. 2000; Carney and Child 2012), 
which have been continuously challenged (Glattfelder 2013). The direct actions of 
expropriation remain scarcely examined. 
 
 
Few studies examine possible expropriation behaviour of controlling owners through 
related-party corporate acquisitions, which offer mixed findings (Bae et al. 2002; 
Buysschaert et al. 2004; Holmen and Knopf 2004). This approach offers a direct 
measure of possible expropriation behaviour of controlling owners based on these 
specific actions performed. Bae et al.’s (2002) findings reveal that Korean business 
groups perform corporate acquisitions within the same business group, which transfer 
wealth from the minority shareholders to the controlling owners. Evidence of Bae et al. 
(2002) support the notion that such intragroup activities are value-destroying to the 
minority shareholders. They refer to such minority shareholder expropriation activities 
as tunnelling. 56 
                                                          
56
 High degree of ownership mechanisms through pyramids, dual-class shares and cross-holdings increases the 
potential for minority shareholder expropriation by the controlling owners through related-party corporate 
acquisitions (Holmen and Knopf 2004). This may generate incentives for the controlling owners to divert 
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However, this is not the case for business groups with controlling owners in other 
nations. Findings of Buysschaert et al. (2004) and Holmen et al. (2004) do not find any 
support for the value-destroying behaviour of the controlling owners through related-
party corporate acquisitions, for the cases of Sweden and Belgian respectively. The 
results of Buysschaert et al. (2004) and Holmen et al. (2004) jointly suggest that such 
corporate acquisitions create value for the minority shareholders. Holmen et al. (2004) 
justify that the existence of extra-legal institutions (which include social norms, the 
press and tax compliance) hinders the controlling owners from expropriating the 
minorities when they have ample opportunities to do so. Within the context of 
Sweden, the controlling owners of the business groups do not perform intragroup 
corporate acquisitions for pecuniary gains.  They initiate the acquisition activities 
among companies to reorganise the cash flow within the business groups for the 
benefit of capital constrained firms specifically. 
 
 
Overall, these existing studies provide empirical support for the fact that controlling 
owners perform related-party corporate acquisitions either for the benefit of 
shareholder wealth, or at the expense of the minority shareholders. Existing studies 
reveal that the reasons for such mixed inferences are due to the varied legal 
environment, corporate governance environment and social norm from which these 
business groups originated.   
  
 
Similarly, related-party corporate acquisitions are also allowed within the context of 
Malaysia. Pursuant to Chapter 10 Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa, all listed 
companies need to disclose corporate acquisition activities as a related party 
                                                                                                                                                                    
resources among companies within the same business group through corporate acquisitions (Buysschaert et al. 
2004). 
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transaction to Bursa when a transaction meets the definition of a related party 
transaction as defined in Chapter 10.02. Pursuant to Chapter 10.02, related party 
transaction means a transaction entered into by the company or subsidiaries which 
involve the interest of a related party. Related party means a director, major 
shareholder or person connected with such director or major shareholder, pursuant to 
Chapter 1 Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia.  
 
 
In simpler terms, within the context of Malaysian family-controlled firms and related-
party corporate acquisitions, a Malaysian family-controlled firm (the acquirer) acquires 
another company (the target), and both are not necessarily within the same business 
group. The corporate acquisition activities involve a related party when:- 
 
i. The director or the owner of the target firm is family related to the director 
or the owner of the acquirer.   
ii. The director or the owner of the target firm is also the director or the 
owner of the acquirer.   
 
 
3.4.2 Free Cash Flow 
 
 
Jensen (1986) posits that acquisitions are one of the means managers can spend cash 
in wasteful investments instead of paying it out to their shareholders. The presence of 
excess cash could therefore leave management with discretion to make value 
decreasing acquisition type of investment decisions. This is also known as the free cash 
flow theory or agency cost of free cash flow. The excess cash refers to free cash flow57, 
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 Past studies measure the excess cash or free cash flow as operating income before depreciation less interest 
expense, taxes, preferred and common dividends  
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which implies remaining cash flow of a company from those that are already invested 
in available net-value-added investment.   
 
 
In precise, if the management is acting in the interest of shareholders, the excess cash 
or free cash flow would be returned to the shareholders in the form of dividends or 
other forms of payout. However, the conflict between management’s best interests 
and shareholders may deter the payout of free cash flow to the shareholders.  In 
response to the condition when the company has too much liquidity and lack of good 
investment options, entrenched managers would attempt overinvestment in corporate 
acquisitions. 
 
 
The value-decreasing behaviour of the managers signifies their possible motivations for 
empire-building and also their entrenchment for not acting in the interest of other 
shareholders. Hence in the case when managers are entrenched, they would intend to 
make themselves as valuable to shareholder and costly to replace by venturing into 
investments that are only valuable under the incumbent managers (Shleifer and Vishny 
1989). In essence, when there is excessive cash available, entrenched managers would 
utilize the excess cash for their own purpose and benefit. 
 
 
Consequently, to determine if managers of the acquiring firms (the acquirers) are 
entrenched, the relation between the measured excess cash of the acquiring firms and 
the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements (stock return changes during 
corporate acquisition announcement period of the acquiring firms) have been 
examined in the literature of corporate acquisitions.  In precise, the negative relation 
between the excess cash and stock performance of the acquiring firms during 
corporate acquisition announcement period suggests management entrenchment in 
opting for value-decreasing corporate acquisition decisions. It also further 
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demonstrates that when managers are presented with the opportunity to opt for 
value-decreasing investment decision (in this case corporate acquisition decisions), 
they would. 
 
 
Lang et al. (1991) studies showed negative relation between acquiring firm free cash 
flow and acquiring firm stock performance during the observed corporate acquisition 
announcement period, but only for firms with low investment opportunities (as 
measured by q-ratio). This signifies that entrenched managers would opt for corporate 
acquisitions instead of wealth distribution back to the shareholders, especially for the 
case when the company no longer has growth opportunities (as measured by Tobin’s 
Q). Their sample covered 101 US mergers for the period of 1968 to 1986. The stock 
performances of the acquiring firms were documented to be significantly negative 
especially for acquiring firms with high cash flow and low q ratio.  
 
 
Harford (1999) studies also revealed that cash-rich acquiring firms are more likely in 
performing corporate acquisitions than other firms. Their evidence also further 
enlightened that acquisitions made by cash-rich firms are value decreasing.  Their 
sample comprises of 487 US corporate acquisition events for year 1977-1993. However, 
as this study employed only corporate acquisition events that acquired public listed 
targets, the inferences can possibly be biased attributable to cases as such. As 
mentioned by Netter et al. (2011) outcomes of past merger and acquisition studies 
could be an artefact of the samples used, which generally oversample large publicly 
traded targets.  
 
 
Studies consecutively support previous findings (Smith and Kim 1994; Kaplan and 
Weisbach 1992). However, there are studies that do not support the notion that excess 
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cash of the acquiring firms is a significant explanatory factor for the wealth effect of 
corporate acquisition announcements (Moeller et al. 2004).  
 
 
Past evidence overall revealed significant negative correlation between the excess cash 
of acquiring firms and valuation effect of corporate acquisition announcements. This 
suggests that managers of the examined acquiring firms are entrenched, for not opting 
for investments that are value-added. Furthermore, it also demonstrates that 
entrenched managers would opt for value-decreasing corporate acquisition decisions 
when presented with opportunities (when firms have excess cash and when firms are 
faced with low growth opportunities). In simpler terms, acquiring firms with extensive 
excess cash and especially those with poor investment opportunities, perform poorer 
and unprofitable corporate acquisition activities. 
 
 
However, studies reveal that when specific ownership structure and feature is 
considered, the previously inferred correlation between free cash flow and firm value 
may not hold (Garvey 1992).  The notion of free cash flow theory infers that manager 
misinvest excess cash when they are not concerned with the interests of the 
shareholders, which results in an inverse relation between free cash flow of the 
company and firm value. However, when the manager is monitored by existing large 
shareholder or the manager is the substantial shareholder of the company, the 
resultant effect on management investment options become ambiguous.  
 
 
Empirical evidence revealed that concentrated shareholdings do not resolve the agency 
costs of free cash flow problem, based on the results exhibited from  322 US public 
listed firms (Garvey 1992). Specifically, the influence of large managerial shareholdings, 
institutional blockholdings or family ownership does not effectively deter the 
management in squandering excess cash of the company in unprofitable investments, 
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instead of distributing the excess cash back to the shareholders. This notion is also 
supported for East Asian firms58 under the influence of large shareholders (Wei and 
Zhang 2008). Wei and Zhang suggested that East Asian firms with high level of free cash 
flows and with large shareholders are likely to go for overinvestment instead of 
returning the cash flow back to shareholders. This is again consistent with the free cash 
flow hypothesis. 
 
 
However, when the large shareholders are the controlling family, the notion of free 
cash flow hypothesis does not hold. Recent studies of Kuan et al. (2012) showed that 
for family firms, the withholding of cash reserves from payout back to the shareholders 
are not necessarily detrimental to the shareholders of family firms, which is 
inconsistent with the notion of free cash flow theory.  Free cash flow theory posits that 
the inclination of the management withholding the excess cash is to invest in wasteful 
investments. Kuan et al. (2012) showed that family firms with low level of cash reserves 
prefer to withhold cash for better investments opportunities. Hanazaki and Liu (2007) 
studies also provide alternative explanation for the behaviour of East Asian family-
controlled firms in preferring to withhold cash, due to severe internal finance 
constraints together with the financing difficulty from external capital markets, in 
comparison to those of non-family firms. These studies further demonstrate the 
dissimilarity between Asian firms and others, in terms of investment behaviour and 
preferences.   
 
 
Overall findings suggest possible positive correlation between free cash flow and firm 
value specifically for family firms. Inconsistent with the notion of free cash flow theory, 
the high levels of free cash flow in family-controlled firms may not necessary bring 
negative effect to firm value, due to the evidenced variant investment behaviour and 
preference of Asian family-controlled firms. As shown from abovementioned studies, 
                                                          
58
 The examined East Asian firms include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, 
Taiwan and Thailand. 
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family-controlled firms exhibit different motives and intentions than non-family firms in 
terms of cash reservation.  
 
 
3.4.3 Board Characteristics 
 
 
Contemporary boards of directors are reckoned as the lynchpin of corporate 
governance with the task of monitoring the top management to ensure that the latter 
act in the best interests of the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976). With fiduciary 
obligations to the vast shareholders and the essential role to determine the strategic 
direction of the company and monitoring, the role of board of directors in the 
governance of the corporation is imperative (Gillan 2006; Licht 2013). Studies have 
constantly indicated that the composition and structure of the board of directors is an 
important element in affecting the strategic direction and performance of the 
company, which ultimately affect the wealth of the shareholders (Arena and Braga-
Alves 2013; Black et al. 2012; Li and Srinivasan 2011; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1997).  
 
 
The board of directors have continuously been viewed as apparatus for ensuring that 
management actions agree with shareholders interest and also play a vital role in 
monitoring possible managerial opportunistic behaviour (Goodstein et al. 1994). The 
structure and composition of board also plays a role in significantly influencing the 
strategic function of the board and hence strategic directions of the company (Masulis 
et al. 2007). The generally perceived multifaceted tasks of the board include 
representing the vast shareholders of the company in advising, evaluating and 
monitoring the managers, determining executive compensation and endorsing 
corporate strategies. Most importantly, the board is also responsible in designing and 
ratifying material corporate strategy (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1997), which includes 
corporate acquisition decisions.  
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Different from non-family firms, the corporate governance function of takeover 
market, institutional investors and even incentive compensations provide less 
governance function in family firms (Gomez-Mejia et al. 2003; Kole 1997; Shivdasani 
1993). This further emphasizes the pivotal role of board in family firms to govern the 
behaviour and actions of the controlling family owners. The boards of family firms can 
be possible mechanisms to limit expropriation of shareholder wealth by family owners 
with large shareholdings (Anderson and Reeb 2004). The boards of family firms are 
found to be generally passive (Corbetta and Tomaselli 2004) and are dominated by 
family members (Cheung et al. 2013). A moderate family members presence on the 
board relative to independent directors is found to provide considerable benefit to the 
family firms (Anderson and Reeb 2004).  
 
 
The different features of boards of family firms in comparison to those of the nonfamily 
firms and the impact of board on family firm value are discussed in the following 
subsections. This subsection also discusses past findings that have provided empirical 
evidence of board-specific features significant impact on the valuation creation of 
corporate acquisition announcements.  
 
 
3.4.3.1  Board Independence 
 
 
The general consensus from the industry and academics is that an independent board 
of directors result in more effective corporate governance (Ryan and Wiggins 2004). 
Independent directors have been viewed as essential in monitoring the management of 
the company, in comparison to other directors (Byrd and Hickman 1992). Independent 
directors also represent important line of defence for minority shareholders against 
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opportunism of large shareholders (Anderson and Reeb 2004). From an agency theory 
perspective, independent directors also fulfil the monitoring role of board on the 
management better than other directors on board due to the minimal conflicts of 
interests with the shareholders, in comparison to other directors on board (García-
Ramos and García-Olalla 2011; Fama and Jensen 1983b). 
 
 
For Malaysia public-listed companies, the classification of an independent director 
(Bursa Malaysia 2012) is not much different from the generally perceived classification 
in other stock market. A director who is independent of management, business or 
relationship which could interfere the effect of independent judgement is classified as 
an independent director (Bursa Malaysia 2012). They are expected to be credible and 
to be equipped with necessary skill and experience to bring independent judgement on 
firm’s strategy, performance and use of firm’s resources (Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance 2000). To perform their function effectively, the board should 
comprise 1/3 of independent directors. 
 
 
There has been no consensus on the correlation between independent directors with 
firm performance. Some studies revealed evidence of the positive effect of 
independent directors on family firm performance (Anderson and Reeb 2004). 
Conversely, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) found significant negative relation between 
independent directors and firm performance. There are findings that found no 
significant relation between board independence and firm performance (Baysinger and 
Butler 1985; Mehran 1995; Klein 1998).  
 
 
For the case of Malaysia public-listed companies, Mak and Kusnadi (2005) also find no 
significant relation between independent directors and firm value. Haniffa and Hudaib 
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(2006) findings based on 347 Malaysia firms for the period of 1996-2000 also support 
this non-significant relation. 
 
 
Within the stream of corporate acquisition literature, Byrd and Hickman (1992) showed 
that US acquiring firms with at least 50% of independent directors on board 
experienced higher positive wealth effect (announcement-period stock returns) of 
corporate acquisition announcement than other acquiring firms. 59 Additionally, Byrd 
and Hickman studies also reveal evidence of a nonlinear relation between independent 
directors and wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. This suggests that 
increasing independent directors on board do not necessary result in persistent 
positive effect on announcement period stock returns of the acquiring firms. When the 
fractions of independent directors on board exceed 60%, it affects negatively the 
announcement period stock returns of the acquiring firms. 
 
 
Within the context of family firm studies, family firms yield different interpretation on 
the relation between board independence and value of family firms. Garcia-Ramos et 
al. (2011) findings contradict the common belief that more independent boards always 
lead to better firm value, when considering the effect of family ownership. The 
presence of independent directors on the board has positive effect on firm value when 
the company is managed by founder. This is consistent with those found for Spain 
family-controlled firms that are run by first generation (Arosa et al. 2010). 
Contradictorily, the correlation between independent directors on board with family 
firm value becomes negative when the company is run by the descendants (García-
Ramos and García-Olalla 2011). 60 The presence of outside directors on the board do 
not necessary contribute positive effect to the family-controlled firm as a whole 
(Jonovic 1989). Classical board may only suit a few family firms. This notion is also 
supported by Ford (1989). Independent board members are less important than 
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  The authors employed samples covering 128 tender bids for the period of 1980-1987. 
60
 Their sample firms specifically comprise of European family firms from Spanish, Portuguese and Italian 
publicly traded companies for the period of 2001 to 2007. 
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insiders for family firms. Past studies consecutively provide a valuable insight on the 
relation between board independence and family firm value. The significant 
contribution of independent directors to firm value do not necessarily applies within 
the context of family firm.  
 
 
The non-significant role of independent directors on family firms’ value can be due to 
specific family firm aspect. Under an ideal situation, independent directors may deter 
the board from opting incompetent family members from assuming key CEO positions 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997). However within the context of family firms, greater 
commitment from family members and value overlap in family firms, which mitigate 
the need for board independence (Corbetta and Salvato 2004). Findings also 
demonstrate that the controlling families often seek to minimise the presence of 
independent directors and are reluctant in the adoption of monitoring practices, which 
do not necessarily result in detrimental effect on firm value (Anderson and Reeb 2004; 
Chen and Nowland 2010). Nevertheless, studies continue to emphasize the role of the 
independent directors on board remain necessary in family-controlled firms to 
safeguard the interests of the minority nonfamily shareholders from the controlling 
family discretion over firm resources (Miller and Le Breton-Miller 2006; Chen and Hsu 
2009; Bammens et al. 2011).  
 
 
Anderson and Reeb (2004) findings demonstrate family-controlled firms attitude 
toward the appointment of independent directors and the importance of independent 
directors on performance of family-controlled firms in US. 61 On average, independent 
directors hold 43.9% of seats on boards for family firms, which is lower than their 
sample of nonfamily firms at 61.2%. The results further support previous family firm 
study (García-Ramos and García-Olalla 2011) on family-controlled firms’ reluctant 
attitudes toward the appointment of independent directors. The large founder family 
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 Anderson and Reeb (2004) sample firms covered those from S&P 500 for 403 non-utility and non-banking 
firms. 
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firms of US that are with relatively few independent directors perform significantly 
worse than non-family firms.  
 
 
3.4.3.2  CEO Duality: Board Leadership Structure 
 
 
Decision to uphold the separation of CEO role from chairman position on the board has 
been a recurring concern (Boyd 1995; Byrd et al. 2012; Dey et al. 2011). CEO duality or 
dual leadership structure occurs when the two most important positions on the board 
are held by the same individual in a corporation, namely the posts of CEO and 
chairman. Two theoretical arguments exist in association with the benefits and costs of 
separating the CEO and chairman role. 
 
 
In precise, advocates of more effective corporate governance would opt for unitary 
leadership structure, where CEO remains independent from the position of chairman. 
Given that the board prime charter is to effectively monitor the decisions and actions 
of top management, CEO duality may impinge the necessary independent judgement 
required (Rechner and Dalton 1989). Agency theory asserts that splitting the titles of 
CEO and chairman between two people improves firm performance as the board of 
directors can better monitor the CEO (Harris and Helfat 1998; Worrell et al. 1997; 
Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994; Brickley et al. 1997; Fama and Jensen 1983b).  In 
consequence of maintaining a unitary leadership structure, agency costs in large 
organizations are reduced by separation of decision management from decision control 
(Boyd 1995). 62  
 
 
                                                          
62
 Decision management refers to the right in initiating and implementing plans for any firm’s resource 
allocation. Decision control refers to the right of approving and monitoring the implementation of firm’s 
resource allocation. 
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On the other hand, stewardship theorists refute the negative effect of CEO duality on 
the company performance. They argue that CEO duality can be both a structural and 
psychological empowerment of the CEO, thereby encouraging CEO to better serve the 
company and the shareholders (Davis et al. 1997). Subsequent scholars have 
continuously given claims on the benefits of maintaining a dual leadership structure. In 
precise, performance of a company improves when the executive has greater authority 
to make critical decisions (Baliga et al. 1996; Harris and Helfat 1998; Finkelstein and 
D'Aveni 1994).  Additionally, the surrounding economic environment and specific 
leadership requirements lead to CEO duality as the possible best option suited for 
firm’s current business condition to achieve managerial efficiency (Dey et al. 2011; 
Brickley et al. 1997; Byrd and Hickman 1992). Byrd et al. (2012) and Brickley et al. 
(1997) specifically emphasized that the separation of the role of CEO and chairman do 
not necessary warrant better effect for the shareholders. The costs of separation are 
larger than the benefits of maintaining unitary leadership structure. CEO duality also 
lead to better firm performance by allowing CEO to obtain complete authority over the 
organization (Desai et al. 2003) and promote better communication across the board 
(Stoeberl and Sherony 1985). 
 
 
Empirical evidence on the relation between CEO duality and firm value yielded 
conflicting results. Rechner and Dalton (1989) examine whether firms with CEO duality 
perform differently than firms without CEO duality. 63  Their results indicate no 
differences of shareholder returns. They concluded that CEO duality does not impact 
shareholder returns. However, subsequent study of Rechner and Dalton (1991) 
concluded that firms opting for independent leadership consistently outperform those 
with CEO duality.  
 
 
On the other hand, another stream of studies finds that CEO duality is not a significant 
factor on firm performance. Baliga et al. (1996) find that the stock market does not 
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 Based on 141 Fortune 500 firms examined over the period 1978-1983. 
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care when announcements have been made on the duality status changes of CEO of 
Fortune 500 firms for the period of 1980 – 1991. Other studies also support the 
inferences of no significant relation between firm value and CEO duality (Peel and 
O'Donnell 1995; Dahya and Travlos 2000).  
 
 
Contrastingly, there are also studies that support the view that separation of CEO and 
chairman roles is value-enhancing to the shareholders. Worrell et al. (1997) find that 
the stock market reacts negatively to announcements when all three key executive 
positions – board chairperson, CEO and president, are held by same individual. They 
posit that this finding support agency theory that duality is detrimental to firm value. 
Rhoades et al. (2000) findings also support this notion of the association between 
higher firm value and separation of role duality. 
 
 
For the case of Malaysian firms, the impact of board leadership structure on firm 
performance remains mixing. 64  Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) found the negative relation 
between CEO duality and firm value (as measured by ROA), but no significant relation 
when using market measure for firm value (as measured by Q-ratio).  Another study 
(Chang 2004) on Malaysia firms found no significant relation between CEO duality and 
firm value, inconsistent with Haniffa and Hudaib finding. The results may be due to 
different firm performance measure employed for the study, which include the natural 
logarithms for both dividend payouts and ROE.  
 
 
In comparison to non-family firms, the corporate governance effect of unitary 
leadership structure remains ambiguous for family-controlled firms, when the role of 
family ownership and family-specific traits are considered (Braun and Sharma 2007; 
                                                          
64
 For Malaysia, in relation to MCCG since year 2000, there is a requirement for the balance of power and 
authority between the chairman and CEO to avoid too much powers of decision made by one individual. 
Avoidance of role duality is recommended and should be explained in the annual report in the event of CEO 
duality.   
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García-Ramos and García-Olalla 2011) . The maintenance of a unitary leadership 
structure in family-controlled firms represents an important monitoring mechanism to 
safeguard the interests of nonfamily shareholders, since the interests of the nonfamily 
shareholders can be secondary to the controlling family. The combination of CEO and 
chairman role by the controlling family may compound agency costs borne by the 
nonfamily shareholders. 
 
 
Braun and Sharma (2007) found that board leadership structure do not significantly 
affect firm performance. However, results also reveal that board leadership structure 
contains significant mediating effect on the relation between family ownership and 
firm performance. Specifically, for family-controlled firms that comply with good 
governance recommendations of maintaining a unitary leadership structure, lower 
family ownership is related to higher firm value. However, when family ownership 
increases, the firm value decreases. Additionally, no significant correlation between 
family ownership and firm value is observed for family-controlled firms that maintain 
dual leadership structure exhibit. Braun and Sharma (2007) suggest that the outcomes 
of the studies assert the governance effect of separating the role of CEO and chairman 
in family-controlled firm is beneficial to firm value, especially when the family owners 
are entrenched. 
   
 
Within the context of family firms, García-Ramos and García-Olalla (2011) contrastingly 
documented varied effect of CEO duality on the value of family-controlled firms when 
the identity of the family owners are considered, specifically whether the family 
owners-managers are descendants or the founders. CEO duality is found to improve 
value of family-controlled firms that are under the management of descendants. 
Conversely, CEO duality plays no significant role on the value of family-controlled firms 
that are under the management of founder. They suggested that unitary leadership 
structure may be an unnecessary corporate governance mechanism in family-
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controlled firms, in which the controlling family exerts de facto control over firm 
resources.  
 
 
3.4.4 Firm Size 
 
 
The origin notion of size effect can be traced back to the earliest paper by Banz (1981), 
who found evidence suggesting that returns were abnormally high for firms with 
relatively small market capitalisation. Subsequently Keim (1982) studies also revealed 
that over the entire 1931-1978 period the relation between daily abnormal returns and 
firm size was negative and more pronounced in January than in any other month. In 
general, size effect infers an inverse relation between firm size and firm value.  
 
 
The implication of size effect is also examined in corporate acquisition studies. The 
overall inferences from past findings are that smaller size acquiring firms are good 
acquirers than larger size acquiring firms, based on the observed stock market reaction 
to corporate acquisition announcements. Moeller et al. (2004) results indicate robust 
evidence that small acquirers on average exhibit positive announcement-period 
abnormal returns and large acquirers on average exhibit negative announcement-
period abnormal returns. Their samples comprise 12023 US corporate acquisition 
announcements for the period 1980-2001. They interpret this size effect as a support 
for managerial hubris hypothesis (Roll 1986). They find that larger acquiring firms tend 
to pay higher premiums and perform negative dollar corporate acquisitions. 
Furthermore, larger size acquiring firm is inherently an effective defender against 
takeover since it takes more resources to acquire a large size firm. Consequently, 
manager of larger acquiring firms is expected to be more entrenched and more likely to 
make value-decreasing corporate acquisitions, resulting in size effect. 
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Subsequent studies that specifically examine if size of the acquiring firms is a significant 
variable in explaining acquiring firm stock performance during corporate acquisition 
announcement period also support Moeller et al. (2004) findings. Based on a sample of 
269 corporate acquisition activities for 1980 to 2003, Kräussl and Topper (2007)  
evidence also revealed the presence of size effect for Dutch stock market. Small firm 
size acquirers are found to earn abnormal returns of 2.45% higher than large firm size 
acquirers during corporate acquisition announcement period. Masulis et al. (2007), 
Faccio et al. (2006) and Bae et al. (2013) studies also document that size of acquiring 
firms has a significant negative effect on acquiring firm announcement-period stock 
returns. 65 
 
 
3.4.5 Target Firm Characteristic 
3.4.5.1  Cross-Border Target and Domestic Target 
 
 
Findings on the correlation between cross-border corporate acquisition and wealth 
effect of corporate acquisition announcements on the acquiring firms remain mixed. 
On one hand, studies also document the negative valuation impact of cross-border 
acquisitions on acquiring firms (Moeller et al. 2004; Conn et al. 2005; Bris and Cabolis 
2008; Kuipers et al. 2009). The discovered correlation can be due to the fact that cross-
border acquisitions may be less favored in conseuqnce of the payment of an 
unwarranted premium for a foreign company to enter foreign markets (Denis et al. 
2002; Shaked et al. 1991).  
 
 
                                                          
65
 Past studies measure firm size as log transformation of acquiring firm’s total assets (Masulis et al. 2007; Bae 
et al. 2013) and market capitalization (Moeller et al. 2004). Moeller et al. (2004) specifically segregate small 
(large) acquiring firms when the market capitalization of the acquiring firm is less (greater) than the market 
capitalization of the 25th percentile of the NYSE firms in the same year. 
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On the other hand, empirical researches have revealed that shareholders of acquiring 
firms place greater value on cross-border corporate acquisition activities than the 
domestic ones (Feito-Ruiz and Menéndez-Requejo 2011). This is consistent with prior 
studies that when acquiring foreign firms, acquiring firms experience significant 
positive announcement period returns for their corporate acquisition activities (Eije 
and Wiegerinck 2010; Ben-Amar and André 2006; Martynova and Renneboog 2008; 
Francis et al. 2008; Moeller and Schlingemann 2005). Cross-border acquisitions may be 
more favored by the acquirers than domestic acquisitions due to synergistic gains 
based on economies of scale and scope, access to additional knowledge, access to 
improved corporate governance (Walker 2000; Doukas and Travlos 1988; Markides and 
Ittner 1994). Other studies attribute cross-border acquisitions to the profit from 
differences in tax systems (Froot and Stein 1991). 66  
 
 
3.4.5.2  Private and Public-Listed Target 
 
 
Public or private target refer to the corporate type of the acquired firm that is either a 
public listed firms or a non-listing firms. Past literature show that target firms that are 
private firms are found to significantly affect stock market reaction, positively. 
Consensual evidence reveals that when acquiring private targets, acquiring firms would 
experience a positive stock return from the corporate acquisition announcements 
(Chang 1998; Fuller et al. 2002; Ben-Amar and André 2006; Conn et al. 2005; Eije and 
Wiegerinck 2010; Faccio et al. 2006; Capron and Shen 2007; Bae et al. 2013).  
 
 
Studies offer few explanations for such phenomenon of the significant and positive 
announcement-period stock returns association with acquisition of private targets, as 
experienced by the acquiring firms. Fuller et al. (2002) state that private firms are less 
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 There have been no existing family firm studies in current literature which focus specifically on examining the 
wealth effect of cross-border acquisitions or domestic acquisitions. 
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liquid and less easily sold, consequently they trade at a discount rate compared to 
those of listing firms. Such notion is also supported by Officer (Officer 2007) given that 
it is more difficult to sell private firms in comparison to public firms, there may be an 
inherent liquidity discount incorporated in the transaction price of private firm 
acquisitions. Conn et al. (2005) also state that private targets are less visible to the 
public which thereby leads to better possibility to terminate acquisition negotiations 
without a loss of face and thus avoid acquirers overpaying due to hubris. Consequently, 
the acquirers of private targets benefit from such discounts and inherent benefits when 
acquiring private targets. 
 
 
3.4.6 Payment Method 
 
 
Studies show mixing results regarding the effect of payment method in relation to the 
stock market’s response to corporate acquisition announcements. Evidence reveals 
that market favour equity-financed acquisitions over cash-financed acquisitions. There 
are also findings that show cash-financed acquisitions induce significant positive 
market reaction.  
 
 
Studies reveal acquirers that select cash-financed acquisitions experience significant 
positive wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. This is generally 
attributed to a signal by the management to the market that acquiring firm’s 
management believes their stock is undervalued (Myers and Majluf 1984).  Hence, 
management expects market to receive such signal and thereby revaluate and raise 
share value upon the announcement of company corporate acquisition activity that is 
financed with cash. Wansley et al. (1983) findings support the notion that cash-
financed corporate acquisition induce significant positive stock market reaction. 
Consistent with Wansley et al. (1983) findings, Asquith and Bruner (1987) evidence also 
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reveals that acquiring firm experience significant stock market positive reaction when 
opt for cash payment mergers. They also further evidence that bidding firms stock 
returns decrease when attempting equity payment mergers. Subsequent studies also 
provide evidence of the significant positive effect of cash-financed corporate 
acquisitions on wealth effect of corporate acquisitions that are experienced by the 
acquiring firms (Linn and Switzer 2001; Walker 2000; Ben-Amar and André 2006; 
Moeller et al. 2003; Cumming and Li 2011; Chi et al. 2011).  
 
 
On the other hand, existing studies also provide empirical evidence that acquiring firms 
experience significant negative stock market response when performing equity-
financed corporate acquisition (Travlos 1987; Amihud and Lev 1981a; Brown and 
Ryngaert 1991; Servaes 1991). This is generally attributed to the adverse selection 
problem in equity issuance (Myers and Majluf 1984). Nonetheless, Chang (1998) and 
Fuller et al. (2002) report that the wealth effect of equity-financed corporate 
acquisition is less negative and even positive when target is privately held. They 
attribute this to the addition of new blockholders in consequence of the equity-
financed corporate acquisition. Consequently, the acquiring firms may benefit from the 
active monitoring from the new blockholders who are also the new owners of the 
acquiring firms.  
 
 
Subsequent to Chang (1998) and Fuller et al. (2002) discoveries, Masulis et al. (2007) 
have attempted to fully capture the effect of target type and acquisition payment 
method by interacting these two categories of factors. 67  Consistent with Chang (1998) 
findings, Masulis et al. (2007) finds that equity-financed acquisition increase 
announcement-period stock performance of acquiring firm, specifically when the target 
is privately held firm or an existing subsidiary. They also suggested that the difference 
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 The interactive indicator includes public cash-financed acquisition, public equity-financed acquisition, private 
cash-financed acquisition, private equity-financed acquisition, subsidiary cash-financed acquisition and 
subsidiary equity-financed acquisition. 
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in acquiring firm stock performance between acquisitions of privately held firm and 
public firm is due to equity payment method. 
 
 
Within the context of family firms, Basu et al. (2009) examined the wealth effect of 
corporate acquisitions of family-controlled acquirers, specifically on cash-financed 
acquisitions. They posited that since cash-financed acquisitions do not alter family 
ownership in the family-controlled firms, the stock performance of the acquiring 
companies can be easily and clearly observed. The stock performance is not affected by 
any value adjustments resulting from equity dilution through stock-financed 
acquisitions. Their findings reveal that family with low level of ownership are more 
likely to perform cash-financed corporate acquisitions. This is to avoid the dilution of 
family control and ownership resultant from the issuance of new equity as the source 
of funds. The concern of the controlling family towards the dilution of family control 
from the issuance of equity is also supported by Amihud et al. (1990).  Amihud et al. 
(1990) reports that firms with owners of concentrated ownership is reluctant to opt to 
equity-financed corporate acquisitions.  
 
 
Basu et al. (2009) also demonstrate a nonlinear relation between the announcement-
period CARs and family ownership for cash-financed acquisitions. Taken as whole, 
family owners with high ownership level perform value-enhancing corporate 
acquisitions due to their interests are well aligned with other shareholders. However, 
family owners with low ownership level are entrenched. Evidence reveals that family 
ownership with low ownership experience negative announcement-period abnormal 
stock returns when performing corporate acquisitions. This overall suggests that the 
level of family ownership play vital role in explaining and revealing whether family 
owners’ interests are well aligned with other shareholders, which thereby determine 
the valuation effect of their corporate acquisition activities.  
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3.4.7 Relative Acquisition Size 
 
 
Empirical evidence claims that large acquisitions relative to the size of the acquiring 
firms destroy value of the acquiring firms (Alexandridis et al. 2013). Accordingly, 
acquirers experience greater losses when acquiring relatively larger targets due to 
higher probability of overpaying. This is especially the case for confident managers who 
overestimate their own ability to extract benefits from the acquisitions (Roll 1986; 
Malmendier and Tate 2005) or for top management who are promised higher private 
benefits (Morck et al. 1990; Loderer and Martin 1990; Harford and Li 2007).  
 
 
Existing studies have demonstrated that wealth effect of corporate acquisitions is 
subjected to the influence of the acquisition transaction value. 68 Asquith et al. (1983), 
Moeller et al. (2004) and Bae et al. (2013) provide evidence that announcement-period 
stock performance of the acquiring firms is positively related to acquisition size.  
Specifically, Moeller et al. (2004) documented that corporate acquisitions made by 
large size acquiring firms result in losses when acquiring large targets. In general, the 
significant correlation documented signifies that a more favourable valuation effect of 
corporate acquisition announcement is realised for the acquiring firm when the 
acquisition size is relatively large. 
 
 
On the other hand, Travlos (1987) and Alexandridis et al. (2013) documented a 
contradictory significant negative correlation between wealth effect of corporate 
acquisition and acquisition size. Conversely, Masulis et al. (2007) do not find any 
significant impact of acquisition size on wealth effect of corporate acquisition. 
However, they do find that acquisition size significantly and negatively explains the 
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 The acquisition size is measured as the ratio of market value of target’s equity to the market value of the 
acquiring firm’s equity (Travlos 1987); it is the sum of all consideration paid, excluding fees and costs, divided by 
market value of equity of the acquiring firm (Moeller et al. 2004; Masulis et al. 2007); alternatively, it is the ratio 
of the market capitalisation of the target firm relative to market median (Alexandridis et al. 2013). 
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wealth effect of corporate acquisition only for corporate acquisitions that are 
performed between two companies from the high tech industries.  They explain that it 
is difficult for these companies of relatively comparable size to integrate smoothly due 
to the comparably important capital and intellectual property in high tech companies, 
which are often lost in employee turnover after the acquisitions. Acquirers are more 
likely to underestimate the costs and overestimate the synergies generated.   
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3.5 Summary 
 
 
In summary, corporate acquisition announcements contained in past relevant studies 
that have been examined in this chapter shed light on a controversial issue: do family-
controlled firms of developing countries engage in activities that extract private 
benefits of control at the expense of the minority shareholders or do they engage in 
value-enhancing activities? Past evidences of family firms and corporate acquisition 
studies inferred that the benefits of family owners with concentrated ownership 
outweigh the costs of potential minority shareholders expropriation, or vice versa. As 
emphasised by Johnson et al. (2000), controlling family owners can make suboptimal 
investment decisions, which increase the socio-political influence of the controlling 
family at the expense of the minority shareholders. On the other hand, the notion of 
interest alignment hypothesis claims that the inherent concentrated ownership by 
family owner-manager naturally align the interests of principals and agents, which 
leads to better investment decision. Faccio and Stolin (2006) as well as Shleifer et al. 
(1997) have also highlighted that the evidences of agency problem have been clearly 
exhibited via corporate acquisition activities.  Overall from a theoretical point of view, 
it is not clear which of the two effects prevails in firms with large family owners: an 
increased positive effect of concentrated family ownership due to better alignment of 
owner-manager interests or the entrenchment of family owners that would go for 
extraction of private benefits that are harmful to minority shareholders. 
 
 
As discussed, relevant examinations were conducted on the role of family-controlled 
firms and wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements, in relation to the 
varied effects of ownership structures, legal and judicial systems as well as institutional 
environments of different countries. The evidences of these studies have been rife with 
disagreements.  Some found family-controlled firms do perform corporate acquisition 
activities that are value-enhancing to shareholders of the acquiring firms. Others 
unearthed evidence that family-controlled firms perform corporate acquisition 
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activities that are detrimental to the wealth of minority shareholders but value-
enhancing to the controlling family in terms of wealth or private benefits that are not 
shared with the minority shareholders.  
 
 
In general, based on past studies examining other stock markets, family ownership is an 
important factor in explaining the stock returns of family-controlled acquiring firms 
during the corporate acquisition announcement period. On average, family-controlled 
acquiring firms are found to induce positive investors’ reaction when announcing one 
of the major corporate investment decisions – corporate acquisitions. This positive 
investor response is inconsistent with past overall findings that the stock returns of 
acquiring firms were insignificant during the corporate acquisition announcement 
period (Campa and Hernando 2004; Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Tuch and 
O'Sullivan 2007; Alexandridis et al. 2010). This further underscores the fact that wealth 
effect of family-controlled firms’ corporate acquisition decisions is quite different from 
that of other non-family-controlled corporations with dissimilar ownership structures. 
 
 
Overall evidence also revealed non-linear relationship between family ownership and 
stock performance of the family-controlled acquiring firms during the corporate 
acquisition announcement period. The documented non-linear relationship further 
suggests successful alignment between the interests of family owner-manager with the 
interests of other shareholders at low level of ownership; entrenchment from family 
owners (minority shareholder expropriation) creeps in following an increasingly 
concentrated family ownership.  
 
 
There is evidence of minority shareholder expropriation activities carried out by Korean 
family-controlled firms through intergroup merger manoeuvres. However, it is not 
always true that corporate acquisition activities are employed by the controlling family 
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owners to extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders.  Hence, 
the conflicting findings and inferences of various studies cannot be generalised and 
applied to all stock markets. The main factor contributing to these divergent findings is 
the fact that these studies were undertaken in different countries, each of which has its 
own set of legal system, investor protection system, corporate governance system, 
social norms and cultural background. Again, this emphasises the importance of 
conducting individual studies for each country as the researchers are able to consider 
the above-mentioned factors in the local context with better control of data quality, 
and holding other factors constant, which might be difficult to disentangle in cross-
country studies (Fan, Wei, et al. 2011).  
 
 
Based on the review of past studies and in consideration of the influence of varied 
family ownership structures, ownership mechanisms, functioning of legal and judicial 
systems and institutional environment as mentioned in Chapter 2, an empirical 
question naturally arises:  do family ownership structures of Malaysian family-
controlled firms lead to a satisfactory alignment of principal-agent interests which 
induces value-enhancing corporate acquisition activities, or do they encourage family 
firms to indulge in minority shareholder expropriation behaviour by opting for value-
destroying corporate acquisition activities as a result of concentrated family 
ownership?  Furthermore, what are the determinants that affect significantly the 
wealth effect of corporate acquisitions for Malaysian family firms? 
 
 
From the traditional corporate governance perspective, the use of control-enhancing 
mechanisms (pyramidal structures and concentrated ownership) by Malaysian family-
controlled firms looks very vulnerable to abuse for extracting the wealth of minority 
shareholders. However, even with ample opportunities to expropriate minority 
shareholders, it does not necessarily mean that Malaysian family-controlled firms 
actually do so. Review from Chapter 2, nevertheless, shows that some Malaysian 
family-controlled firms are involved in questionable activities that amount to 
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expropriation of minority shareholders; these evidences are based on actual cases from 
the industries. However, are such behaviours also reflected in corporate acquisition 
activities of Malaysian family-controlled firms? 
 
 
Overall, the review demonstrates that due to the distinctive features and 
characteristics of family-controlled firms, the relationship between different 
determinants and wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements may deviate 
from those normally perceived for a company in general, especially those from the East 
Asian countries. The discussed determinants in this chapter included firm-related 
characteristics (free cash flow, corporate governance mechanisms and firm size), deal 
characteristics (domestic or non-domestic target, public or private target, payment 
method and relative deal size) and family-specific features. These deviations have been 
given explanations (in past studies) due to specific characteristics and features of family 
firms, which are not carried in other type of organizations. These further highlight the 
importance of understanding is needed regarding the effect of various determinants on 
firm value under the influence of family ownership in the extant literature, especially in 
the international context.   
 
 
Studies that are mainly conducted for large public firms from developed countries also 
raise concern that the applicability of those results that may not apply to the non-
developed countries, as a result of different institutional and economic settings. Such 
notion has also been highlighted by Miller et al. (2007), Cucculelli and Micucci (2008), 
Fan et al. (2011), Faccio et al. (2001) and Maury et al. (2013). The review in this chapter 
overall provides further predictions on the possible correlation between these firm-
related characteristics with announcement-period stock returns of the acquiring firms, 
specifically under the influence of family-controlled firms for the forthcoming chapters.  
 
  
129 
 
  
CHAPTER 4 HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter presents the development of hypotheses to answer the research 
questions and objective of this study. With reference to the family firm literature, 
corporate acquisition literature and corporate governance literature, a number of 
hypotheses are developed within the Malaysian context.  From our discussions, a total 
of nine hypotheses emerge and articulated in Section 4.2. These hypotheses are used 
to examine the relation between family-related traits and the announcement-period 
wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. These family-specific traits 
comprise mainly family ownership, family management regime, board features of 
family firms and related party acquisitions. 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 in Section 4.2.1 addresses Research Question 2– Is 
family ownership an important corporate governance characteristic to determine 
whether Malaysian family-controlled firms perform value-enhancing or value-
decreasing corporate acquisitions?  Hypothesis 3 until Hypothesis 8 in Section 4.2.2 – 
Section 4.2.7 addresses Research Question 3– Are family-related traits important 
determinants of the market value changes in Malaysian family-controlled firms when 
undertaking corporate acquisitions? 
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It should be emphasised that one of the family-specific traits examined in this study has 
hitherto not yet been empirically studied and given much attention within the 
corporate governance literature and family firm literature. Specifically, Malaysian 
family firms having family-related CEO and chairman on the board are commonly 
observable. However, such family-specific trait has never raised the concern as to 
whether such practices (while not against the current recommended corporate 
governance practices) are detrimental to firm value.  
 
 
This chapter ends at Section 4.3, which presents an overall summary and conceptual 
schema of this study. 
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4.2 Hypotheses Development 
4.2.1 Family Ownership  
 
 
Corporate acquisitions have been one of the most researched corporate investment 
strategies over decades.  The findings  of these studies (Campa and Hernando 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007; Alexandridis et al. 2010) 
for firms in the European Union, the UK, the USA, France and Korea have been 
reviewed thoroughly and summarised. It has been concluded that on average, the 
acquired firms (targets) experience significant positive investor reaction during 
corporate acquisition announcement periods. In contrast, the value-creation effects of 
corporate acquisition announcements on acquiring companies have been reported to 
be insignificant. In other words, past empirical studies have concluded that corporate 
acquisitions fail to contribute significantly (either positively or negatively) to the 
acquiring firms (the acquirers). 
 
 
This raises the concern that investors actually care less about the investment strategies 
of their invested companies. According to the traditional valuation theory, the stock 
market is expected to respond to the corporate acquisition decision of an acquiring 
firm (acquirer) upon the release of the announcement to the public, thereby inducing 
movement in the stock prices. Hence, the discovery is also in disagreement with the 
traditional valuation theory where the total market value of a firm is equal to present 
value of future expected earnings generated by existing assets and the net present 
value of future investment opportunities taken by firms in the future (Miller and 
Modigliani 1961).  
 
 
Since growing attention has been given to family firms, a few studies have discovered 
that corporate acquisition decisions of family-controlled firms can be interpreted 
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differently in regard to the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. 69 In 
consequence of the inherent characteristics of family-controlled firms, corporate 
acquisition decisions of family-controlled firms are found to result in significant stock 
market response upon the release of announcements to the public (either negatively or 
positively).  
 
 
Two opposing hypotheses predict the relation between family ownership and wealth 
effect of corporate acquisition announcements. Based on the prediction of interest 
alignment hypothesis, the inherent alignment of interests between family owners-
managers and the shareholders creates an incentive for family owners-managers to 
perform value-enhancing corporate acquisition activities. In accordance with the notion 
of interest alignment hypothesis, the market is expected to react positively and 
significantly to corporate acquisition announcements of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms.   
 
 
However, existing empirical findings provide evidence that at a high level of insider 
shareholdings, the insiders become entrenched, resulting in a decrease in firm value. 
Such situation is generally known as managerial entrenchment (Morck et al. 1988; 
Hermalin and Weisbach 1991), which fosters the misallocation of company resources 
and attempts to block takeovers (Jensen and Ruback 1983). Looking further into this 
area, within the agency framework in family firm studies, family-controlled firms 
intrinsically lead to this second type of agency conflict known as the principal-principal 
agency problem—Agency Problem II (Villalonga and Amit 2006; André et al. 2012; Croci 
and Petmezas 2010), which differs in nature70 from those in non-family firms (Chrisman 
et al. 2004). 
 
 
                                                          
69
 As discussed in Chapter 3. 
70
 The differences are discussed in detail in Chapter 3—Section 3.2.2. 
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Hence, the beneficial effect of concentration of insider family ownership in aligning 
interests between manager and owner may be substituted with conflict of interest 
between family owners-managers and minority shareholders, in support of the 
expropriation hypothesis (Villalonga and Amit 2006; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). There 
is a possibility that the controlling family may opt for value-destroying corporate 
acquisitions for private benefits that can only be enjoyed by the controlling family, at 
the expense of the minority shareholders of the acquiring firms (Bae et al. 2002). As the 
level of family ownership increases, the adoption of a non-economic objective of the 
controlling family becomes more likely (Chrisman et al. 2012). Consequently, if the 
investors loathe value-destroying corporate acquisitions of family-controlled firms, the 
market is expected to react significantly and negatively to corporate acquisition 
announcements of Malaysian family-controlled firms. Based on the existing opposing 
hypotheses that predict the relation between family ownership and wealth effect of 
corporate acquisition announcements, a null hypothesis is made in accordance with the 
interest alignment hypothesis; hence, it is hypothesised that:- 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 
There is a positive relation between family ownership and stock returns of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms during corporate acquisition announcement 
periods. 
 
 
The juxtaposition of these two extreme agency problems (Agency Problem I and 
Agency Problem II) based on evidence drawn from Malaysia, an emerging economy 
where family insider ownership is common, shall enhance our understanding of the 
basic behaviour of Malaysian family-controlled firms vis-à-vis those from the developed 
economies. This reinforces the arguments of Fan et al. (2011) and Jameson et al. (2014) 
that the applicability of past empirical inferences drawn based on family firm studies 
from developed economies may not be relevant to the emerging markets, due to 
dissimilar cultural, institutional and economic settings.   
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There are also evidence that reveal a nonlinear relation between family ownership and 
family firm performance, for family firms of the S&P500 in the US (Anderson and Reeb 
2003b), Poland (Kowalewski et al. 2010), Canada (Ben-Amar and André 2006) and 
Europe (Maury 2006). The notion of a nonlinear relation between family ownership and 
family firm value posits that as the level of family ownership increases, the beneficial 
effect of interest alignment between family owners-managers and shareholders on 
firm performance is substituted with conflict of interest between family owners-
managers and shareholders. Hence, the adoption of a non-economic objective of the 
controlling family becomes more likely (Chrisman et al. 2012). To examine if there is a 
nonlinear relation between family ownership and firm market value within the context 
of Malaysian family-controlled firms and corporate acquisitions, it is hypothesised 
that:- 
 
 
Hypothesis 2 
There is a nonlinear relation between family ownership and stock returns of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms during corporate acquisition announcement 
periods. 
 
 
In general, for the purpose of testing Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, the significance of 
stock market reaction to corporate acquisition announcements of Malaysian family-
controlled firms is examined. Specifically, inferences of Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 
are based on the observed share price adjustments upon corporate acquisition 
announcements of Malaysian family-controlled firms. The measurement employed for 
the share price adjustments in this study is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. 
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4.2.2 Family Management  
 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1.1, one of the common features of family-controlled firms 
is the controlling family dominating the senior management position in family firms, 
especially among Asian family firms (Carney and Child 2012; Lins 2003). Advocate of 
agency theory argues that family CEOs are beneficial to family firm performance. In 
comparison with non-family-related CEO, exchange of knowledge and skills from 
different dimensions are exchanged with one another over a long horizon (Fama and 
Jensen 1983b).  Furthermore, family CEOs also have better access to resources through 
informal or private networks (such as business groups) (Peng and Jiang 2010). Existing 
studies support the beneficial effect of family management on family firm value (Isakov 
and Weisskopf 2014). Existing country-level studies that have been respectively 
conducted on family firms from different countries show that family firms with founder 
CEO or descendant CEO have a positive impact on family firm value (Anderson and 
Reeb 2003b; Sraer and Thesmar 2007; Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013).  
 
 
However, there are also studies that have provided different inferences on this notion. 
There are studies that showed the succession to CEO position by descendants 
deteriorates family firm value (Pérez-González 2006; Villalonga and Amit 2006), while 
some showed that firms under the ownership of heirs only perform positively when the 
descendants do not assume an active managerial role in the family firms (Barontini and 
Caprio 2006). There is also a study that finds descendant-managed firms do not exhibit 
significant relation with family firm value (André et al. 2012). These studies with mixed 
evidence were conducted on family firms from different continents across the US to 
Europe and Asia. The evidence raises the conjecture that different impacts of family 
managerial role on firm valuation differ across family firms from different countries. 
This can be due to the influence of different legal and institutional environments, and 
cultural settings of the family firms (Caprio et al. 2011; Fan, Wei, et al. 2011).  
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The non-consistent findings, in general, on the relation of family active management 
with family firm value from different countries raise the concern to further examine 
this notion within the context of Malaysian family firms. An important question that 
needs to be answered is: Does the active managerial role of controlling family as family 
CEO in Malaysian family firms induce better corporate acquisition decisions, which are 
value-adding to family firms? It is hypothesised that:- 
 
 
   Hypothesis 3 
There is a positive relation between family CEO and stock returns of Malaysian 
family-controlled firms during corporate acquisition announcement periods. 
 
 
4.2.3 Founder-CEO 
 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1.2, in comparison with other types of firm owners, 
founding owners often better understand their businesses because of their active 
involvement in managing the firms. Founding owners have the incentive and 
motivation to monitor the business closely. They have a great deal of their fortune 
invested in the firms, and the future of their families depends on the successful 
operations of these firms; these personal interests spur many of these owners to 
become careful stewards of their companies (Anderson and Reeb 2003a; Villalonga and 
Amit 2006). Founders are able to add value to the company due to their specialised 
knowledge, long-term ownership and non-pecuniary ties to the company (in terms of 
reputational and emotional ties) (James 1999; Demsetz and Lehn 1985). 
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Several studies have compared the financial performance of firms managed by 
founders and firms managed by non-founders.  Since the earlier years of corporate 
development, Willard et al. (1992) found no difference in financial performance 
between founder-managed and professionally managed firms. On the other hand, 
analysis by Anderson and Reeb (2003) indicated a positive relation between founding 
family owners and firm performance when founders were still active in the 
management of family firms. Later studies further supported the findings of Anderson 
and Reeb (2003) that founder firms showed superior performance (Lee 2006; Miller et 
al. 2007; Saito 2008; Andres 2008; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Adams et al. 2009). 
Within the context of corporate acquisition and family firms, studies have reported the 
positive effect of founder on value creation of corporate acquisitions (André et al. 
2012; Sraer and Thesmar 2007). Overall, empirical evidence supports the notion that 
founders add value to family firms. 
 
 
Within the context of corporate acquisitions, Andre et al. (2012) support the notion of 
founder positive effect on the announcement-period firm value of the acquiring family 
firms.  This finding supports those found in previous studies that founder perform 
value-added corporate acquisitions (Li and Srinivasan 2011; Fahlenbrach 2009). A 
report from Grant Thornton (2002a) reveals that the majority of Malaysian family 
businesses are managed by founders. However, it is unclear whether founders are a 
significant influence in inducing Malaysia family-controlled firms to perform value-
added corporate acquisition activities. Such family-specific features have not yet been 
empirically examined within the context of Malaysia. Hence, it is hypothesised that:- 
 
Hypothesis 4 
There is a positive relation between the founder-CEO and stock returns of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms during corporate acquisition announcement 
periods. 
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4.2.4 Descendant-CEO  
 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1.3, the concern about inherited control in a family firm has 
often been highlighted and examined (Amore et al. 2011; Cucculelli and Marchionne 
2012) even decades earlier (Beckhard and Gibb Dyer Jr 1983); it is generally accepted 
that maintaining the prosperity of businesses in a family firm over time has been 
difficult.  It has also been generally emphasised in past studies that inherited control is 
linked to poor family firm performance (Kidwell et al. 2013). The findings of Villalonga 
and Amit (2006) and Pérez-González (2006) particularly assert that when descendants 
serve as CEO, the firm value is destroyed. They examined specifically family-controlled 
firms in the US. Other studies also empirically showed that descendant-managed family 
firms exhibit poor financial performance in Canada (Morck et al. 1998), Germany, the 
UK and the US (Bloom and Van Reenen 2006), Italy (Cucculelli and Micucci 2008) and 
Denmark (Bennedsen et al. 2007).  
 
 
Different from the Western economies, studies conducted among Asian family firms 
showed that Asian family firms continue to perform well under the management of the 
descendants.  Japanese family firms (Suzuki, Suntory, Matsui Securities etc.) have 
persistently proven their permanent existence worldwide, breaking the decree against 
declining family dynasty (The Economist 2012). A recent study conducted among 
Japanese family firms further reveals an entirely different notion on firm performance 
of inherited Japanese family firms (Mehrotra et al. 2013) from the conventionally 
perceived notion that wealth does not last over three generations (Lee and Li 2009). 
Japanese family firms are found to maintain family firm performance throughout 
generations by performing adoptions or marriages to bring in capable sons-in-law (or 
daughters-in-law) into the businesses (Mehrotra et al. 2013). Similarly, Thailand family 
firms tend to perform marriages that add value to family firms71 to ensure the 
continuous good performance of the family firms (Bukanwanicha et al. 2013). These 
                                                          
71
 When the partners are from either prominent businesses or political families. 
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findings overall demonstrate that past inferences for family firms of the examined 
economies (Villalonga and Amit 2006; Pérez-González 2006) do not necessarily apply to 
those of other economies due to dissimilar cultural, legal and economic settings (Miller 
et al. 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). 
 
 
Succession decision continues to be one of the most contentious issues surrounding 
family firms (Deloitte Growth Enterprise Services 2013; Poutziouris et al. 2013; KPMG 
2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). In Malaysia, Malaysian family-controlled firms 
are highly concentrated, with strong control by the founder families and descendants 
(Mallin 2011). A national survey by Grant Thornton72 in collaboration with Malaysian 
Institute of Management (MIM) highlighted the attitude of Malaysian family businesses 
towards management succession (Grant Thornton 2002a). The survey reports that at 
an almost equivalent basis, one third of Malaysian family owners believe that 
management succession should be maintained within the family while another one 
third feel that management succession need not be maintained within the family.  
Corporate acquisition activities, in this case, provide a direct measure of heir’s ability to 
make value-enhancing or value-decreasing investment decisions. 73  Based on the 
evidence documented for Asian family firms, this notion leads to the following 
hypothesis:- 
 
Hypothesis 5 
There is a positive relation between the descendant-CEO and stock returns of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms during corporate acquisition announcement 
periods.  
                                                          
72
 The complexity and special circumstances surrounding family businesses and the importance of family 
businesses to a country’s economy are emphasised by Grant Thornton. Consequently, this brings to the 
establishment of this national survey worldwide, which is part of the unique service product of Grant 
Thornton’s specialist service for family businesses—PRIMA (People and Relationship Issues in Management). To 
date, more than 30 countries have been involved in this academic research for family businesses which 
underpins PRIMA (Grant Thornton 2002b). 
73
 One study has employed such method to study the impact of descendants on family firm performance for the 
case of French family firms (Sraer and Thesmar 2007). 
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4.2.5 Family Representatives on the Board  
 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1.4, ideally, the governance role and functions of the board 
of a family firm should not differ from those of other non-family firms. However, 
studies reveal that family-controlled firms often seek to minimise the presence of 
independent directors (Anderson and Reeb 2004) and are reluctant to adopt 
monitoring practices (Chen and Nowland 2010), which may inevitably harm the 
shareholders’ wealth if the actions of the board are not effectively monitored.  
Moreover, recent studies have found that the board of a family firm tends to be 
dominated by family members (García-Ramos and García-Olalla 2011; Collin and 
Ahlberg 2012); this negatively affects family firm corporate governance practices, 
which in turn has a negative effect on firm value (Cheung et al. 2013; Anderson and 
Reeb 2004). Nonetheless, specific studies on the relation between the board of family 
firms with controlling shareholders and firm valuation remain scant (Collin and Ahlberg 
2012; Cheung et al. 2013).  
 
 
From an agency perspective (Jensen and Meckling 1976), if the board of family firms 
continues its governance role, the investment decision of family-controlled firms would 
be value-adding to the firms’ wealth. This naturally leads to the concern whether the 
board with family directors continues to act in the interest of all the shareholders. 
Studies have investigated the influence of family representatives on the board on firm 
valuation, with a negative influence concluded for Hong Kong publicly listed family 
firms (Cheung et al. 2013). The studies of Anderson and Reeb (2004) also showed the 
poorer performance of US family-controlled firms when the number of family 
representatives exceeded those of the independent directors on the board.  Hitherto, 
no studies have been done to discover if the domination of family members on the 
board significantly affects these investment decisions of the family-controlled firms, 
which in turn affect the value of the family-controlled firms. Hence, with reference to 
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the literature and based on existing studies, for the case of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms, it is hypothesised that:- 
 
 
Hypothesis 6 
There is a negative relation between family representatives on the board 
(relative to independent directors on the board) and announcement period stock 
performance of Malaysian family-controlled acquiring firms. 
 
 
4.2.6 Family-Related CEO and Chairman 
 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.3.2, CEO duality occurs when the positions of CEO and 
board chairperson are both held by the same individual in a corporation. Given that the 
purpose of prime board charter is to effectively monitor the decisions and actions of 
top management, dual role of CEO may impinge on the necessary independent 
judgement required (Rechner and Dalton 1989; Dey et al. 2011). Such notion is 
supported by agency theory, which asserts that the separation of CEO and chairman 
role on the board improves firm performance, as a result of better monitoring by the 
chairman (Fama and Jensen 1983b; Finkelstein and D’Aveni 1994). Furthermore, agency 
costs are also reduced by separation of decision management from the decision control 
(Boyd 1995). 
 
 
Within the literature of family firms, the corporate governance effect of unitary 
leadership structure remains ambiguous for family-controlled firms, when the role of 
family ownership and family-specific traits are considered (Braun and Sharma 2007; 
García-Ramos and García-Olalla 2011). Unitary leadership structure in family-controlled 
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firms represents an important monitoring mechanism which safeguards the interests of 
non-family shareholders, since the interests of the non-family shareholders can be 
secondary to the controlling families. The combination of CEO and chairman roles by 
the controlling family may compound agency costs, which will be borne by non-family 
shareholders. 
 
 
Within the context of family firms, there can be cases when the roles of CEO and 
chairman are separated between two individuals who are family-related. In this case, 
the roles of CEO and chairman that are held by family-related individuals are said to 
have lost its preliminary function of maintaining a unitary board leadership structure.  
Within the context of Malaysian family-controlled firms, such scenario is commonly 
observable. 74 The family relation between a chairman and a CEO on the board normally 
involves father-son, spouses, uncle-nephew or even siblings. Such setting is not against 
the guidance and best practices as recommended by the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance. In the Statement of Corporate Governance in the annual report, the 
description given to the status of the chairman is generally stated as independent from 
the role of CEO.  However, given that the purpose of prime board charter is to 
effectively monitor the decisions and actions of top management, (Rechner and Dalton 
1989; Dey et al. 2011), such arrangement of independent roles of CEO and chairman 
who are family-related may impinge on the necessary independent judgement 
required.  
 
 
Hitherto (Jameson et al. 2014), such family-specific features on the board have never 
been empirically examined within family firm literature and corporate governance 
literature. Therefore, this thesis aims to be the first to examine if the separated roles of 
CEO and chairman among family-related individuals inflict any significant negative 
effect on the value of family firms, within the context of corporate acquisition studies. 
                                                          
74
 As discussed and reported in forthcoming chapter—Chapter 5 Section 5.4.2 
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Hence, the existence of such arrangement within the context of Malaysian family-
controlled firms leads to the following hypothesis:- 
 
Hypothesis 7: 
There is a negative relation between family-related CEO and Chairman and 
stock performance of Malaysian family-controlled acquiring firms during 
announcement periods. 
 
 
4.2.7 Related Party Corporate Acquisition  
 
 
The potential to abuse related party transactions by controlling owners has become a 
worldwide policy issue, although this behaviour is seldom banned (OECD 2012b). The 
importance of a corporate governance framework that manages related party 
transactions with the aim of protecting minority shareholders has been emphasised, 
especially for Asian countries with lower investor protection systems and with 
concentrated shareholding ownership structure, in comparison with those of 
developed countries (McCahery and Vermeulen 2013; OECD 2012b).  
 
 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1.5, existing studies provide mixed evidence on the wealth 
effect of related party corporate acquisitions that are performed by family firms from 
different economies (Bae et al. 2002; Buysschaert et al. 2004; Holmen and Knopf 2004). 
Bae et al. (2002) documented expropriation behaviour of controlling owners through 
related-party corporate acquisitions for Korean business groups. On the other hand, 
Holmen et al. (2004) and Buysschaert et al. (2004) do not find any support for the 
expropriation behaviour of the controlling owners through related-party corporate 
acquisitions, for the case of Sweden and Belgian respectively. These existing studies are 
conducted among business groups with controlling owners under the influence of 
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different legal settings, corporate governance environments and social norms in which 
these related party corporate acquisitions are performed. Rationale has been given to 
possible expropriation behaviour by the controlling owners – for private benefits in the 
forms of pecuniary gains or non-pecuniary gains (Johnson et al. 2000). On the other 
hand, Holmen et al. (2004) also suggest that the existence of extra-legal institutions 
also hinders the controlling owners from expropriation behaviour when they have 
ample opportunities to do so. 
 
 
Within the context of Malaysia, related party corporate acquisitions are allowed, in 
accordance with the Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa. The permission to 
conduct such transaction provides controlling family owners with opportunities to 
extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. This leads to an 
important empirical question:  Do Malaysian family owners expropriate minority 
shareholders through related party corporate acquisitions? On the other hand, do 
Malaysian family owners perform related party corporate acquisitions for strategic 
purposes that are beneficial to the overall shareholders’ wealth? Based on these 
arguments, it is hypothesised that:- 
 
 
 Hypothesis 8: 
There is a negative relation between related party corporate acquisitions and 
stock performance of Malaysian family-controlled acquiring firms during 
announcement periods. 
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4.3 Summary  
 
 
Eight hypotheses are constructed to explore family-specific features that may reveal a 
significant relation with the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements, 
within the context of family-controlled firms. The conceptual schema that depicts the 
relation among the key research variables is presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 1:  Conceptual Schema 
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CHAPTER 5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter focuses on explaining the data sources and research design used in this 
study specifically for Malaysian family-controlled firms, corporate acquisition 
announcements and other relevant information needed for the analysis.  Descriptive 
statistics are also discussed at the end of this chapter.  
 
 
Section 5.2 discusses the sample selection. Section 5.2.1 discusses the definition of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms in this study. Section 5.2.2 discusses the definition of 
corporate acquisition announcements in this study.  Section 5.2.3 discusses the stock 
prices used in this study. 
 
 
Section 5.3 overall discusses the dependent variable, independent variables and control 
variables in this study. The construction of the dependent variable using event study 
methodology is discussed in Section 5.3.1. The generated dependent variable – 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR), as specified in equation 5.5, is used as the 
measure of the announcement-period wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
announcements. Section 5.3.2 discusses the independent variables used in this study.  
Section 5.3.3 discusses the control variables used in this study. A summary of the 
measurement of the dependent variable, independent variables and control variables 
used for the research are presented in Table 5.1 at the end of Section 5.3. 
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Section 5.4 provides data description and summary statistics on the examined 
variables. Section 5.5 discusses the methodology employed to examine the hypotheses. 
Specifically, to draw empirical inferences from this study, the use of CAR in both 
univariate analysis and multivariate analysis of the hypotheses are discussed in Section 
5.5. Section 5.5.1 focuses discussion on univariate analysis while Section 5.5.2 focuses 
discussion on multivariate analysis. Brief discussions on the variable of interests to 
examine the hypotheses are presented in Section 5.5.2.1. Section 5.5.3 discusses the 
methodology for sensitivity test to determine the robustness of the findings is 
discussed at the end of the chapter.  Section 5.6 summarizes the chapter. 
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5.2 Sample Selection  
5.2.1 Malaysian Family-Controlled Firms 
 
 
Based on the characteristics of Malaysian family-controlled firms as discussed in 
Chapter 2, a Malaysian publicly listed firm is considered as a Malaysian family-
controlled firm meeting the following criteria:-  
 
 
(i) At least one of the family members holds shares in the company; 
(ii) At least one of the family members manages the company (as proxied by 
holding at least one position on the board, which is publicised information);  
(iii) The family is the heir of previous founder, if any;  
(iv) The family is the largest shareholder of the company. 75  
(v) The Malaysian family-controlled firm is a publicly listed company on the 
Main Market of Bursa Malaysia (previously known as Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange before 14 April 2004);  
(vi) The Malaysian family-controlled firms cover nonfinancial acquiring firms 
that are listed on the Main Board of Bursa Stock Exchange between the 
years 2001 and 2011 and have been an acquirer of corporate acquisition 
activities from the years 2002 to 2011.  
(vii) Firms with a single dominating owner-manager (who can be a founder or a 
non-founder) is not considered as a family-controlled firm as there is a 
possibility that the single dominating owner-manager may not transfer their 
rights and control in the firms to their heirs (Villalonga and Amit 2006). 76   
 
 
                                                          
75
 This is to ensure the absolute control of the dominant family over the family-controlled firms, in terms of 
ownership and management of the business. Family ownership is treated as the total corporate equity 
ownership held by all related family members. Hence, the total family ownership is accumulated among those 
that are held by related family members. 
76
 Relevant detailed discussions in Chapter 2. 
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Two approaches are used to identify the presence of family in Malaysian publicly listed 
firms. The first approach is through Shareholding Analysis77 of the annual report to 
trace the existence of family relationship among the shareholders. This approach 
allows the identification of item (i) and (iv).  Shareholding Analysis is one of the 
mandatory sections to be disclosed in annual reports of all publicly listed firms on Bursa 
Malaysia.  This section discloses the shareholdings held by substantial shareholders78 
and also the shareholdings held by the top thirty shareholders in the company. Details 
on both the direct and indirect shareholdings of the substantial shareholders in the 
company are disclosed, which specifically include those held by related family members 
of the substantial shareholders in the company. This mandatory disclosure is pursuant 
to Chapter 9 – Continuing Disclosure Section 9.25 of Bursa Listing Requirement. This 
requirement enables the existence of family relationship among family-related 
shareholders of the company to be identifiable.  
 
 
The second approach to identify the presence of family is through the Profile of 
Directors as stated in the annual report. This approach allows the identification of item 
(ii), (iii) and (vii). Any family relationship among the members on the board or family 
relationship with a major shareholder is mandatory to be disclosed in the Profile of 
Directors. The Profile of Directors provides details of family involvement in the 
management of the company through their position as directors on the board. It is 
common to observe that family-related management groups normally have family 
members who act as chairmen, chief executive officers, managing directors or 
executive directors on the board.  From the year 2001 onwards, the Profile of Directors 
became a mandatory disclosure in the annual reports for Malaysian publicly listed 
firms.  
 
                                                          
77
 Also known as Analysis of Shareholdings 
78
 The definition of substantial shareholder is given in Section 69D of Companies Act 1965: a substantial 
shareholder can be an individual or a corporation (whether listed or unlisted) who holds no less than an 
aggregated 5% of total voting rights in a company. 
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5.2.2 Corporate Acquisition Announcements 
 
 
Corporate acquisition refers to the situation where one firm takes over another existing 
firm through the acquisition of target firms’ equity at specified terms and date (Halpern 
1983). 79 During this process, the target (the acquired firm) ceases to exist, the buyer 
(the acquirer) swallows the business of the target, and the buyer's stock continues to 
be traded. The future generated incremental cash flows and the combination of the 
buyer and the target are expected to provide more benefits than prior to acquisition. 
The buyer is often known as the acquirer, the acquiring firm, or the bidder. The 
acquired firm on the other hand is often called target, acquiree, or acquired firm.   
 
 
Based on the general criteria of existing studies (Vermaelen and Xu 2014; Netter et al. 
2011) restricted to sample corporate acquisition announcements in this study, 
corporate acquisition announcements of Malaysian family-controlled firms (the 
acquirers), must satisfy the following criteria80: 
 
1) Corporate acquisition announcements are publicly announced by Malaysian 
family-controlled firms on the Bursa Malaysia – Announcement Section on the 
website for the period of the year 2002 to the year 2011. 
2) The release of the corporate acquisition announcement by the acquirer is 
pursuant to paragraphs 9.19(23) and 10.07(a) of Bursa Malaysia Listing 
Requirements. 
3) The acquirer has annual financial statement information available and stock 
return data. 
4) The acquirer purchased a stake of 50% or more in the target and owned less 
than 50% of the target prior to the purchase. 
                                                          
79
 A merger by definition is different from corporate acquisition activities, where a merger happens when two 
companies agree to continue their operations as a single new company rather than remain separately owned 
and operated. 
80
 For the purpose of their studies, Vermaelen and Xu (2014) restricted their target type to public targets only. 
In this study, no restriction is imposed on target type, following the research pattern of Netter et al. (2011). 
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In event studies, there is an issue with isolating the wealth effect of the examined 
event when there are other confounding events (noises) surrounding the day of the 
examined event (McWilliams and Siegel 1997; Brown and Warner 1985; Konchitchki 
and O'Leary 2011; Groening and Kanuri 2013; Levy and Gunthorpe 1994; Deitz et al. 
2013). Confounding events have been found to experience significant market reaction 
upon the release of announcement for the confounding events. 81 Existing event studies 
also reveal that the inclusions of sample observations that are contaminated with 
confounding events cause bias to the inferences made (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990; 
Deitz et al. 2013). 82 These studies reveal that the inclusion of sample events of concern 
that are contaminated with confounding events have material effects on the results. 
The stock price reactions that arise are due to the confounding events surrounding the 
event examined.  
 
 
Hence, based on findings from past event studies, to isolate the wealth effect of 
corporate acquisition announcement from the biases caused by other confounding 
events, contaminated corporate acquisition announcements are not examined in this 
study. 83 To be precise, contaminated corporate acquisition announcements with any 
occurrences of confounding events five days before and after the announcement day 
are not examined in this study. According to the suggestions given by McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997), these confounding events include earning announcement (Brown and 
Warner 1985), stock split announcement (Cannella and Hambrick 1993), equity 
offerings announcement (Masulis and Korwar 1986), asset acquisition announcement 
                                                          
81
 For instance, past studies have revealed significant stock market reaction surrounding the days of 
announcement day for earning announcement. (Brown and Warner 1985), stock split announcement (Cannella 
and Hambrick 1993), equity offerings announcement (Masulis and Korwar 1986), asset acquisition 
announcement and corporate acquisition announcement (Fuller et al. 2002) 
82
 Rosentein and Wyatt’s (1990) study revealed that any gain in power as a result of an increase in sample size 
after including contaminated sample announcements is overshadowed by the added noise inherent in the 
contaminated sample.  
83
 Groening and Kanuri (2013) removed contaminated observations with confounding events that occurred 
three days before and after the examined events of their study. Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam (2012) exclude 
contaminated sample acquisition announcements from analysis when there are clustered takeovers. Various 
event studies have excluded sample announcements that are contaminated with confounding events 
surrounding the announcement day or on the day of the announcement day. (Cooper et al. 2005; Levy and 
Gunthorpe 1994; Deitz et al. 2013; Lefanowicz et al. 2000; Afshar et al. 1992; Otchere and Ip 2006; Zhang 1997; 
Chikh and Filbien 2011) 
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(McConnell and Muscarella 1985) and clustered corporate acquisition announcement 
(Barbopoulos and Sudarsanam 2012). 
 
 
With reference to studies by Netter et al. (2011) and Vermaelen and Xu (2014), both 
privately held targets and public targets are examined in this study. This study also 
does not impose restrictions on the deal value, as was the trend in past corporate 
acquisition studies (Netter et al. 2011; Vermaelen and Xu 2014).  Netter et al. (2011) 
emphasise the misleading inferences made by researchers conducting past corporate 
acquisition studies based on unrepresentative samples. Past corporate acquisition 
studies restrict sample corporate acquisition announcements to those with large 
publicly listed targets and large deal value. According to Netter et al. (2011), inferences 
on wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements from past studies are drawn 
based on relatively small and unrepresentative samples. Furthermore, the study by 
Netter et al. (2011) provides strong evidence that acquirers experienced significant 
positive wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. This discovery 
contradicts past corporate acquisition findings, which generally suggested corporate 
acquisition announcements do not create value to acquirers.  
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5.2.3 Daily Stock Price 
 
 
Daily stock prices of the acquiring firms – Malaysian family-controlled firms are needed 
to examine the wealth effect (valuation effect) of corporate acquisition 
announcements. The daily stock prices of the examined Malaysian family-controlled 
acquiring firms are retrieved from Bursa (Malaysia Stock Exchange). The stock price 
data of the acquiring firm are used for computing daily stock returns in this study. The 
stock price of the acquirers covers the period from the year 2001 to the year 2011.  
 
5.3 Variable Construction 
5.3.1 Dependent Variable  
 
 
To measure the effects of a corporate acquisition announcement on the value of an 
acquirer, cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are calculated using the standard event 
study methodology (Brown and Warner 1985; Campbell et al. 1997).  The application of 
the method is discussed in Sections 5.3.1.1 - 5.3.1.3. 84 The CAR is specified in equation 
5.5. The generated CAR as specified in Sections 5.3.1.1 - 5.3.1.3 are used in both 
univariate and multivariate analyses.  
 
 
                                                          
84
 To examine the valuation effect of corporate acquisition activities on the acquirers (the acquiring firms), 
other available approaches include the market-based methodology (long-run stock performance) and 
accounting methodology. The shortcomings of these two approaches have been identified. Martynova & 
Renneboog (2008) and Kothari and Warner (2007) Provide comprehensive review of past evidence on the 
limitations and weaknesses of long run stock performance event study methodology. Past corporate acquisition 
study also employs short-run stock performance event studies due to the methodological concerns with the 
employment of long-run stock performance studies. (Masulis et al. 2007). Andrade et al. (2001) also mentioned 
that problems arise when using accounting performance to measure the wealth effect of corporate 
acquisitions. 
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Event study methodology posits that the valuation effect of an announcement should 
be reflected in the changes of stock prices when market adjusts its expectation of 
future earnings from businesses (Salter and Weinhold 1982). In simpler terms, event 
study methodology produces measures that determine the impact of a specific event 
on the market values of a sample of firms.  Examination of the valuation (wealth) effect 
of an event (or an announcement) on a firm’s market value using event study 
methodology has been a major focus in prior event study research since this 
methodology provides a powerful setting to examine the informativeness of an event 
as assessed by market participants (Konchitchki and O'Leary 2011). Event study 
methodology is also one of the solutions to hinder the common latent factor (causal 
interpretation) that impels a significant relation between an observed factor and firm’s 
market value, since capital market valuation data carry a forward looking trait (Morck 
and Yeung 2009). The derivations of CAR involve three main stages, and these are 
discussed in the following sections from Sections 5.3.1.1 - 5.3.1.3. 
 
 
5.3.1.1  Abnormal returns 
 
 
The daily stock returns employed for the event study methodology are derived for each 
event firm as: 
 
     
           
      
        Equation 5.1 
 
 
, where      is the closing price for event firm i on day t. Each event firm i refers to a 
publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled firm that made a public corporate 
acquisition announcement. 
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The basic aim of event study methodology is to isolate the effect of certain events on 
stock returns from other factors influencing the movement of the stock returns 
(MacKinlay 1997). This effect is examined through abnormal return.  The abnormal 
return is the difference between the predicted return (expected return) and the actual 
return during the examined event period, which can be specified as:- 
 
 
                                        Equation 5.2 
 
 
, where       of event firm i at event date t represents a stochastic error term that has 
an expected value of zero and is uncorrelated over time.       is the actual observed 
return of firm i on day t.           is the expected return for event firm i on day t. The 
deviations of actual return from the expected return are attributed to the event and 
constitute the abnormal return (MacKinlay 1997). 85  
 
 
Once the event study timeline is defined, a return generating model is used to generate 
the expected return,        . The deviation between expected return and the actual 
observed return,      , generates the abnormal return for each event firm i on day t, as 
specified in equation 5.1.  
 
 
In this study, market model is used as the return generating model to generate the 
expected returns. 86 The use of market model has been a universal measure used in 
event studies to assess the wealth effect of an event until today (Corrado and Truong 
                                                          
85
   Detailed description of event study methodology is discussed in MacKinlay (1997). 
86
 Independent of any return generating model used for the estimation of the expected returns, concerns still 
arise due to the fact that there is no true data generating process underlying the stock returns that is known 
to the researchers. (Kramer 2001) 
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2008; Strong 1992; Asimakopoulos and Athanasoglou 2013; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012; 
Corrado 2011; Netter et al. 2011; Amira et al. 2013; Pevzner et al. 2013; Zhao 2013). 
Market model is also widely used in event study of corporate acquisitions (Harford et 
al. 2012; Campa and Hernando 2004; Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Tuch and 
O'Sullivan 2007; Alexandridis et al. 2010; Cai and Sevilir 2012). Studies reveal empirical 
evidence that the generation of CAR using market model and national market indexes 
provides valid inferences for event studies (Campbell et al. 2010). 87   
 
 
Existing empirical findings collectively proved the ability of market model to yield valid 
findings. Among various existing return generating models, studies show that the three 
commonly used models – mean-adjusted model, market-adjusted model and market 
model yield similar power abilities to detect the presence of abnormal performance 
(Dyckman et al. 1984; Brown and Warner 1985; Wübben and Schiereck 2007; Campbell 
et al. 2010). Brown and Warner (1980) found no evidence that more complicated 
models convey any additional benefit in measuring security price performance. They 
subsequently proved that market model is as powerful as other return-generating 
models in detecting the significant wealth effect of specific events (Brown and Warner 
1985). Evidence further revealed the existence of biases when using other types of 
return generating models that generate the size and book-to-market adjusted 
cumulative abnormal returns (Bao and Edmans 2011). Moreover, there are other 
studies that continue to confirm the supremacy of market model in producing robust 
inferences for event studies (MacKinlay 1997; Campbell et al. 2010; Cable and Holland 
1999; Prabhala 1997). 
 
 
Market model is a single-index model which posits a linear relation between the stock 
returns and market portfolio returns over an examined time period. The model predicts 
a stable relation between the market return and any security return. To prevent the 
parameters estimated from the market model being influenced by the event of 
                                                          
87
 Their inferences are based on studies covering 54 non-US countries, including Malaysia. 
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interest, parameters of the market model are estimated during the pre-announcement 
period, which is also generally known as the estimation period (to be discussed in 
Section 5.3.1.2).  The market model that is used to derive the expected returns,       , 
can be written as: 
 
 
        ̂   ̂                Equation 5.3 
 
 
      is the expected return of event firm i on day .        is the return of the market 
index on day t.   ̂  and   ̂  are the estimated parameters from the OLS regression 
during the estimation period. 88      is the error term for event firm i on day t.   ̂       is 
the portion of event firm i return that is due to market-wide movements. The market 
returns are derived from the returns of KLCI composite index. 89 The error term     is 
part of the return that cannot be explained by market movements and captures the 
effect of firm-specific information. 
 
 
5.3.1.2  Estimation Period  
 
 
Estimation period is necessary to generate estimated parameters from the return 
generating model – market model. Kothari and Warner (2004) indicated that the length 
of the estimation period is arbitrary. It has to be long enough to contain a reasonable 
number of observations to estimate the parameters of the model and short enough to 
                                                          
88
 Brown and Warner’s (1985) studies do not find that the application of Dimson or the Scholes and Williams 
procedures to estimate  ̂  improve the power of tests for abnormal returns in event studies. The application of 
these procedures has been explained in detail by Peterson (1989) Both of these more complicated alternative 
procedures do not provide a definite benefit over the OLS procedures for parameters estimation of the market 
model (Peterson 1989). 
89
 Studies proved that the generation of abnormal returns using simple market model and national market 
indexes provides valid inferences in event studies (Campbell et al. 2010).  The inferences are based on studies 
covering 54 countries, including Malaysia. 
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avoid an eventual instability of the parameters. There has been different durations of 
estimation period employed in past event studies, which can range from 120 days to 
250 days (Dyckman et al. 1984; MacKinlay 1997; Corrado and Truong 2008).    
 
 
Given the concerns about the stationarity of the market model parameters, the use of 
one year of observations (a pre-announcement period of 250 trading days) is 
recommended as estimation period to estimate parameters of the market model 
(Binder 1998; Brown and Warner 1985). This research study employs 250 days of 
estimation period for the parameter estimation.  
 
 
Another aspect needed to be considered is to determine the exact day that the 
estimation period should end prior to the day of announcement. This study follows 
previous event studies (Lease et al. 1991; Wooldridge and Snow 1990; Masulis et al. 
2007) and ends the estimation period 10 days prior to the day of announcement, which 
are two trading weeks away from the day of the announcement.90 
 
 
5.3.1.3  Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) and Event Window 
 
 
The abnormal returns (      , as specified by equation 5.1, are then aggregated to a 
portfolio in order to draw overall inferences for the event of interest. By taking an 
equally weighted portfolio, the aggregation is through time and across securities. First, 
individual event firm abnormal returns can be aggregated across securities, as follows: 
 
                                                          
90
 Some studies end the estimation periods on Day – 60 or even closer days prior to the day of the 
announcement. (Campa and Hernando 2004; Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007; 
Alexandridis et al. 2010; Netter et al. 2011), which can be as close as Day -6 (Moeller et al. 2004) 
 
  
159 
 
  
 
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
 
(∑      
 
   )       Equation 5.4 
 
, where N is the number of firm events,       is the abnormal return for security i at 
time t.  
 
 
The average abnormal returns are then aggregated over the event window. The 
aggregation is along two dimensions, across securities and through time. 
 
 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅        ∑   ̅̅ ̅̅    
  
          Equation 5.5 
 
 
, where     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅        is the average cumulated abnormal return across the observed 
event window and security events. The       as specified in equation 5.5 denote the 
number of days which      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (as specified in equation 5.4) is accumulated over the 
event window. 
 
 
Empirical evidence demonstrated that a short event window usually captures the 
significant effect of an event (Ryngaert and Netter 1990). A long window would capture 
events that would bias the interpretations on the wealth effect of the examined events 
while a short event window would not account for information leakage or transitory 
delays before official announcements (McWilliams and Siegel 1997; Groening and 
Kanuri 2013). Past corporate acquisition studies revealed one-day (Day 0), two-day 
(Day 0 to Day +1) or three-day (Day –1 to Day +1) of an event window (     ) are 
common in event studies (Campa and Hernando 2004; Martynova and Renneboog 
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2008; Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007; Alexandridis et al. 2010; Netter et al. 2011; Amira et al. 
2013; Pevzner et al. 2013). Existing corporate acquisition studies for family firms 
commonly employ Day -1 to Day 1 to observe the cumulated valuation effect of the 
announcements on the market value of family firms (Holmen and Knopf 2004; Cosh et 
al. 2006; Ben-Amar and André 2006; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). 91  
 
 
Based on existing event studies, this study looks at an event window of Day -1 to Day 
+1 to capture the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements. 92,93,94  The 
CAR are cumulated over Day -1 to Day +1 in this study to evaluate investors’ reaction 
(wealth effect) to corporate acquisition announcements of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms. Figure 5.1 displays graphical presentation of the event study timeline for both 
the estimation period and event window used in this study. 
 
 
 
 
    Day(t)     -260          -11  -10                 -1         0      +1    ……… 
                       (T1)            (T2) 
 
          Estimation Period                       Event Window     
Figure 5. 1:  Timeline for Event Study 
 
 
                                                          
91
 Some authors used event window of Day –5 to Day +5. (Bae et al. 2002; Holmen and Knopf 2004; Banerjee et 
al. 2014) or Day-2 to Day +2 (Gonenc et al. 2013; Banerjee et al. 2014) No rationale is given for the choices. 
92
 (Moeller et al. 2004; Amira et al. 2013; Pevzner et al. 2013; Gonenc et al. 2013) 
93
 It has been highlighted that longer event window severely reduces the power of the test statistic, which leads 
to misleading inferences about the significance of the valuation effect of the announcements (Brown and 
Warner 1985). Brown and Warner (1985) employed event window of Day -5 to Day +5 for their simulation 
studies. Their studies showed the decrease of power of test on the valuation effect of events when the event 
window exceeds the intervals of Day -5 to Day+5.  
94
 For sensitivity of the analysis, alternate event windows are also examined. These are further explained in 
detail in Section 5.5.3 of this chapter. 
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5.3.2  Independent Variables of Interest 
 
 
Based on the conceptual schema as depicted in Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 – Hypothesis 
Development, the following subsections discuss the sources and measures for the 
independent variables that are employed in this study. All relevant information for the 
measurements of the independent variables is retrieved from annual reports of the 
acquiring firms as at the fiscal year-end that comes immediately before the release of 
corporate acquisition announcements by Malaysian family-controlled firms.  
 
 
5.3.2.1  Family Ownership 
 
 
Within the context of Malaysian family-controlled firms, information of family 
ownership stakes are retrieved from Shareholding Analysis of the annual report. 
Shareholding Analysis discloses both the direct and indirect shareholdings held by 
substantial shareholders95 of the company. It also discloses the total shareholdings held 
by related family members of these substantial shareholders.  
 
 
When determining family ownership in a publicly listed family-controlled firm, past 
studies (La Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000; Faccio and Lang 2002; Lins 2003; 
Faccio and Stolin 2006) considered both direct and indirect shareholdings held by all 
related family members of the controlling family.  Consistent with the approach used in 
past studies, family ownership in this study is measured by the total of both direct and 
indirect shareholdings held by related family members in Malaysian family-controlled 
                                                          
95
 The definition of substantial shareholder is given in Section 69D of Companies Act 1965: a substantial 
shareholder can be an individual or a corporation (whether listed or unlisted) who holds no less than an 
aggregated 5% of total voting rights in a company. 
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firms. In addition, based on existing studies (McConnell and Servaes 1990; Morck et al. 
1988; Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Ben-Amar and André 2006), family ownership is also 
squared to examine possible nonlinear relation with firm value for multivariate 
analysis. 
 
The variable of family ownership that is used in both univariate and multivariate 
analyses is represented by Own. The variable own is measured in the form of 
percentage. The squared of family ownership is represented by Own2. 
 
 
5.3.2.2  Family Management 
 
 
Existing studies have empirically shown that active family management (when 
assuming the role of a CEO) by the family is an important feature in creating value for 
family-controlled firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Villalonga and Amit 2006; Isakov 
and Weisskopf 2014). The variable of family management that is used in both 
univariate and multivariate analyses is represented by FamilyCEO to examine its 
relation with CAR. The dummy variable FamilyCEO equals to one when the family 
member takes the role of a CEO, zero otherwise. Information regarding this specific 
family firm feature is retrieved from the Profile of Directors in the annual reports of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
 
 
5.3.2.3  Founder-CEO and Descendent-CEO 
 
 
Empirical studies reveal significant relation between active family management (by 
taking the position of a CEO either by founders or by the heirs) in adding value to family 
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firms. Studies showed significant positive relation between founder-CEO and family 
firm value (Anderson and Reeb 2003b). Contradictorily, studies also documented 
significant negative relation between descendant-CEO and family firm value (Villalonga 
and Amit 2006) or significant positive relation between descendant-CEO and family 
firm value (Sraer and Thesmar 2007). Hence, dummy variables are created to represent 
these specific family firm features.   
 
 
In this study, information regarding the founder-CEO and descendant-CEO is retrieved 
from the Profile of Directors in the annual reports of Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
To examine separately the effect of founder-CEO and descendent-CEO on firm value, 
two dummy variables are generated and used in both univariate and multivariate 
analyses.  To measure the presence of a founder-CEO, it is represented by the dummy 
variable F_CEO, which equals to one when founder is the CEO, zero otherwise. To 
measure the presence of a descendant-CEO, it is represented by the dummy variable 
H_CEO, which equals to one when Heir is the CEO, zero otherwise. 
 
 
5.3.2.4  Family Representatives on the Board 
 
 
To determine if the presence of family on the board has effect on the wealth creation 
of corporate acquisition decisions of Malaysian family-controlled firms, the relevant 
information is retrieved from the Profile of Directors in the annual reports.  A dummy 
variable is used to measure the relation between family representatives on the board 
and announcement-period CAR (Anderson and Reeb 2004). The dummy variable 
Fam_Ind equals to one when the ratio of total percentage of family representatives on 
the board over the total percentage of independent directors on the board is more 
than one.  The information regarding the number of independent directors on the 
board is retrieved from either the Profile of Directors or the Statement of Corporate 
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Governance in the annual reports.  The measurement used is percentage of total 
independent directors on the board.  
 
 
5.3.2.5  Dual Role of Family CEO-Chairman 
 
 
One of the widely accepted corporate governance mechanisms is the implementation 
of unitary leadership on the board, where the duty of the chairman is separated from 
the duty of the CEO. Agency theory asserts that splitting the positions of CEO and 
chairman between two people improves firm performance as the board of directors 
can better monitor the performance of the CEO (Harris and Helfat 1998; Worrell et al. 
1997; Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994; Brickley et al. 1997; Fama and Jensen 1983b). 
However, due to the specific feature of family firms, the corporate governance function 
of a unitary leadership on the family firm board when upheld becomes futile. 
Specifically, the purpose of having an independent chairman and an independent CEO 
on the board is lost when these two positions are held by two individuals who are 
family related.  Such traits are possible among family-controlled firms and are common 
among Malaysian family-controlled firms. Yet, this specific family firm feature has 
never been raised as a concern and has never been examined in the stream of family 
firm literature.  To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical study that 
examines specific family firm feature relation with family firm value, within the context 
of corporate acquisition studies. 
 
 
The term family-related CEO and chairman is used in this study to refer to this feature 
of family firms. To examine the relation between family-related CEO and chairman and 
CAR, this feature is measured through a dummy variable – F_Dual, which equals to one 
when the roles of CEO and chairman are held by two different individuals, who are 
family related.  Information regarding this specific family firm feature on the dual role 
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of family CEO-Chairman is retrieved from the Profile of Directors in the annual reports 
of Malaysian family-controlled firms.  
 
 
5.3.2.6  Related-Party Acquisition 
 
 
To determine if the corporate acquisition performed by Malaysian family-controlled 
firms involve related parties who are family related, relevant information can be 
retrieved from the announcement.  Information content of the announcement can be 
retrieved from the official website Bursa Malaysia – Announcement section. Related 
party corporate acquisitions are allowed within the context of Malaysia. Pursuant to 
Chapter 10 Main Market Listing Requirements of Bursa, all listing companies need to 
disclose corporate acquisition activities as a related party transaction to Bursa when a 
transaction meets the definition of a related party transaction as defined in Chapter 
10.02. Pursuant to Chapter 10.02, related party transaction means a transaction 
entered into by the company or subsidiaries which involve the interest of a related 
party. Related party means a director, major shareholder or person connected with 
such director or major shareholder, pursuant to Chapter 1 Main Market Listing 
Requirements of Bursa.  A dummy variable, represented by rpa, equals to one when 
the acquisition is a related-party corporate acquisition.  For the purpose of examining 
related-party corporate acquisitions within the context of Malaysian family firm 
studies, the corporate acquisition activities involve related party when:- 
 
iii. The director or the owner of the target firm is family related to the director 
or the owner of the acquirer.   
iv. The director or the owner of the target firm is also the director or the 
owner of the acquirer.   
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5.3.3 Control Variables  
 
 
Existing family firm studies and corporate acquisition literature identify a number of 
significant factors that affect acquirer announcement returns. Using these studies as a 
guide, these factors are included in the multivariate regression analysis as control 
variables. Relevant financial information for the measurement of these control 
variables is retrieved from the database – Capital IQ, as at the fiscal year-end that 
comes immediately before release of the corporate acquisition announcements. 
Information on acquisition-related traits is retrieved from the corporate acquisition 
announcements that are archived at the Announcement Section of Bursa Malaysia. The 
control variables that are used in this study are:- 
 
i. Period of global financial crisis 
 
Based on a recent corporate acquisition study (Banerjee et al. 2014), to control the 
period affected by the global financial crisis, the period of 2008 to 2011 is considered as 
a controlling factor. This is measured by using a dummy variable that equals to 1 when 
the event year of the period falls between the years 2008 and 2011. This variable is 
represented by Yr08_11. 
 
ii. Free cash flow 
 
Existing studies demonstrated significant relation between free cash flow and CAR. By 
referring to the literature (Lang et al. 1991), the same measurement for free cash flow 
is used. The variable is represented by FCF.  The free cash flow is calculated as follows: 
 
= (Operating Income + Depreciation – Interest Expenses – Taxes – Preferred dividend – 
Common dividend) / Total Assets 
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iii. Firm size 
 
Moeller et al. (2004) indicate robust evidence of a strong relation between acquirer 
firm size and announcement-period abnormal returns of the acquirers. To control for 
firm size, firm size is measured by the log of market capitalisation (or market value of 
equity) (Vermaelen and Xu 2014). This variable is represented by LN_MVE. 
 
 
iv. Firm age 
 
The firm age is measured as the number of years since the year of firm’s incorporation 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Villalonga and Amit 2006).  This information is retrieved 
from the annual report and the official company website where the information and 
biography of the company are displayed. This variable is represented by FirmAge. 
 
 
v. Proportion of Independent Directors on the Board 
 
Empirical studies showed the significant positive relation between independent 
directors on the board and the announcement-period abnormal returns of the 
acquirers (Anderson and Reeb 2004).  To control this effect, as done in previous 
studies, the variable Ind_Director is generated and denotes the total percentage of 
independent directors on the board.  Information regarding the number of 
independent directors on the board is retrieved from either the Profile of Directors or 
the Statement of Corporate Governance in the annual report.   
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vi. Deal size 
 
Recent findings reveal a significant negative relation between deal size and the 
announcement period abnormal returns of the acquirers (Alexandridis et al. 2013). To 
control this effect, following the work of Alexandridis et al. (2013), the deal size is 
measured as the log of the transaction value. The information is retrievable from the 
announcement.  This variable is represented by LN_RM. 
 
 
vii. Pre-announcement stock price run-up of acquirer 
 
Previous studies documented that prior firm performance of the acquirer exhibits 
significant relation with announcement period abnormal returns (Masulis et al. 2007; 
Bae et al. 2002).  Based on previous studies, the same measure is employed in this 
study.  Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up is measured by cumulative 
abnormal return over the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is estimated 
using market model as specified in equation 5.3. This variable is represented by 
Pre_CAR. 
 
 
viii. Related industry acquisition 
 
An existing study reports higher acquirer abnormal return for within-industry 
acquisitions (non-diversifying) compared with diversifying acquisitions (Maquieira et al. 
1998).  To control for whether the acquisition is within the same industry, a dummy 
variable is used to identify if the target and the acquirer are in the same industry. 
Related information is retrieved from the announcement on Bursa. This variable is 
represented by non_related. 
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ix. Other deal-related traits that are represented by a dummy value 
 
There are several research findings on the significant relation between a few deal-
related traits and the stock market’s response to corporate acquisition 
announcements. Following the literature (which has been discussed in Chapter 3), the 
effects of these traits are controlled using dummy variables, as discussed below:- 
 
a. Acquisition payment method (cash, equity or mixed payment method)  
A dummy variable is created, which equals to one if acquisition is financed 
by equity payment, zero otherwise. This is represented by the variable 
Equity. 
b. Target type (privately-held target or public target)  
A dummy variable is created, which equals to one if publicly held target is 
acquired, zero otherwise. This is represented by the variable Public. 
c. Acquisition of domestic target or cross-border target 
A dummy variable is created, which equals to one if non-domestic target is 
acquired, zero otherwise. This is represented by the variable Crossborder. 
 
A summary of all the variables mentioned and their measurements are presented in 
Table 5.1 as follows. 
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Table 5. 1 Summary Table Describing the Measurements for the Dependent, Independent and 
Control Variables 
Dependent Variable 
     :  Cumulative abnormal returns over the event window  
Independent Variables  
    : Total family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity   
ownership in the company 
     :  Squared     
          : Dummy variable that equals to one when family member of the controlling 
family is the CEO, zero otherwise 
       :  Dummy variable that equals to one when founder is the CEO, zero otherwise 
       :  Dummy variable that equals to one when the heir is the CEO, zero otherwise 
        : Dummy variable that equals to one when the ratio of total number of family 
members on the board over total number of independent directors on the 
board is more than one, zero otherwise 
       : Dummy variable that equals to one when two related family members hold the 
positions of CEO and chairman respectively, zero otherwise 
    : Dummy variable that equals to one for related party acquisition, zero 
otherwise 
  
Control Variables 
         :  Firm age of the company  
             :  Total percentage of independent directors on the board 
        : Dummy variable that equals to one when the position of CEO and chairman are 
both held by the same individual, zero otherwise 
        : Acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up is measured by cumulative 
abnormal return over the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is 
estimated using market model 
            : Dummy variable that equals to one when target is not within the same industry 
as the industry of the acquirer 
    : Free cash flow ratio that is denoted by (Operating Income + Depreciation – 
Interest expense – Taxes – Preferred  dividend – Common dividend) / Total 
Assets  
       :  Firm size that is denoted by log of market capitalisation 
      : The transaction size that is denoted by the log of transaction dollar value of the 
acquisitions in Malaysia Ringgit currency 
            : Dummy variable that equals to one for acquisition of non-domestic target, zero 
otherwise 
       : Dummy variable that equals to one for acquisition of private target, zero 
otherwise 
       : Dummy variable that equals to one for equity-financed acquisition, zero 
otherwise 
        : Dummy variable that equals to one when the year of the event is during the 
period of 2008-2011, zero otherwise 
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5.4 Data Description and Summary Statistics 
 
 
This section provides discussion on the characteristics of the data. Section 5.4.1 
discusses the distribution of the sample corporate acquisition announcements across 
the years and across the industry. Section 5.4.2 discusses the summary statistics of the 
variables used in this study. 
 
 
5.4.1  Corporate Acquisition Announcements 
 
Table 5. 2 Distribution of Corporate Acquisition Activity by Announcement Year 
TABLE 5.2 
Distribution of Corporate Acquisition Activity by Announcement Year 
The sample comprises 267 corporate acquisition announcements categorised 
by announcement year released by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms 
between 2002 and 2011. Column 2 and Column 3 report numbers and 
percentages of the acquisition activities. 
Year  N % 
2002 4 1.50 
2003 10 3.75 
2004 15 5.62 
2005 27 10.11 
2006 42 15.73 
2007 43 16.10 
2008 32 11.99 
2009 32 11.99 
2010 26 9.74 
2011 36 13.48 
Total 267 100 
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There are in total 267 observations examined, which represent 267 corporate 
acquisition announcements announced by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms in this 
study, across a 10-year period of studies, from the year 2002 to year 2011. 96 The 
following subsections provide further discussion on the distribution of sample 
corporate acquisition announcements across different aspects and a brief descriptive 
statistics on the examined variables. A list of the sample corporate acquisition 
announcements performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms is presented in 
Appendix A3. Table 5.2 reveals that the distribution of corporate acquisition 
announcements of Malaysian family-controlled firms across the examined sample 
period does not deviate far from the mean.   
 
 
Studies (Metwalli and Tang 2009, 2002) reported that over the years 1990–2007, 
Malaysia accounted for the highest percentage of the total deals and transaction value 
in the Southeast Asian region among other examined Southeast Asian countries. For 
the case of corporate acquisition activities of Malaysian family-controlled firms, Table 
5.2 presents the distribution of sample by announcement year – the year when the 
corporate acquisition announcements were released to the public by Malaysian family 
controlled firms (the acquirer). The frequencies of the corporate acquisition activities 
across 2002 to 2011 demonstrate an upward trend. Few corporate acquisition 
investment activities were undertaken by family-controlled acquirers in the year 2002, 
with the lowest total number of acquisitions among other years. The low number of 
corporate acquisition investment activities could be due to the economic recovery 
stage experienced by the country after the large impact of the 1997 Economic Crisis 
and the year 2000 dot.com bubble. Nevertheless, Malaysia’s economy returned to 
steady growth beginning in the year 2002 (Goh and Lim 2010; Ministry of Finance 
Malaysia 2002). The low number of corporate acquisition activities is also in line with 
Metwalli and Tang’s (2009) findings of a sharp decline in corporate acquisition activities 
                                                          
96
 Sample size is not an issue. A recent event study employs 92 sample announcements (Change, 2014). 
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that were not exclusive to Malaysia, but over the whole Southeast Asian region97 in the 
year 2002.  
 
 
Based on Table 5.2, it is observed that there is an increasing number of corporate 
acquisition activities of Malaysian family-controlled firms from 2002 until the year 
2005. This observation is consistent with the result of Metwalli and Tang (2009) and 
Rahim and Pok (2012), who find a significant expansion of corporate acquisition 
activities in the Southeast Asian region and Malaysia from the years 2002 to 2005.  The 
increase in the number of corporate acquisition activities during these periods are due 
to the strong economic growth in Malaysia (Rahim and Pok 2012). 
 
 
It is interesting to observe that the general downward trend of corporate acquisition 
activities in Malaysia over the years 2006 and 2007 do not significantly affect the 
corporate strategies of Malaysian family-controlled firms.  Table 5.2 reveals an 
increasing trend of corporate acquisition activities of Malaysian family-controlled firms 
continues in the year 2006 until 2007. This pattern is inconsistent with the general 
trend of corporate acquisition activities in Malaysia for the years 2006 and 2007. In 
fact, there was a drop in corporate acquisition activities in the year 2006 until the year 
2007 in Malaysia (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2007; Rahim and Pok 2012). The decreasing 
trends of corporate acquisition activities in Malaysia persisted in the year 2008 due to 
the global financial crisis (Rahim and Pok 2012).  
 
 
The increasing trend of Malaysian family-controlled firms’ corporate acquisition 
activities from 2006 to 2007 shown in Table 5.2 provides valuable insight. It is clear that 
Malaysian family-controlled firms were able to maintain their strong contributing role 
to the Malaysian economy (Ngui 2002). Malaysian family-controlled firms demonstrate 
                                                          
97
 The Southeast Asian countries examined include the ASEAN big five countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and ASEAN small five countries (Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and 
Cambodia). Data do not exhibit any corporate acquisition activities in Cambodia. 
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their constant involvement in investment activities even during times of economic 
downturn. Similar to family firms worldwide, Malaysian family-controlled firms remain 
strong and are steady performers even in times of economic crisis. This evidence 
supports a recent survey conducted by Ernst & Young on 33 countries, highlighting that 
family firms worldwide are relatively immune to economic turbulences with resilient 
business and steady business growth (Ernst & Young 2012). Findings of existing family 
firm performance studies also reveal empirical evidence that family firms outperform 
non-family firms even during the time of economic recessions as a result of the unique 
behaviour of family firms (Kashmiri and Mahajan 2014). The authors highlight that 
family firms are an effective organisation form. This finding is also consistent with 
studies that infer family firms are strong performers in comparison with other non-
family firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Mehrotra et al. 2013).  
 
 
Table 5. 3 Distribution of Corporate Acquisition Activity Across Industries 
TABLE 5.3 
Distribution of Corporate Acquisition Activity Across Industries 
The sample comprises 267 corporate acquisition announcements of 129 
Malaysian family-controlled firms across industries between 2002 and 2011. 
The classification of bidding firm industries follows those identified from 
Bursa. Column 2 and Column 3 report numbers and percentages of the 
acquisition activities.  
Industry N % 
Industrial Product 88 32.96 
Plantation 55 20.60 
Trading/Services 49 18.35 
Consumer Product 47 17.60 
Properties 19 7.12 
Construction 5 1.87 
Technology 4 1.50 
Total 267 100 
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The industry distribution of corporate acquisition announcements is reported in Table 
5.3. The identification of the industries follows the classification of Bursa – the Malaysia 
Stock Exchange. As reported in Table 5.3, corporate acquisition announcements occur 
more often for the industry of industrial product over the sample period.  However, 
there is no indication of significant industry concentration in any industry group. The 
percentage of sample corporate acquisition announcements shows that the sample 
announcements are generally distributed across the industries evenly, except for those 
of the construction and technology industry, which make up less than 2% of the total 
sample respectively. 
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5.4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 5. 4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 5.4 
Descriptive Statistics 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables examined in this study. N 
represents the total number of observations for each variable. Mean represents the mean 
of the variables. SD represents the standard deviation, Median represents the median, Max 
and Min represents the maximum and minimum of the variable. Skewness and Kurtosis 
represent the skewness and kurtosis of the variables’ distribution. 
Variable N Mean SD Median Max Min Skewness Kurtosis 
Own 267 46.74 13.38 46.62 84.5 20 0.25 2.52 
F_CEO 267 0.47 0.50 0 1 0 0.13 1.02 
H_CEO 267 0.37 0.48 0 1 0 0.55 1.30 
FamilyCEO 267 0.84 0.37 1 1 0 -1.84 4.40 
Fam_Ind 267 0.30 0.46 0 1 0 0.86 1.73 
DualCEO 267 0.26 0.44 0 1 0 1.10 2.22 
F_Dual 267 0.27 0.44 0 1 0 1.06 2.12 
Rpa 267 0.28 0.45 0 1 0 0.98 1.95 
FirmYear 267 25.91 17.90 25 105 3 1.43 6.20 
Ind_Director 267 41.55 10.57 40 83.33 20 1.03 4.03 
Pre_CAR 267 1.45 15.67 1.97 100.76 -74.38 0.44 11.88 
non_related 267 0.12 0.32 0 1 0 2.40 6.74 
FCF 267 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.24 0 0.58 3.54 
LN_MVE 267 19.88 1.71 19.62 24.52 16.3 0.57 2.82 
LN_RM 267 16.45 1.74 16.25 21.54 13.01 0.47 2.86 
Crossborder 267 0.31 0.47 0 1 0 0.80 1.64 
Public 267 0.02 0.14 0 1 0 7.10 51.42 
Equity 267 0.03 0.17 0 1 0 5.51 31.41 
Yr08_11 267 0.47 0.50 0 1 0 0.11 1.01 
 
 
 
In Table 5.4, the variable Own (total ownership of the controlling family in percentage) 
reveals the high concentration of family ownership in Malaysian family-controlled 
firms.   The maximum family ownership can reach as high as more than 80%. The 
minimum percentage of family ownership examined in this study is 20% with a mean of 
close to 50%.  The nature of highly concentrated family ownership in Malaysian family-
controlled firms exhibited in the sample is in accordance with past findings (Claessens 
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et al. 2000; Carney and Child 2012). Taking a further look at family ownership exhibited 
in Table 5.5 below, 61% of the sample corporate acquisition announcements involve 
acquisitions that are performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms held by the 
controlling family with more than 50% of total family ownership. This shows that 
regardless of the level of total family ownership, either more than the absolute 50% 
ownership or less, Malaysian family-controlled firms are involved in corporate 
acquisition activities.   
 
 
Table 5. 5 Frequency Distributions of Family Ownership 
Table 5.5 
Frequency Distributions of Family Ownership 
The sample distribution comprises 267 corporate 
acquisition activities of 129 Malaysian family-controlled 
firms across family ownership between 2002 and 2011. 
Column 2 and Column 3 report numbers and 
percentages of the acquisition activities, respectively. 
Family Ownership in % N Percentage 
Between 20% -29% 33 12.36 
Between 30% -39% 55 20.6 
Between 40% -49% 70 26.22 
Between 50% -59% 61 22.85 
Between 60% -69% 32 11.99 
Between 70% -79% 15 5.62 
More than 80% 1 0.37 
Total 267 100 
 
 
 
The variables F_CEO and H_CEO represent dummy variables that identify the position 
of CEO held by either the founder or the heir, respectively. Table 5.4 reveals that 
Malaysian family-controlled firms that are managed by family members are active in 
corporate acquisition activities. Among 267 sample corporate acquisition 
announcements, 47% of acquisitions are performed by founder-managed Malaysian 
family-controlled firms. In this study, founder-managed Malaysian family-controlled 
firms refer to the situation when founder is actively involved in managing family-
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controlled firms through the position of CEO. Another 37% of the acquisitions are 
performed by descendant-managed Malaysian family-controlled firms. The remaining 
16% of the sample corporate acquisition announcements involve acquisitions 
performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms that are managed by a professional 
CEO, who is not family-related to the controlling family owners.  The results reveal one 
of the specific characteristics common among Asian family firms, which is in line with 
the findings of past literature (Lins 2003). More specifically, family members are active 
in managing Malaysian family-controlled firms by holding active managerial position as 
the CEOs. This is again similar to the findings of Lins (2003) on the preference of 
controlling families in emerging countries filling up the role as active managers of the 
family-controlled firms. 
 
 
The variable Fam_Ind denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the 
proportion of total family members’ representation on the board over total 
independent directors on the board is more than one. This dummy variable allows 
examination of the balancing monitoring power from the independent directors in 
relation to family members on the board (Anderson and Reeb 2004). Excessive 
numbers of family members on the board relative to independent directors increase 
the likelihood of the family expropriating the company’s wealth. On the other hand, 
fewer family representatives relative to independent directors reduce family 
monitoring and board effectiveness. Table 5.4 reveals that 30% of the sample 
acquisition announcements are performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms with 
family members on the board exceeding the independent directors on the board. This 
is in line with the findings of a previous study that family members participation on the 
boards are observable in Malaysian family-controlled firms (Ameer and Abdul Rahman 
2009).   
 
 
The variable DualCEO represents a dummy variable that equals to one when there is a 
dual role held by the same individual on the board, who is both the CEO and the 
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chairman on the board. The variable F_Dual represents a dummy variable that equals 
to one when the roles of CEO and chairman are held separately by two individuals, who 
are family related. In this case, the governance function of an independent chairman 
and independent CEO on the board may be impeded.  Table 5.4 reveals that 26% of the 
acquisitions are performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms with a board structure 
that does not comply with the recommendation of the voluntary Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance released in March 2000 – both the roles of CEO and chairman 
are held by the same individual. Another 27% of the acquisitions are performed by 
Malaysian family-controlled firms with a board structure that complies with the 
recommended good corporate governance practice of Bursa – the roles of CEO and 
chairman are held by two separate individuals, who are however, family-related. The 
remaining 47% of the acquisitions are performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms 
with a unitary board leadership structure, where the roles of CEO and chairman are 
held by two separate individuals, who are not family-related. Overall, 74% of sample 
acquisitions are performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms with a unitary 
leadership board structure that is in compliance with the recommended good practice 
of corporate governance by Bursa. This is again in line with findings of existing studies 
that examine Malaysian family-controlled firms (Amran and Ahmad 2009; Wan-Hussin 
2009). Malaysian family-controlled firms favour the good practice of dual leadership 
structure where CEO and Chairman of the board are vested in two separate individuals. 
However, it is not mentioned in these past studies (Amran and Ahmad 2009; Wan-
Hussin 2009) whether the two separate individuals are family-related or not family-
related.  
 
 
The variable rpa represents a dummy variable that equals to one when the announced 
corporate acquisition involved related parties, as explained in Section 5.3.2.6 in this 
chapter. Table 5.4 shows that 28% of the sample corporate acquisition announcements 
involve related parties. The data reveal that Malaysian family-controlled firms are not 
so active in performing corporate acquisition activities involving related parties.  The 
related parties, in simpler terms, refer to the situation when the acquisitions happen 
between the acquirers and the targets that are either owned or managed by related 
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family members. Related party acquisitions are allowed by Bursa, which must be 
disclosed to Bursa and the public in the announcements. 
  
 
For control variables, in terms of the firm age (FirmYear) of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms since its incorporation, Table 5.4 reveals the average age of the sample Malaysian 
family-controlled firms is 25 years, with the maximum age at 105 years and minimum 
age at 3 years.  The distribution is a close-to-one skewness, implying that the sample 
firm age distribution does not deviate too far from the mean.  
 
 
The variable Ind_Director is expressed in total percentage of independent directors on 
the board. Table 5.4 shows that on average the independent directors’ ratio on the 
board for the case of Malaysian family-controlled firms (the acquirers) is in compliance 
with the recommendation of the voluntary Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, 
with an average of more than 1/3 of independent directors on the board.  The 
minimum measure shows 20% of independent directors on the board. This implies that 
there are cases of Malaysian family-controlled firms not following the recommended 
good practice of corporate governance by Bursa, in terms of having at least 1/3 of 
independent directors on the corporate board. Overall, the distribution of independent 
directors in terms of total percentage on the board for the acquirers does not deviate 
too far from the mean, with skewness of close to 1. This shows that most of the 
Malaysian family-controlled firms – the acquirers, are complying with the 
recommended Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, with an average of more 
than 40% independent directors on the board (with a median of 40% independent 
directors on the board as well). The data are also in line with the findings of a previous 
study (Wan-Hussin 2009) on Malaysian family-controlled firms, which also report an 
average of close to 40% independent directors on the Malaysian family-controlled 
firms’ corporate board. 
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The remaining control variables, discussed as the following, reveal the preferences of 
the sample Malaysian family-controlled firms when undertaking corporate acquisition 
activities. The dummy variable Crossborder reveals that 30% of the sample corporate 
acquisitions are cross-border acquisitions, with the remaining 70% belonging to 
acquisitions of local targets.  The dummy variable Public reveals that 2% of the sample 
corporate acquisitions belong to the acquisition of public targets, with the remaining 
98% belonging to the acquisition of private targets. This shows that Malaysian family-
controlled firms prefer the acquisition of private target to public target.  
 
 
The dummy variable Equity reveals that 3% of the sample corporate acquisitions are 
equity-financed corporate acquisitions performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
Further examination of the data reveals that more than 90% of the sample corporate 
acquisitions performed by Malaysian family-controlled firms are cash-financed 
acquisitions. Another 5% of sample corporate acquisitions are financed with other 
financing alternatives (mixed financing of using cash, equity and others). This shows 
that Malaysian family-controlled firms generally do not favour financing their 
investments using equity compared with other alternatives. The data support previous 
findings (Basu et al. 2009) on family-controlled firms’ preference of using cash as a 
medium of financing corporate acquisitions. This is to avoid the dilution of family 
control in the family-controlled firms. The controlling family owners of Malaysian 
family-controlled firms exhibit similar behaviour to other family firms’ owners outside 
of Malaysia, in terms of fear of dilution of control.  
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5.5 Methodology 
5.5.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
 
To examine empirically the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements – as 
measured by CAR as specified in equation 5.5, test statistic is required to test the null if 
CAR are significantly different from zero.  Section 5.5.1.1 discusses the test statistic 
employed in this study. 
 
 
Univariate analysis has been an integral part of past corporate acquisition studies (Bae 
et al. 2002; Masulis et al. 2007; Cai and Sevilir 2012). The purpose is to examine any 
significant factors that are correlated with the wealth effect of the examined 
announcements (CAR). The findings also provide further insights and empirical 
evidence of determinants that significantly affect investors’ reaction to corporate 
acquisition announcements of Malaysian family-controlled firms. A multivariate setting 
is further employed to examine the robustness of the findings from univariate analysis 
(Cai and Sevilir 2012). 
 
 
The CAR as specified in equation 5.5 are divided into different categories as discussed 
in the following subsection 5.5.1.2, with the aim of testing the hypotheses as specified 
in Chapter 4. 
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5.5.1.1  Empirical Test of the Significance of CAR 
 
 
To make valid inferences on the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements 
for acquiring firm, empirical tests of the significance of CAR are needed. The tests on 
these cumulated event-period abnormal returns (the wealth effect of the 
announcements) for its significance are in itself another area of significant literature. 
Numerous testing procedures have been proposed and examined for their power in 
explaining the significance of stock market reaction to the announcements.  
 
 
The use of parametric tests to test the significance of the event-period abnormal 
returns in event studies has been continuously challenged, which consequentially 
raises the subsequent proposals of non-parametric tests (Kolari and Pynnonen 2011; 
Cowan 1992; Corrado 1989).  This is due to the fact that one of the underlying 
assumptions of existing parametric tests on the significance of these abnormal returns 
is commonly violated, in which the examined daily abnormal returns are generally 
assumed to be normally distributed. It has been a stylised fact that daily stock returns 
are scarcely normally distributed (Fama 1965; Officer 1972; Corrado and Truong 2008). 
Studies conducted by Campbell et al. (2010) for non-US samples across 54 countries 
(which include Malaysia) provide empirical evidence that the use of non-parametric 
tests for event studies is more powerful than parametric tests. 98 
 
 
Subsequent to the study by Corrado and Truong (2008), the most recent relevant 
literature expanded by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011) tested the power of all the 
frequently employed testing procedures in past event studies. Both parametric tests 
and non-parametric tests are examined. Both of these tests have been used in past 
event studies to examine the significance of the CAR. These CAR surrounding the event 
                                                          
98
 The two common parametric tests examined in Campbell et al.’s (2010) study are the Patell Z-statistic Patell 
1976) and Boehmer standardised cross-sectional tests (Boehmer et al. 1991).  
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day reflect the significance and wealth effect of an event. A comparison among these 
test statistics99 reveals that the Generalised Rank Test (GRANK) prevails over other 
testing procedures as it provides better explanatory power on the significance of an 
event.  Based on the most recent findings of Kolari and Pynnonen (2011), this study 
employs the GRANK test in testing the significance of cumulated abnormal returns 
generated. The computation of the test statistic using GRANK procedure can be found 
in the study by Kolari and Pynnonen (2011). GRANK test is discussed in Appendix A5. 
 
 
5.5.1.2  Empirical Test of CAR According to Traits 
 
 
The classifications of mean CAR according to the characteristics as identified in i to vi 
below provide preliminary evidence on the relation between CAR and these key 
characteristics, which are mentioned in the hypotheses – Chapter 4.  
 
i. Family ownership  
ii. Acquiring firms that are managed by family CEO and professional CEO 
iii. Acquiring firms that are managed by founder CEO and descendant CEO 
iv. Acquiring firms with unitary board leadership structure (CEO ≠ chairman), 
duality board leadership structure (CEO = chairman, not related family 
members) and family-related CEO and chairman (CEO ≠ chairman, and both 
CEO and chairman are family-related members) 
v. Related party corporate acquisitions and non-related party corporate 
acquisitions 
 
 
                                                          
99
 The examined test statistics include both parametric and non-parametric test statistics, which are Patell’s 
standardised residual test. (Patell 1976),  Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen’s standardised cross-sectional test. 
(Boehmer et al. 1991), Corrado’s rank test (Corrado 1989) and Corrado-Zivney’s sign test (Corrado and Zivney 
1992) 
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5.5.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis 
 
 
The results from univariate analysis are suggestive of factors that determine the 
magnitude of CAR. A multivariate setting is employed to examine the influence of these 
suggestive factors while controlling for other factors that have been generally shown to 
affect the announcement returns in earlier corporate acquisition literature (Cai and 
Sevilir 2012). This allows examination of the robustness of the findings from univariate 
analysis. This pooled regression analysis is conducted through standard linear 
multivariate ordinary least squares regressions.  
 
 
Past family firm studies and corporate acquisition literature have identified a number 
of significant factors which affect acquirer announcement returns (as discussed in 
Section 5.3.2). Following the literature, specific to family firm studies, these factors that 
have been empirically proven to exhibit significant relation with CAR are included in the 
multivariate regression analysis as control variables. The determinants and the 
controlling factors of the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements can be 
tested, by considering CAR as the following function:- 
 
 
CAR = f (independent variables, control variables,  ) 
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Equation 5.6 below presents the baseline model specification applied for the 
multivariate analysis in this study. A summary of the measurements for the dependent 
variables, independent variables and control variables are displayed in Table 5.1. A 
summary of the measurements for the variables is shown in Table 5.1. 
 
 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 FamilyCEOi + βi3 Fam_Indi + βi4 F_Duali + βi5 DualCEOi + βi6 
Ind_Directori + βi7 Rpai + βi8 Firmyeari + βi9 Pre_CARi + βi10 non_relatedi + βi11 FCFi + βi12 
LN_MVEi + βi13 LN_RMi + βi14 Crossborderi + βi15 Publici + β16 Equityi + β17 Yr08_11i +   
   
Equation 5.6 
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5.5.2.1  Hypothesis Testing 
 
Table 5. 6 Predicted Relation Direction between the Independent Variables and the 
Dependent Variable from the Regression Model 
Table 5.6 Predicted Relation Direction between the Independent Variables and the 
Dependent Variable from the Regression Model 
Independent Variables Predicted Relation Direction Hypothesis tested 
    + H1 
         +, -  H2 
          + H3 
       + H4  
      + H5 
        - H6 
       - H7 
    - H8 
 
 
Table 5.6 presents the hypothesised relation between the independent variables and 
the dependent variable (CAR) from the baseline regression model equation 5.6. The 
directions of the relation have implications for the testing of the hypotheses as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  Discussions in this section are relevant to the testing of H1 to 
H9. 
 
 
The relation between the variable     and the dependent variable – CAR is used to 
examine Hypothesis 1. It is predicted that there is a significant positive linear relation 
between             . To test Hypothesis 2, following the literature (Morck et al. 
1988),     is squared to examine a possible nonlinear relation between family 
ownership and CAR.  
 
  
188 
 
  
 
The variable           represents a dummy variable that equals to one when the 
position of CEO is held by the controlling family (Isakov and Weisskopf 2014). This 
allows the examination of Hypothesis 3 on the relation between active family 
management roles and firm value, as measured by CAR in this study. To further 
investigate the effect of generations on family firm value, the dummy variables       
and      are used to examine Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5. Each represents a 
dummy variable that equals to one when the position of CEO is held by either the 
founder or the descendant respectively, zero otherwise. The existence of these 
variables allow observations if active family management either by the founder or the 
descendant exhibit significant relation with the announcement period CAR. Following 
existing studies (Miller et al. 2007; Sraer and Thesmar 2007),      and       are 
used to examine H4 and H5 if founder active management role and heir active 
management role reveal significant relation with CAR.  
 
 
The inclusion of the variable          examines Hypothesis 6 if representatives of 
family members on the board display significant relation with CAR. Following the 
literature (Anderson and Reeb 2004),  the variable          is measured by a dummy 
variable that equals to one when the ratio of total percentage of family members on 
the board over total percentage of independent directors on the board is more than 
one. This allows examination of family members’ influence over the performance of 
family firms relative to the number of independent directors on the board.  It is 
predicted that there is a significant negative relation between         and     . The 
predicted significant negative relation demonstrates that excessive numbers of family 
representatives on the board relative to the number of independent directors (the 
monitor) increase the likelihood of expropriation by the controlling family (Anderson 
and Reeb 2004). 
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The variable        allows the testing of Hypothesis 7 to determine whether two 
related family members who hold both the roles or chairman and CEO exhibit 
significant negative relation with CAR.  The relation provides further insight into this 
specific trait existing among family firms. To meet the listing requirement, it is 
recommended that the roles of chairman and CEO are held by two separate individuals 
to encourage good corporate governance. It is generally accepted that separation of 
the CEO and chairman roles brings positive effects to firm value. However, it is worth 
noting that when two separate individuals holding both positions of CEO and chairman 
are family related, the positive effect may be compromised. Hitherto, the effect of 
       on family firm value has never been raised as a concern and has never been 
empirically examined. This study is the first that empirically examined the relation 
between        and family firm value within firm performance literature, family firm 
literature and corporate governance literature. 
 
 
The variable     examines Hypothesis 8 if related party corporate acquisitions exhibit 
significant negative relation with CAR. Within the context of Malaysia, related party 
corporate acquisitions are allowed, in accordance with the Main Market Listing 
Requirements of Bursa. Since such transaction is permissible, controlling family owners 
have opportunities to extract private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. 
Existing literature revealed mixing findings of family firms performing related party 
acquisitions that are either value decreasing or not value decreasing. The findings of 
this study sheds light on whether Malaysian family firms perform related party 
acquisitions that are value enhancing or value decreasing. 
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5.5.3 Robustness Analysis 
 
 
The CAR that are used in both univariate and multivariate analyses are cumulated over 
event window Day (-1, +1) (as discussed in Section 5.3.1.3).  It has been a common 
practice that when making inferences for event studies, the measure of the acquirers’ 
abnormal announcement returns – CAR, are alternated to ensure the sensitivity and 
robustness of the results. Following existing studies, the CAR are cumulated over 
alternate event windows for Day (-2,+2) and Day (-3,3) 100 ; the measures of the CAR are 
again regenerated using market model. The results are also reported in both univariate 
and multivariate analyses.  
 
 
Market-adjusted abnormal returns model is also used in the literature of corporate 
acquisitions when generating the CAR. This model circumvents a potential endogeneity 
problem when using the market model for the case when the sample includes firms 
that acquire multiple targets. The estimation period for parameters estimation of the 
market model may be contaminated by prior acquisitions. Hence, following 
recommendation from existing studies (Conn et al. 2005; Faccio et al. 2006; Fuller et al. 
2002; Gonenc et al. 2013), this study uses market-adjusted model to re-estimate CAR 
for additional sensitivity tests.  The generated CAR using market-adjusted model over 
the event windows for Day (-1, +1), Day (-2, +2) and Day (-3, +3) are again examined 
and reported in both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis. 
 
 
Sensitivity of the results is again re-examined in this study by the command rreg using 
STATA for the base model equation 5.6. In particular, the base model equation 5.6 is 
re-estimated using robust regressions technique, which is also known as iterative 
                                                          
100
 Past studies have employed various alternate CAR that are cumulated over different event window lengths. 
No rationale has been given on the chosen event window length. For sensitivity tests, Masulis et al. measure 
acquirer abnormal announcement returns over event windows of (-1,1), (-1,0), (0,1) and (-5,5) and Cai and 
Sevilir (2012) used event windows of (-1,1), ),(-2,2) and (-3,3). 
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weighted least squares (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). The robust regression down-
weights observations with larger absolute residuals using iterative weighted least 
squares. In addition, robust regression can help justify the use of ordinary least squares 
results (Verardi and Croux 2009). When robust regression results are similar to those 
for ordinary least squares, there is a reassurance that ordinary least squares are not 
unduly influenced by the outliers (Abell et al. 1999). These sensitivity analyses are again 
run over the event windows of Day (-1, +1), Day (-2, +2) and Day (-3, +3) in the 
multivariate analysis for the respective CAR that are generated through both market 
model and market-adjusted model.   
 
 
Lastly, due to the nature of pooled dataset in this study, the residuals may be 
correlated across firms, time or industry. In resultant, the OLS standard errors can be 
over- or underestimated.  Tests are performed for firm effects, time effect and industry 
effect to ensure that the interpretation and analyses of the results are not influenced 
by firm fixed effect, time effect or industry effect. The tests performed provide further 
justification whether adjustment are needed on the standard errors for possible 
dependence of the  residuals (Peterson 2009).  Stata is used to perform the tests for 
firm, time and industry effect using the command test.  
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5.6 Summary 
 
 
This chapter explains the data sources, data characteristics and research design used in 
this study for corporate acquisition announcements, specifically for the case of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms.  Descriptive statistics are also discussed to 
understand the characteristics of the data.  
 
 
A summary of the measurements of the dependent variable, independent variables and 
control variables used for the research are presented in Table 5.1. This chapter also 
discusses in detail the procedures required in generating the dependent variable using 
event study methodology as discussed in Section 5.3.1. 
 
 
The generated dependent variables (CAR) as specified in equation 5.6 are discussed 
concerning their use in both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis. Both 
univariate analysis and multivariate analysis are necessary to draw empirical inferences 
from this study. The chapter ends with a discussion on the methodology for robustness 
tests and analyses.  
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CHAPTER 6 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter presents and analyses the results. Section 6.2 reports and analyses the 
average cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) around the announcement period of 
corporate acquisition announcements for Malaysian family-controlled acquirers.  The 
changes in announcement-period market value -    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   provide an understanding of 
investors’ reactions to corporate acquisition announcements of Malaysian family-
controlled firms.  
 
 
Next, Section 6.3.1 reports and discusses the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimate of baseline regression (Equation 5.6).  A more detailed discussion based on 
the baseline regression results in Section 6.3 is presented in Section 6.4 to Section 6.10. 
Robustness test and regression diagnostic test on the baseline regression model 
(Equation 5.6) are performed and reported in Section 6.3.2 and Section 6.3.3, 
respectively. These tests are performed to ensure the robustness of the inferences 
drawn from the reported results of the baseline regressions.  
 
 
Detailed analyses and discussions are presented in Section 6.4 to Section 6.10 in 
relation to the examined hypotheses, based on the baseline results reported in Section 
6.3. On a case by case basis, further univariate anlaysis and multivariate analysis are 
performed when needed to draw empirical inferences from the examined hypotheses. 
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It is important to note that univariate analyses are conducted to provide preliminary 
evidence of the possible correlation between variables of interest and dependent 
variable (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ).   
 
 
As highlighted by Masulis et al. (2007), results of univariate analyses do not allow 
reliable inferences to be made since the correlations between the partitioned    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and 
other possible determinants of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are not considered in univariate analyses.  This has 
been one of the limitations of univariate analysis. The observed significance of 
announcement period    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of each subsample could be an artefact of the subsamples 
having correlations with other unobservable factors and firm characteristics, such as 
firm size, payment methods and target type (Masulis et al. 2007; Bauguess and 
Stegemoller 2008). Results of univariate analysis only allow the researcher to have 
preliminary observations of the relation between the examined family features and the 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (Masulis et al. 2007; Bauguess and Stegemoller 2008). Care is needed when 
drawing conclusions at this stage as there are likely to be other uncontrolled factors 
exhibiting significant relation with     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
 
 
Hence, the influences of other possible determinants of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  need to be controlled 
before any empirical inferences are drawn from the results of univariate analyses. This 
can be achieved through multivariate analyses, where under a controlled multivariate 
setting, inferences can be made, as presented in the following section, Section 6.3 
Multivariate Analysis. 
 
 
Lastly, due to the nature of the pooled dataset, Section 6.11 presents further 
robustness analysis of the baseline regression model to control for the fixed effects of 
firms, years and industries (see Peterson, 2009 for details). Discussions are provided to 
infer whether the baseline regression model is influenced by any firms, years and 
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industry effect. This chapter ends with Section 6.12, which summarises the contents of 
this chapter. 
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6.2 Announcement Returns to Malaysian Family-Controlled 
Acquirers 
 
Table 6. 1 Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian 
Family-Controlled Firms 
Table 6.1 
Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-
Controlled Firms  
The sample comprises mean cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    from a sample of 267 corporate acquisition 
announcements of 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 267 corporate acquisition announcements are 
categorised by announcements with acquirers under the management of family CEO and professional CEO, 
across the sample period of 2002 to 2011. The average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of each categorised corporate acquisition 
announcement is expressed in percentage of returns. N and % of Column 1 report the frequencies and 
percentage of the categorised sample corporate acquisition announcements, respectively. Columns 2, 3 and 
4 display the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  estimated using market model. Columns 5, 6 and 7 present the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    
estimated from market adjusted model. The    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is reported over the three-day event window (-1, +1), the 
five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3, +3). The statistical test employs Kolari 
and Pynnonen’s (2011) generalised rank test (GRANK), as shown in parentheses, to examine if     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    value is 
significantly different from zero. The numbers in parentheses denote the standard error. *,**, and *** stand 
for statistical significance of GRANK at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
N 
(%) 
Market Model 
CAR 
Market Adjusted Model 
CAR 
 
 
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
(Grank) 
267 
(100%) 
0.4198** 
(2.0447) 
0.5974*** 
(2.6828) 
0.7153*** 
(3.1226) 
0.6002** 
(2.3610) 
0.9400*** 
(3.3588) 
1.1969*** 
(3.5199) 
 
 
In Table 6.1, the cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) experienced by Malaysian family-
controlled acquirers are reported over various event windows. For the purpose of 
examining the sensitivity of the results, the    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is reported over the three-day event 
window (-1,+1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-
3,+3) respectively, where 0 denotes Day 0 – the announcement day.  In addition, for 
the purpose of examining the sensitivity of the results to     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   is measured by 
two models and is reported for the aforementioned event windows (As discussed in 
Chapter 5,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is estimated using both market model and market adjusted model, 
respectively).  Table 6.1 provides empirical evidence on the wealth effect of corporate 
acquisition announcements experienced by Malaysian family-controlled acquirers.  
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The results in Table 6.1 report positive    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  at 1% significance level across almost all 
the event windows for both market model     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and market adjusted model     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . For 
market model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        , Malaysian family-controlled firms experience 0.42%    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
at 5% significance level. Market adjusted model     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         also reports 0.6%    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
at 5% significance level for Malaysian family-controlled acquirers. The inferences drawn 
from the wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements experienced by 
Malaysian family-controlled firms remain unchanged over other event windows across 
different measures of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  
 
 
As shown in Table 6.1, Malaysian family-controlled acquirers experience significant 
positive announcement-period value gains for all the examined event windows and 
also for both measures of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . This demonstrates that Malaysian family-controlled 
acquirers, on average, perform value-creating corporate acquisitions. The results also 
reveal that investors favour corporate acquisitions attempted by Malaysia family-
controlled firms. Hence, this evidence reveals that Malaysian family-controlled firms, 
on average, do not perform corporate acquisitions that are value-destroying.   
 
 
The findings in Table 6.1 are consistent with those reported in other family firm 
studies. Existing family firms studies have empirically showed positive corporate 
acquisition announcement wealth effect experienced by family-controlled acquirers 
from Sweden (Holmen and Knopf 2004), India (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012) and France 
(Bouzgarrou and Navatte 2013).  These prior empirical findings support the notion that 
concentrated family ownership naturally mitigates principal-agent conflict of interests, 
leading to the undertakings of value-added corporate acquisitions. These further 
supports the notion that family firms are an effective organisational form in mitigating 
principal-agent conflict of interests (Kashmiri and Mahajan 2014).  
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However, the findings in Table 6.1 are not consistent with empirical evidence obtained 
by past corporate acquisition studies (Campa and Hernando 2004; Martynova and 
Renneboog 2008; Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007; Alexandridis et al. 2010). These past 
studies found that acquirers, on average, earn insignificant announcements returns. 
This is because the effect of family firms is not considered in these prior researches. 
Findings in Table 6.1 are also inconsistent with those in studies that showed firms with 
controlling owners are found to use corporate acquisition as a tool for minority 
expropriation, which induce negative announcement wealth effect experienced by the 
acquirers (Bae et al. 2002; Buysschaert et al. 2004; Bertrand et al. 2002).  
 
 
Overall, results in Table 6.1 provide valuable insight to policy makers and existing/ 
potential investors of Malaysian family-controlled firms. First, these results further 
supports the emphasis of Fan et al. (2011) and previous authors (Miller et al. 2007; 
Cucculelli and Micucci 2008) that implications for family firms from developed markets 
may not necessarily apply to family firms from emerging markets. Second, Malaysian 
family-controlled firms, on average, do not engage in minority expropriation activities 
through corporate acquisitions, as opposed to other Asian counterparts such as 
Korean-controlled Chaebol (Bae et al. 2002).101  The findings in Table 6.1 provide 
support to existing notion that Malaysia is an emerging economy with a strong investor 
protection system (World Bank 2009, 2011, 2012), being a regional leader in corporate 
governance (World Bank 2012) and the only emerging market of East Asia in which the 
government has institutionalised shareholder activism (Azizan and Ameer 2012) to 
effectively protect the interests of the minority shareholders.  
 
 
                                                          
101
 As discussed earlier, Korean Chaebols are found to expropriate minority shareholders through corporate 
acquisitions. 
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Third, the findings in Table 6.1 sheds light on the relation between family ownership 
and family firm value within the context of Malaysia, an emerging economy. As 
discussed earlier, corporate acquisition activities provide the advantage as a direct 
measure for evidence of agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). In this case, 
results demonstrate that family ownership in Malaysian family-controlled firms 
encourage improvement the valuation outcome of corporate acquisitions. These 
evidence shows that family ownership in Malaysian family-controlled firms reduce 
principal-agent conflict.  Results obtained here provide valuable insight concerning 
family ownership concentration; it sheds light that concentrated family ownership in 
the acquiring firms can be a panacea for the valuation outcome (wealth effect) of 
corporate acquisitions (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). Lastly, results in Table 6.1 answer 
the Research question 1, Malaysian family-controlled firms, as acquirers, on average 
undertake value-enhancing corporate acquisitions.  
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6.3 Baseline Regression  
6.3.1 Baseline Regression Analysis 
 
 
This section examines the announcement returns to Malaysian family-controlled 
acquirers in a multivariate regression setting. To control for known determinants of 
acquirer returns within the context of Malaysian family firm studies, the determinants 
are recognised based on past empirical evidence in the literature of family firms and 
corporate acquisitions. These determinants and related measures have been discussed 
in Chapter 5 – Research Methodology.  
 
 
Table 6.2 provides OLS regression results of Malaysian family-controlled acquirers’ 
returns based on equation 5.6 – the baseline model. The reported results from the 
baseline regression in Table 6.2 form the basis to draw empirical inferences on the 
tested hypotheses, which are discussed further in detail in Section 6.4 to Section 
6.10.102  Column (1)-(3) and Column (4)-(6) report the results of the multivariate 
regressions that regress the dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  on the explanatory variables, 
across the three-day event window (-1, +1), five-day event window (-2, +2) and seven-
day event window (-3, +3), respectively. The dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Column (1)-(3) 
is estimated from market model, while the dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Column (4)-(6) is 
estimated from market-adjusted model.  Day 0 is the day the announcement is 
released. Inferences are made and discussed based on the baseline results in Column 
(1). To support the results reported in Column (1) and to support the inferences drawn 
based on Column (1), additional results are reported alongside Column (1) in Column 
(2)-(6) for robustness and sensitivity analysis.  
 
                                                          
102
 The baseline model – Equation 5.6 is further expanded to examine Hypothesis 2, Hypothesis 4 and 
Hypothesis 5. 
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Table 6.2 
Baseline Model Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 FamilyCEOi + βi3 Fam_Indi + βi4 F_Duali + βi5 DualCEOi + βi6 Ind_Directori + βi7 Rpai + 
βi8 Firmyeari + βi9 Pre_CARi + βi10 non_relatedi + βi11 FCFi + βi12 LN_MVEi + βi13 LN_RMi + βi14 Crossborderi + 
βi15 Publici + β16 Equityi + β17 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Market Adjusted Model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
       
Own -0.0036 0.0254 -0.0036 -0.0075 0.0214 -0.0050 
 (-0.21) (0.97) (-0.13) (-0.43) (0.85) (-0.19) 
FamilyCEO 1.2975* 1.7412* 1.4894 0.9824 1.5613 1.2811 
 (1.82) (1.66) (1.45) (1.32) (1.43) (1.26) 
Fam_Ind -1.2527** -1.2124 -0.2877 -1.2001** -1.1995 -0.2581 
 (-2.35) (-1.53) (-0.30) (-2.24) (-1.54) (-0.27) 
F_Dual -0.5704 -1.9075** -1.5486* -0.4707 -1.8948** -1.4271 
 (-0.98) (-2.42) (-1.65) (-0.80) (-2.43) (-1.53) 
DualCEO -0.6872 -0.0755 -0.2495 -0.7231 -0.1584 -0.3862 
 (-1.17) (-0.08) (-0.24) (-1.22) (-0.17) (-0.38) 
Ind_Director -0.0863*** -0.1187*** -0.1218*** -0.0807*** -0.1075*** -0.1043*** 
 (-4.23) (-4.99) (-3.74) (-3.87) (-4.67) (-3.38) 
Rpa -0.9027** -1.4820** -1.5882** -1.0789** -1.7314*** -1.9070*** 
 (-2.00) (-2.38) (-2.29) (-2.30) (-2.75) (-2.81) 
Firmyear 0.0268** 0.0352** 0.0489** 0.0194 0.0231 0.0342* 
 (2.20) (2.01) (2.29) (1.54) (1.29) (1.72) 
Pre_CAR 0.0165 0.0150 0.0148 0.0132** 0.0149* 0.0174* 
 (0.99) (0.77) (0.64) (2.09) (1.82) (1.93) 
non_related -1.4288** -0.6482 -0.9897 -1.4810** -0.8381 -1.2424 
 (-2.03) (-0.74) (-0.93) (-2.04) (-0.95) (-1.17) 
FCF 0.4244 4.2591 9.4492 -0.9666 1.6870 6.6886 
 (0.08) (0.59) (1.18) (-0.18) (0.24) (0.86) 
LN_MVE -0.0526 -0.0717 0.0590 -0.0060 -0.0290 0.0904 
 (-0.36) (-0.29) (0.23) (-0.04) (-0.11) (0.35) 
LN_RM -0.3518*** -0.3911** -0.4143* -0.3253*** -0.3095* -0.3096 
 (-2.80) (-2.11) (-1.73) (-2.66) (-1.76) (-1.33) 
Crossborder -1.3601*** -1.6637** -1.2285 -1.2803*** -1.5307** -0.9475 
 (-3.06) (-2.58) (-1.51) (-2.86) (-2.42) (-1.17) 
Public 2.7986* 0.6814 0.8374 2.6278 1.1469 1.6791 
 (1.65) (0.17) (0.30) (1.49) (0.26) (0.54) 
Equity 2.1996** 2.7319* 3.3505** 1.9753* 2.5727** 2.9863* 
 (1.98) (1.96) (2.01) (1.74) (2.03) (1.90) 
Yr08_11 -0.8850** -0.7102 -0.4049 -0.7439* -0.5838 -0.3178 
 (-2.11) (-1.22) (-0.60) (-1.77) (-1.01) (-0.49) 
Constant 11.0291*** 11.6838*** 10.0219** 10.1367*** 10.0140** 8.0011* 
 (3.93) (2.99) (2.19) (3.51) (2.48) (1.76) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.186 0.144 0.120 0.180 0.138 0.111 
Adjusted R-squared 0.131 0.0857 0.0601 0.124 0.0789 0.0499 
F-Test 3.657*** 3.283*** 2.492*** 3.095*** 2.864*** 2.116*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0003) (0.0045) (0.0004) (0.0029) (0.0070) 
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The sample comprises 267 observations. The observations denote 267 corporate acquisition announcements 
made by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa across the sample period 
of 2002 to 2011. The reported dependent variable – CAR is regressed against the independent variables and 
control variables for each model from Column (1)-(6). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the CAR that is estimated 
using market model. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the CAR that is estimated from market adjusted model. The 
CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns over an event window for each observation. The reported CAR 
estimated from both the market model and market adjusted model are cumulated over the three-day event 
window (-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. 
Day 0 denotes the day of corporate acquisition announcement release. The variable Own denotes total 
family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity ownership in the company. The variable 
FamilyCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when family member of the controlling family is 
the CEO, zero otherwise. The variable Fam_Ind denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the ratio 
of total number of family members on the board over total number of independent directors on the board is 
more than 1, zero otherwise. The variable F_Dual denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when two 
related family members hold the positions of CEO and chairman, zero otherwise. The variable DualCEO 
denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the position of CEO and chairman are both held by the 
same individual, zero otherwise. The variable Ind_Director denotes the total percentage of independent 
directors on the board. The variable Rpa denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the acquisition 
is a related party corporate acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Firmyear denotes the firm age of the 
company. The variable Pre_CAR denotes an acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up, which is 
measured by cumulative abnormal returns over the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is 
estimated using market model. The variable non_related denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when 
target is not within the same industry as the industry of the acquirer, zero otherwise. The variable FCF 
denotes free cash flow ratio, which is measured by [(Operating Income + Depreciation – Interest expense – 
Taxes – Preferred dividend – Common dividend) / Total Assets]. The variable LN_MVE denotes firm size that 
is measured by log of market capitalisation. The variable LN_RM denotes transaction size that is measured 
by the log of transaction dollar value of the acquisition in Malaysia Ringgit currency.  The variable 
Crossborder denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for the acquisition of a non-domestic target, zero 
otherwise. The variable Public denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for acquisition of a public target, 
zero otherwise. The variable Equity denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for equity-financed 
acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Yr08_11 denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the 
year of the event is during the period of 2008 to 2011, zero otherwise. The *,**, and *** stand for statistical 
significance based on two-wide tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses denote the standard error. 
 
Table 6. 2 Baseline Model Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR) 
 
Results from the regression models with low R square must be viewed with scepticism, 
even if the F-statistics for the regression models are positive and significant (Fuller et al. 
2002; Travlos 1987; Chang 1998; Morck et al. 1990). Table 6.2 reports significant F-
statistics at 1% across all models from Column (1)-(6). F-statistics is a measure of the 
overall significance of the estimated regression model (Gujarati 2004). The F-statistic 
value with 1% significance level in Table 6.2 rejects the F-test null hypothesis that all of 
the coefficients are equal to zero.103 
 
 
                                                          
103
 All the examined models in Table 6.2 with 1% significance level of F-statistics have significant predictive 
capability. The F-statistics value and significance also show that regression specification fits the data reasonably 
well (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012).   
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Results from the baseline regression model in Table 6.2 provide evidence on the 
examined hypotheses. Inferences for the hypotheses (based on the variables of 
concern) are made later in Section 6.4 to Section 6.10, based on the baseline regression 
results and other generated results in Section 6.4 to Section 6.10, respectively. 
 
 
In Table 6.2, significant relation between the control variables and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  across various 
event windows and measure of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are reported, which are consistent with previous 
findings. Specifically, it is observed that Ln_RM has a negative relationp with    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  This 
is consistent with previous findings of the negative relation between deal value and 
announcement-period    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   due to the complex factors associated with large deal, 
which lead to overpayment by the acquirers (Alexandridis et al. 2013).  Crossborder 
also reveals a negative relation with announcement-period    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  This is consistent with 
previous findings of a significant negative relation between cross-border acquisitions 
and announcement-period    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (Bris and Cabolis 2008), where the costs of 
internationalisation outweigh the benefits of portfolio diversifications for the acquirers 
(Moeller and Schlingemann 2005).   Table 6.2 also reports a significant positive relation 
between Equity and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . This is consistent with previous findings of the significant 
positive relation between equity-financed corporate acquisitions and announcement-
period    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Previous studies (Chang 1998) has attributed this positive relationship to 
the addition of the expertise and skills from the new shareholders, which are beneficial 
to the acquirers and other shareholders. Consequently, the acquiring firms benefit 
from the monitoring of these new shareholders, who are also the new owners of the 
acquiring firm. Findings of Chang (1998) is further supported by Masulis et al. (2007), 
who also finds that equity-financed acquisition increase the announcement-period 
stock performance of acquiring firm.  
 
 
The relation and statistical significance between family firm age (Firmyear) and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
are fairly stable across the models in Table 6.2. The relation is especially positive and 
significant for market-model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  across the three examined event windows.  The 
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significance of the positive relation between family firm age and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is inconsistent 
with past findings on family firms from developed countries. Anderson and Reeb’s 
(2003a) findings on S&P500 family firms and Villalonga and Amit’s (2006) findings on 
Canadian family firms documented a negative relation between family firm age and 
family firm value.  The results in Table 6.2 reinforce the emphasis of Fan et al. (2011) 
and previous authors (Miller et al. 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008) that implications 
for family firms from developed markets may not necessarily apply to family firms from 
emerging markets, an area that requires further investigation.  In this case, the gap has 
been filled in terms of the implications for the relation between family firm age and 
family firm value, within the context of Malaysia, a developing Asian economy. The 
finding in Table 6.2 also supports previous notions on Asian families’ unique practices 
to maintain a good performance track record and ensure continuing long-term survival 
of the family firms. 104 
 
 
Results from the baseline model in Table 6.2 also reveal a significant negative relation 
between Ind_Director and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  across all event windows and all measures of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
This reported significant negative relation between Ind_Director and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   is not 
consistent with the generally accepted notion that higher proportion of independent 
directors on the board has positive effect on firm value (Anderson and Reeb 2004). 
However, the significant negative relation between Ind_Director and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  from the 
reported baseline results in Table 6.2 is consistent with the findings reported in past 
studies (Byrd and Hickman 1992; Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Jameson et al. 2014). 
These studies document empirical evidence that stronger presence of independent 
directors on the board inflict negative impact on firm performance.  
 
 
                                                          
104
 Members of Thailand family firms perform marriages that add value to family firms, when the partners are 
from either prominent businesses or political families (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013). The performance of 
Japanese family firms, on the other hand, is maintained through acceptance of capable managers into the 
family in the form of adoptions or marriages (Mehrotra et al. 2013).   
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The presence of outside directors on the board does not necessarily contribute positive 
effect to the family firm as a whole (Jonovic 1989). A classical board structure may only 
suit a few family firms (Ford 1989). Consistent with this notion, controlling families are 
found to be in favour of minimising the presence of independent directors and are 
reluctant to adopt monitoring practices (Anderson and Reeb 2004; Chen and Nowland 
2010).105  Family firms may appoint directors who are socially connected to the 
controlling family owners for the mere purpose of satisfying the regulatory 
requirement for independent directors (Jameson et al. 2014), which results in less 
effective monitoring (Hwang and Kim 2009). In general, these existing studies 
demonstrate that negative relation between independent board members and family 
firms in comparison to other non-family firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
105
 This practice does not necessarily result in detrimental effect on firm value (Chen and Nowland 2010). 
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6.3.2 Regression Diagnostic on Baseline Model 
 
 
Assumptions underlying an OLS regression need to be examined and treated with 
appropriate statistical procedures to ensure robust inferences can be derived from the 
multivariate regression analysis. The base model in this study is described in equation 
5.6 (Chapter 5), which is regressed against    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         of market model     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Details 
of the regression diagnostics are discussed in this section, particularly the validity of the 
sample size, model residuals normality, heteroskedasticity, model specification and 
multicollinearity. In summary, based on the following results from the regression 
diagnostics, the base model is able to provide robust inferences and does not violate 
the necessary diagnostic properties of the regression model assumptions. 
 
 
The results displayed in Appendix A4 Figure A4.1 and Appendix A4 Figure A4.2 report 
that there is a deviation from normality for the residuals, with leptokurtic distribution 
for the baseline model.  It has been emphasised by statisticians that the violation of 
prediction error normality assumption is virtually inconsequential for sample sizes that 
are sufficiently large (Brooks 2008; Wooldridge 2009; Bohrnstedt and Carter 1971; Sen 
and Srivastava 1990; Cohen et al. 2013; Hanneman et al. 2012). Normality of the 
residuals are needed for tests of significance to make inferential statements based on 
the tests of OLS regression estimated parameters (Draper and Smith 1981). 
Nevertheless, in the case when the random errors depart from normal distribution but 
the sample size is large, the t-tests and F-tests still remain robust by relying on the 
Central Limit Theorem (Gujarati 2004; Baltagi 2011; Berry and Feldman 1985; Yan and 
Su 2009). Statistical theory showed that the OLS estimates generally tend to be 
normally distributed when the sample sizes increase indefinitely, based on the Central 
Limit Theorem (Malinvaud 1970; Theil 1978). The prediction error normality 
assumption is only critical for small samples (Berry and Feldman 1985). With reference 
to recommendations from previous authors, with sample size that is relatively large, 
the violations of the normality assumption do not lead to serious problems with the 
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interpretation of either significance tests or confidence intervals (Brooks 2008; 
Wooldridge 2009; Bohrnstedt and Carter 1971; Sen and Srivastava 1990; Cohen et al. 
2013; Hanneman et al. 2012). 106 
 
 
In regard to the size of the sample, there are no general prescriptions on how large the 
sample size must be for the test statistics approximation to be good enough (Gujarati 
2004; Wooldridge 2009). Econometricians normally perceive that observations of more 
than 30 are satisfactory (Gujarati, 2004). Hair et al. (2006), on the other hand, 
mentioned that sample size depends on the number of independent variables that the 
researchers incorporate in the regression model. It is suggested that for multiple 
regression analysis, a minimum sample size of 100 observations are needed. They also 
mentioned that for each independent variable employed in the regression model, the 
sample size should not fall below a ratio of 5:1. The desirable ratio is between 15:1 and 
20:1, where there should be 15–20 observations available for each individual 
independent variable. The higher the ratio, the higher is the degree of freedom and 
statistical power responsible for achieving generalisability of the results (Rudestam and 
Newton 1999; Hair et al. 2006). This study employs 267 observations with 17 
independent variables incorporated in the base model as specified in equation 5.6. The 
ratio between the numbers of observations with the numbers of considered 
independent variables is 15:1, where there are approximately 15 observations available 
for each individual independent variable. The 15:1 ratio is within the desirable ratio 
range of 15:1 to 20:1 as stated by Hair et al. (2006) and Rudestam and Newton (1999).  
 
 
It is important that the homoskedasticity assumption of the prediction errors is held in 
order to justify the inferences from the t-statistics (Wooldridge 2009; Brooks 2008; Yan 
and Su 2009). In the case where the variances of the error terms are not constant, the t 
                                                          
106
 Sall and Jones (2004) also provided Monte Carlo evidence that as long as the departure from normality is not 
too large, the probability of a type 1 error (rejecting null when it is true) is at or below 0.05 with a 95% 
confidence interval.  The examined model residuals by Sall and Jones (2004) are the symmetrical double 
exponential distribution with a kurtosis of 6 (twice that of the normal distribution). The skewed normal used 
was obtained by moving 5% of the simulated distribution with 3 standard deviations to the left. 
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statistics become invalid regardless of how large the sample is, and it is irrelevant to 
the Central Limit Theorem. In the case when the prediction errors are found to be 
heteroskedastic, the inferences from the OLS regression analysis remain robust with 
the application of heteroskedasticity-robust procedure.  As mentioned by Stock and 
Watson (2003), the application of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
procedures ensure statistical inferences are valid regardless of whether the residuals 
are heteroskedastic or not. Hence, the Huber-White robust standard errors are applied 
consistently across all the regression models analysed in this thesis. The Huber-White 
robust standard errors procedure is also able to address the residuals normality issue 
(Stock and Watson 2003). This technique produces parameter estimates and standard 
errors that are robust to departures from normality (Acock 2008).  
 
 
Model specification error can occur when one or more relevant variables are omitted 
or included in the model. The effects are the inflation of model residuals and wrong 
regression estimations (Gujarati 2004).  To test whether the baseline model 
experiences any significant model specification error, a model specification link test is 
performed.  A Ramsey RESET test is also performed on the base model to detect if 
there are any omitted variables for the baseline model.  The outcomes of the tests are 
displayed in Appendix A4 Figure A4.3. The variable _hat, which is the variable of 
prediction, should be significant since it is the predicted value. The variable of concern 
is the squared prediction, _hatsq.  In the case if the _hatsq is significant, it implies that 
the model experiences model specification error. Appendix A4 Figure A4.4 reveals that 
_hatsq is insignificant, which implies that the model does not experience any 
specification error. A Ramsey RESET test is also performed to detect if there are any 
omitted variables for the baseline model.  The outcome exhibited in Appendix A4 
Figure A4.4 reveals insignificant estimates, which implies that the baseline model  
overall does not experience any significant model specification error. 
 
 
  
209 
 
  
Lastly, a multicollinearity test is performed on the baseline model. Multicollinearity 
refers to the situation when there are significant correlations among the independent 
variables.107  Furthermore, multicollinearity among the independent variables also 
increases the variance of the standard errors of the regression coefficient estimates, 
leading to smaller t-statistics and less precision in the analysis of the model (Wübben 
and Schiereck 2007; Berry and Feldman 1985; Yan and Su 2009). The Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) procedure is used to detect any multicollinearity among the independent 
variables of the baseline model. For variables with VIF values that are greater than 10 
or 1/VIF values (the tolerance value) that are lower than 0.1, they imply the presence 
of a linear relation with other independent variables.  The outcome of the test is 
reported in Appendix A4 Figure A4.5. The baseline model passes the test of 
multicollinearity. There is no significant linear relation among the examined 
independent variables (the determinants) in this study. 
 
 
Overall, the regression diagnostics performed on the baseline model (which is 
regressed against    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         of market model) provides further assurance that the 
results and analyses of the model are reliable. Regression diagnostics are also 
performed for equation 5.6, which is regressed against    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        , and 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         of market model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  as well as against    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        ,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        , 
and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         of market-adjusted model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . A summary of the regressions 
diagnostic results are displayed in Appendix A4 Table A4.1. All these models pass the 
test of regression diagnostics. The results from these models provide reliable 
inferences that do not violate the necessary diagnostic properties of the regression 
model assumptions. 
                                                          
107
 In the case when there is a perfect collinearity among the independent variables, it yields a precise R-square 
of 1, which induces biases in inferences made based on the examined model. 
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6.3.3 Robustness Analysis of Baseline Model 
Table 6. 3 Robust Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
 
 
Table 6.3 
Robust Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR)  
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 FamilyCEOi + βi3 Fam_Indi + βi4 F_Duali + βi5 DualCEOi + βi6 Ind_Directori + βi7 Rpai + 
βi8 Firmyeari + βi9 Pre_CARi + βi10 non_relatedi + βi11 FCFi + βi12 LN_MVEi + βi13 LN_RMi + βi14 Crossborderi + 
βi15 Publici + β16 Equityi + β17 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
       
Own 0.0086 0.0188 0.0033 0.0105 0.0167 0.0100 
 (0.61) (0.93) (0.15) (0.74) (0.84) (0.48) 
FamilyCEO 1.2229** 1.9170** 1.4936 0.9604 1.5852* 1.6287* 
 (2.10) (2.32) (1.62) (1.64) (1.94) (1.90) 
Fam_Ind -0.7768* -1.0538 0.2543 -0.7874* -1.0386 0.2455 
 (-1.71) (-1.63) (0.35) (-1.72) (-1.62) (0.36) 
F_Dual -0.7900 -1.7424** -1.9101** -0.6633 -1.8265*** -2.2579*** 
 (-1.60) (-2.49) (-2.44) (-1.35) (-2.65) (-3.12) 
DualCEO -0.3274 -0.5047 -0.6698 -0.2533 -0.7404 -0.9135 
 (-0.67) (-0.73) (-0.87) (-0.52) (-1.08) (-1.27) 
Ind_Director -0.0818*** -0.1069*** -0.0812*** -0.0776*** -0.0971*** -0.0611** 
 (-4.19) (-3.85) (-2.62) (-3.96) (-3.54) (-2.12) 
Rpa -0.2924 -0.7761 -0.4811 -0.5109 -0.9568* -0.5416 
 (-0.72) (-1.34) (-0.74) (-1.24) (-1.67) (-0.90) 
Firmyear 0.0341*** 0.0369** 0.0562*** 0.0308*** 0.0201 0.0349** 
 (2.98) (2.27) (3.09) (2.69) (1.25) (2.06) 
Pre_CAR 0.0034 -0.0014 0.0112 0.0084* 0.0076 0.0066 
 (0.30) (-0.09) (0.62) (1.90) (1.23) (1.02) 
non_related -1.0595* -0.6636 -0.4746 -0.9581* -0.6905 -0.6546 
 (-1.88) (-0.83) (-0.53) (-1.69) (-0.87) (-0.79) 
FCF 1.9726 6.8662 10.0299 -0.0149 5.4326 5.5467 
 (0.45) (1.11) (1.45) (-0.00) (0.88) (0.86) 
LN_MVE -0.0312 -0.0485 0.0023 -0.0013 0.1321 0.0829 
 (-0.23) (-0.25) (0.01) (-0.01) (0.70) (0.42) 
LN_RM -0.2947** -0.2141 -0.2385 -0.2453** -0.1604 -0.1855 
 (-2.59) (-1.32) (-1.32) (-2.14) (-1.00) (-1.10) 
Crossborder -0.9769** -1.0503* -0.7561 -0.8866** -0.9068 -0.6308 
 (-2.44) (-1.84) (-1.19) (-2.20) (-1.61) (-1.07) 
Public 2.9899** 4.2786** 1.0483 2.6402* 2.5670 3.3539* 
 (2.21) (2.23) (0.49) (1.94) (1.35) (1.68) 
Equity 1.6972 2.5865* 3.3945** 1.3956 2.5632* 3.2721** 
 (1.64) (1.76) (2.06) (1.34) (1.76) (2.14) 
Yr08_11 -0.6047* -0.6227 -0.2088 -0.4540 -0.3554 -0.0302 
 (-1.70) (-1.23) (-0.37) (-1.27) (-0.71) (-0.06) 
Constant 7.7623*** 7.1187* 5.1184 6.4946** 3.2219 2.4566 
 (2.99) (1.93) (1.24) (2.50) (0.89) (0.64) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.172 0.141 0.114 0.152 0.124 0.105 
Adjusted R-squared 0.115 0.0828 0.0531 0.0936 0.0644 0.0442 
F-Test 3.032*** 2.413*** 1.878** 2.615*** 2.076*** 1.724** 
 (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0203) (0.0006) (0.0084) (0.0391) 
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The sample comprises 267 observations. The observations denote 267 corporate acquisition announcements 
made by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa across the sample period 
2002 and 2011. The reported dependent variable – CAR is regressed against the independent variables and 
control variables for each model from Column (1)-(6). Column 1, 2 and 3 report the CAR that are estimated 
using market model. Column 4, 5 and 6 reports the CAR that are estimated from market adjusted model. The 
CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns over an event window for each observation. The reported CAR 
estimated from both the market model and market adjusted model are cumulated over the three-day event 
window (-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3,+3), respectively. 
Day 0 denotes the day of corporate acquisition announcement release. The variable Own denotes total 
family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity ownership in the company. The variable 
FamilyCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when family member of the controlling family is 
the CEO, zero otherwise. The variable Fam_Ind denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the ratio 
of total number family members on board over total numbers of independent directors on board is more 
than 1, zero otherwise. The variable F_Dual denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when two related 
family members hold the positions of CEO and chairman, zero otherwise. The variable DualCEO denotes a 
dummy variable that equals to one when the position of CEO and chairman are both held by the same 
individual, zero otherwise. The variable Ind_Director denotes the total percentage of independent director 
on the board. The variable Rpa denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the acquisition is a 
related party corporate acquisition, zero otherwise The variable Firmyear denotes the firm age of the 
company. The variable Pre_CAR denotes an acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up, which is 
measured by cumulative abnormal returns over the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is 
estimated using market model. The variable non_related denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when 
target is not within the same industry as the industry of the acquirer, zero otherwise The variable FCF 
denotes free cash flow ratio that is measured by [ (Operating Income + Depreciation – Interest expense – 
Taxes – Preferred  dividend – Common dividend) / Total Assets ]. The variable LN_MVE denotes firm size that 
is measured by log of market capitalization. The variable LN_RM denotes transaction size that is measured 
by the log of transaction dollar value of the acquisition in Malaysia Ringgit currency.  The variable 
Crossborder denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for the acquisition of non-domestic target, zero 
otherwise. The variable Public denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for acquisition of public target, 
zero otherwise. The variable Equity denotes a dummy variable that equals to equity-financed acquisition, 
zero otherwise. The variable Yr08_11 denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the year of the 
event is during the period of 2008-2011, zero otherwise. The *,**, and *** stand for statistical significance 
based on two-wide tests at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. The numbers in parentheses denote the 
standard error. 
 
 
The baseline model equation 5.6 is re-estimated using robust regressions technique, 
known as  iterative  weighted least squares (Blanchard and Leigh 2013). As mentioned 
in Chapter 5 Methodology,  robust regression can help justify the use of ordinary least 
squares results (Verardi and Croux 2009). When robust regression results are similar to 
those of ordinary least squares, there is a reassurance that results of the ordinary least 
squares are not influenced by the outliers (Abell et al. 1999).  
 
 
Table 6.3 above reveals that the overall magnitude and significance of the explanatory 
variables of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  remain unchanged. The significance level for the magnitude of the 
explanatory variables generally becomes more persistent across different event 
windows for the market-model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and market-adjusted-model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , except for rpa.   
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The magnitude of rpa supports Hypothesis 8, which posits a negative relation between 
related party corporate acquisitions and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Malaysian family-controlled acquirers. 
However, the significance of the magnitude diminishes, in comparison with those from 
Table 6.2 in Section 6.3.1.  This shows that the significance of the negative relation 
between rpa and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (across different event windows and different measures of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
in Table 6.2 in Section 6.3.1) is induced by influential observations. Stata is used to 
perform estimation on the models using robust regression (the command rreg); any 
influential observations (outliers) with Cook’s distance of more than 1 will be omitted 
from observations when performing estimation for the robust regression. Table 6.3 
reveals that none of the observations are omitted from the observations of the robust 
regression. This indicates that there may be certain observations that are influential to 
some extent, while not exceeding the Cook’s distance of more than 1. Even though the 
significance of the relation diminishes in Table 6.3, the direction of the relation remains 
unchanged.  There is weak evidence supporting the value-destroying behaviour of 
Malaysian family-controlled acquirers when they choose corporate acquisitions that 
involve family-related parties.  
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6.4 H1 Family Ownership: Linear Relation 
6.4.1 Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
The baseline model results in Table 6.2 of Section 6.3.1 and the results from the robust 
regressions in Table 6.3 of Section 6.3.3 simultaneously support the notion that there 
is no significant linear relation between family ownership and family firm value.  In this 
case, Hypothesis 1 is rejected.  Hypothesis 1 hypothesises a positive linear relation 
between family ownership and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Malaysian family-controlled acquirers, based on 
the notion of Agency Theory I (principal-agent theory).   
 
 
Results presented in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 support findings of Maury (2006) that no 
significant positive linear relation exists between family ownership and family firm 
value.  Increasing family ownership does not always increase firm value; in fact, high 
level of family ownership increases family opportunism (Maury 2006).  Family 
ownership at concentrated level induces family owners to pursue personal objectives 
over profit maximisation.  Specifically, family owners with undiversified ownership 
induce different investment behaviours and preferences which tend to be more risk-
averse in comparison with those exhibited by the atomistic shareholders (Anderson 
and Reeb 2003b; Anderson et al. 2012). As the level of family ownership increases, the 
adoption of non-economic objective of the controlling family becomes more likely 
(Chrisman et al. 2012). Existing family firm studies also do no support the linear relation 
between family ownership and family firm value, for family firms of S&P500 in the US 
(Anderson and Reeb 2003b), Poland (Kowalewski et al. 2010), Canada (Ben-Amar and 
André 2006), Europe (Maury 2006; Pindado et al. 2013), India (Bhaumik and Selarka 
2012) and Switzerland (Isakov and Weisskopf 2014).  
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6.5 H2 Family Ownership: Nonlinear Relation 
6.5.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
 
Table 6.4 
Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-
Controlled Firms for Subsamples Categorised by Family Ownership 
The sample comprises mean cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    from the sample 267 corporate acquisition 
announcements of 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 267 corporate acquisition announcements are 
categorised by family ownership across the sample period 2002 to 2011. The term < 50% denotes family 
ownership of less than 50% in acquirer firms. The term Between 50%–59% denotes family ownership of 50% or 
more and less than 60% in acquirer firms. The term 60%–69% denotes family ownership of 60% or more and 
less than 70% in acquirer firms. The term 70% or more denotes family ownership at 70% or more in acquirer 
firms.  The average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of each categorised corporate acquisition announcements is expressed in percentage 
of returns. N and % of Column 1 report the frequencies and percentage of the categorised sample corporate 
acquisition announcements, respectively. Columns 2, 3 and 4 display the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  estimated using the 
market model. Columns 5, 6 and 7 present the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    estimated from the market adjusted model. The 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is reported over the three-day event window (-1,+1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-
day event window (-3,+3). The statistical test employs Kolari and Pynnonen’s (2011) generalised rank test 
(GRANK) to examine if     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   are significantly different from zero. The numbers in parentheses denote the 
standard error. *,**, and *** stand for statistical significance of GRANK at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
N 
(%) 
Market Model 
CAR 
Market Adjusted Model 
CAR 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
Subsamples grouped by family ownership 
108
    
<  50%  158 
(59%) 
0.4749* 
(1.9565) 
0.4702** 
(1.9772) 
0.9136*** 
(2.9773) 
0.6171** 
(2.0840) 
0.7712** 
(2.3885) 
1.2921*** 
3.1857 
50%-59% 61 
(23%)  
0.6645* 
(1.7500) 
1.2291** 
(2.1847) 
0.6355 
(0.9450) 
0.8234* 
(1.7680) 
1.5566*** 
(2.6360) 
1.2223 
(1.4437) 
60%-69% 32 
(12%)  
0.4442 
(1.0875) 
1.0524* 
(1.7058) 
0.7028 
(1.4407) 
0.4794** 
(2.5253) 
0.2753 
(1.3831) 
0.2798 
(0.7785) 
70% and 
more
109
 
16 
(6%) 
-1.1070*** 
(-3.4660) 
-1.4654** 
(-1.9132) 
-0.9142 
(-0.6306) 
-0.6656** 
(-2.3883) 
-0.7606 
(-1.2163) 
-0.0159 
(-0.3096) 
Total 267 
(100%) 
      
Table 6. 4 Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-Controlled Firms for 
Subsamples Categorised by Family Ownership 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
108
 Family ownership at 50% and more ensure absolute control over the family firm (Faccio and Lang 2002). 
109
 The maximum family ownership in this sample is 84.5%. There is only one sample firm that carries family 
ownership of more than 80%.  
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Table 6.4 tabulates the announcement-period mean cumulative abnormal returns 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    for the 267 sample corporate acquisition announcements over the period 2002 
to 2011, which are classified according to different levels of family ownership in 
Malaysian family-controlled acquirers. Results of Table 6.4 provide preliminary 
evidence of the nonlinear relation between family ownership and announcement 
period    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  . The purpose of classifying the 267 sample announcements and reporting 
the     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   according to different levels of family ownership of the Malaysian family-
controlled acquiring firms is to examine the possibility of a nonlinear relation between 
family ownership and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  , as predicted by Hypothesis 2.   
 
 
Table 6.4 reports the cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) experienced by Malaysian 
family-controlled acquirers over various event windows. For the purpose of examining 
the sensitivity of the results, the    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is reported over the three-day event window (-
1,+1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3,+3) 
respectively, where 0 denotes Day 0 — the announcement day.  In addition, for the 
purpose of examining the sensitivity of the results to the measures of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   are 
measured by two models (market model and market-adjusted model) respectively and 
are reported across all the three examined event windows.   
 
 
Table 6.4 reveals that, overall, there is a significant positive relation between family 
ownership and announcement-period wealth effect of corporate acquisitions—the 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . When family ownership is less than 50% (for the subsample of < 50%), the 
significance of the market model (market-adjusted model)     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         is at 10% (5%) 
with an average of 0.47% (0.61%) cumulated abnormal returns. The announcement 
wealth effect remains significant across all other examined event windows. This shows 
that the results are not sensitive to the measures of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  or the examined event 
window.  
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The significance of positive announcement wealth effect experienced by Malaysian 
family-controlled acquirers only persists when family ownership is less than 50%. When 
family ownership increases to 50% or more, the significance of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  experienced by 
Malaysian family-controlled acquirers becomes weaker and insignificant across 
different event windows for the two measures of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , respectively.  These indicate a 
prima facie evidence (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012) supporting Hypothesis 2, that there 
may be a nonlinear relation between family ownership and announcement-period CAR 
of Malaysian family-controlled acquirers.  
 
 
Table 6.4 further reports     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   that is tabulated for family ownership at 70% or more. 
The tabulated     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   becomes negative and significant across most of the examined 
event windows for the two measures of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , respectively. This is another preliminary 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 2. Concentrated ownership in the hands of family 
reduces Agency Problem I (principal-agent conflicts). However, when a certain point of 
concentrated family ownership is reached, the benefit of mitigating Agency Problem I is 
offset by higher cost incurred by Agency Problem II (principal-principal conflicts). This is 
observable within the context of Malaysian family-controlled firms based on the 
reported results in Table 6.4. 
 
 
Results of Table 6.4 support a possible nonlinear relation between family ownership 
and family firm value (as measured by announcement-period abnormal returns). The 
results are consistent with past family firm studies for family firms from S&P500 in the 
US (Anderson and Reeb 2003b), Poland (Kowalewski et al. 2010), Canada (Ben-Amar 
and André 2006), Europe (Maury 2006; Pindado et al. 2013) and Switzerland (Isakov 
and Weisskopf 2014), which all documented a nonlinear relation between family 
ownership and family firm value. These past studies jointly demonstrated that family 
  
217 
 
  
firms originating from different countries with different corporate governance settings 
experienced a nonlinear relation between family ownership and family firm value. 110   
 
 
Overall, results in Table 6.4 support the nonlinear relation between Malaysian family 
ownership and family firm value (as measured by    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), as predicted by Hypothesis 2. 
The results also further demonstrate that within the context of Malaysia, principal-
principal conflict (Agency Problem II) emerges as a result of increasing family ownership 
concentration.  
 
 
These results imply that consistent with interest alignment hypothesis, increased family 
ownership reduces principal-agent conflict and induces beneficial value-enhancing 
effect on family firms. However, increasing family ownership also gradually gives rise to 
principal-principal conflicts (Villalonga and Amit 2006; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012; 
Maury 2006).  This is because family owners with concentrated shareholdings have 
sufficient control and power to ensure that the family-controlled firms pursue activities 
and corporate strategies that favour family interest, which do not necessarily favour 
the interests of the minority shareholders (Allen and Sharon 1982). The adoption of 
non-economic objective of the controlling family becomes more likely as the level of 
family ownership increases (Chrisman et al. 2012).  The controlling families can 
continue to pursue maximisation of firm performance while creating conflicts over 
wealth distribution among the shareholders (Ditmar et al. 2003).  
  
                                                          
110
 For Western Europe family firms from a strong protective environment (European countries with strong 
investor protection and higher quality corporate governance institution), Pindado et al. (2013) showed the 
nonlinear relation between family ownership and family firm value. This notion is also supported by existing 
empirical findings for emerging countries with low investor protection and weak corporate governance (La 
Porta et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004).  The occurrence of Agency Conflict II (principal-
principal conflict) due to ownership concentration is also shown in India, an emerging market with weak 
corporate governance (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). 
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6.5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
Table 6.5 
Non-Linearity Between Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) and Family Ownership: Squared Polynomial Model 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 Own
2
i + βi3 FamilyCEOi + βi4 Fam_Indi + βi5 F_Duali + βi6 DualCEOi + βi7 Ind_Directori 
+ βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 non_relatedi + βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 LN_RMi + βi15 
Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + β17 Equityi + β18 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
       
Own 0.1964* 0.2806* 0.0945 0.1885* 0.2776 0.1176 
 (1.90) (1.67) (0.57) (1.81) (1.58) (0.70) 
Own
2
 -0.0021** -0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0020** -0.0027 -0.0013 
 (-2.08) (-1.54) (-0.60) (-2.01) (-1.46) (-0.74) 
FamilyCEO 1.0681 1.4485 1.3767 0.7612 1.2722 1.1428 
 (1.50) (1.41) (1.35) (1.02) (1.19) (1.16) 
Fam_Ind -1.3315** -1.3128 -0.3264 -1.2781** -1.3015 -0.3069 
 (-2.47) (-1.62) (-0.33) (-2.35) (-1.63) (-0.32) 
F_Dual -0.5571 -1.8904** -1.5420 -0.4395 -1.8540** -1.4076 
 (-0.95) (-2.39) (-1.64) (-0.74) (-2.36) (-1.50) 
DualCEO -0.7776 -0.1909 -0.2939 -0.8061 -0.2668 -0.4381 
 (-1.33) (-0.21) (-0.28) (-1.37) (-0.29) (-0.42) 
Ind_Director -0.0829*** -0.1144*** -0.1202*** -0.0773*** -0.1030*** -0.1022*** 
 (-4.07) (-4.73) (-3.70) (-3.70) (-4.41) (-3.33) 
Rpa -0.9839** -1.5856** -1.6280** -1.1615** -1.8393*** -1.9586*** 
 (-2.12) (-2.50) (-2.32) (-2.40) (-2.85) (-2.85) 
Firmyear 0.0264** 0.0347** 0.0487** 0.0195 0.0232 0.0343* 
 (2.17) (2.00) (2.29) (1.54) (1.31) (1.73) 
Pre_CAR 0.0136 0.0113 0.0134 0.0135** 0.0153* 0.0176* 
 (0.81) (0.61) (0.58) (2.19) (1.88) (1.93) 
non_related -1.4016* -0.6135 -0.9763 -1.4486** -0.7958 -1.2222 
 (-1.97) (-0.71) (-0.91) (-1.97) (-0.90) (-1.14) 
FCF -0.9492 2.5064 8.7749 -2.1436 0.1489 5.9526 
 (-0.18) (0.35) (1.07) (-0.41) (0.02) (0.76) 
LN_MVE -0.0985 -0.1303 0.0365 -0.0507 -0.0874 0.0625 
 (-0.66) (-0.51) (0.14) (-0.32) (-0.33) (0.24) 
LN_RM -0.3288** -0.3617* -0.4030* -0.3033** -0.2807 -0.2958 
 (-2.58) (-1.93) (-1.68) (-2.46) (-1.57) (-1.26) 
Crossborder -1.3612*** -1.6651** -1.2291 -1.2856*** -1.5375** -0.9508 
 (-3.08) (-2.58) (-1.51) (-2.89) (-2.43) (-1.17) 
Public 2.8380* 0.7317 0.8568 2.6814* 1.2169 1.7126 
 (1.87) (0.21) (0.33) (1.70) (0.31) (0.59) 
Equity 2.3623** 2.9394* 3.4303** 2.1434* 2.7923** 3.0914* 
 (2.02) (1.96) (2.02) (1.81) (2.05) (1.93) 
Yr08_11 -0.8565** -0.6738 -0.3909 -0.7176* -0.5494 -0.3013 
 (-2.07) (-1.16) (-0.58) (-1.73) (-0.95) (-0.46) 
Constant 7.3151** 6.9446 8.1988 6.4467** 5.1916 5.6935 
 (2.39) (1.57) (1.61) (2.11) (1.17) (1.11) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.200 0.155 0.122 0.192 0.149 0.113 
Adjusted R-squared 0.142 0.0941 0.0578 0.134 0.0873 0.0483 
F-Test 3.570*** 3.017*** 2.364*** 2.965*** 2.648*** 1.986** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0111) 
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The sample comprises 267 observations. The observations denote 267 corporate acquisition announcements 
made by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa across the sample period 
of 2002 to 2011. The reported dependent variable – CAR is regressed against the independent variables and 
control variables for each model from Column (1)-(6). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the CAR that is estimated 
using market model. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the CAR that is estimated from market adjusted model. The 
CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns over an event window for each observation. The reported CAR 
estimated from both the market model and market adjusted model are cumulated over the three-day event 
window (-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. 
Day 0 denotes the day of corporate acquisition announcement release. The variable Own denotes total 
family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity ownership in the company. The variable 
Own
2
 denotes squared Own. The variable FamilyCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when 
family member of the controlling family is the CEO, zero otherwise. The variable Fam_Ind denotes a dummy 
variable that equals to one when the ratio of total number of family members on the board over total 
number of independent directors on the board is more than 1, zero otherwise. The variable F_Dual denotes 
a dummy variable that equals to one when two related family members hold the positions of CEO and 
chairman, zero otherwise. The variable DualCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the 
position of CEO and chairman are both held by the same individual, zero otherwise. The variable 
Ind_Director denotes the total percentage of independent directors on the board. The variable Rpa denotes 
a dummy variable that equals to one when the acquisition is a related party corporate acquisition, zero 
otherwise. The variable Firmyear denotes the firm age of the company. The variable Pre_CAR denotes an 
acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up, which is measured by cumulative abnormal returns over 
the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is estimated using market model. The variable 
non_related denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when target is not within the same industry as the 
industry of the acquirer, zero otherwise. The variable FCF denotes free cash flow ratio, which is measured by 
[(Operating Income + Depreciation – Interest expense – Taxes – Preferred dividend – Common dividend) / 
Total Assets]. The variable LN_MVE denotes firm size that is measured by log of market capitalisation. The 
variable LN_RM denotes transaction size that is measured by the log of transaction dollar value of the 
acquisition in Malaysia Ringgit currency.  The variable Crossborder denotes a dummy variable that equals to 
one for the acquisition of a non-domestic target, zero otherwise. The variable Public denotes a dummy 
variable that equals to one for acquisition of a public target, zero otherwise. The variable Equity denotes a 
dummy variable that equals to one for equity-financed acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Yr08_11 
denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the year of the event is during the period of 2008 to 
2011, zero otherwise. The *,**, and *** stand for statistical significance based on two-wide tests at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses denote the standard error. 
 
Table 6. 5 Non-Linearity Between Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
and Family Ownership: Squared Polynomial Model 
  
 
The baseline model Equation 5.6 is expanded by including the new variable Own2, 
which follows the following equation: 
 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 Own
2
i + βi3 FamilyCEOi + βi4 Fam_Indi + βi5 F_Duali + βi6 
DualCEOi + βi7 Ind_Directori + βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 non_relatedi + 
βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 LN_RMi + βi15 Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + β17 Equityi + β18 
Yr08_11i +    
         Equation 6.1 
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Equation 6.1 allows examination of Hypothesis 2 within a controlled multivariate 
setting. Hypothesis 2 predicts a nonlinear relation between family ownership and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . 
The squared Own – Own2, is based on prior family firm studies (Anderson and Reeb 
2003b; Isakov and Weisskopf 2014) to examine the possibilities of a nonlinear relation 
between family ownership and family firm value.   
 
 
The results are reported in Table 6.5 as above. Column (1)-(3) and Column (4)-(6) 
report the results of the multivariate regressions that regress the dependent variable 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  on the explanatory variables, across the three-day event window (-1, +1), five-day 
event window (-2, +2) and seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. The 
dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   of Column (1)-(3) is estimated from the market model.  The 
dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Column (4)-(6) is estimated from the market-adjusted 
model.   
 
 
Results from Columns (1) and (3) support Hypothesis 2. Columns (1) and (3) report 5% 
significance level for the coefficients of the variables Own and Own2. The results 
indicate that there is a significant nonlinear relation between family ownership and 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The inflection point 111  (or maximum family firm performance) where the 
beneficial effect of Malaysian family firms begins to diminish is at 46.76% (47.13%) for 
the market model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (+1,+1) (market adjusted model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (+1,+1)). Similar relation is 
also found based on the results in Columns (2) and (4), with an inflection point at 
53.96% and 51.41% respectively, when generating    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  across the five-day event 
window. The inflection point based on results of Columns (3) and (6) is at 47.25% and 
45.23% respectively for the seven-day event window    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The overall results indicate 
Malaysian family-controlled firm performance increases until the controlling families 
                                                          
111
 Inflection point is calculated from the formula ( - βi1 / βi2x2), where βi1 and βi2 are the coefficients of the 
variables Own and Own
2
 respectively in Table 6.5.  
  
221 
 
  
own close to 50% or more of the equity shareholdings in family firms. Beyond this 
point, performance of Malaysian family-controlled firms decline. 
This finding is consistent with the result reported by Pindado et al. (2013). Study of 
Pindao et al. (2013) reveals that the optimal level of family ownership which maximises 
the value of family firms is at 51% in Switzerland. However, the results of the optimal 
level of family ownership concentration contrast with those documented in the study 
of Anderson and Reeb (2003a) for US family firms, which reports 30% as the optimal 
level.  
 
 
The results overall imply that the controlling family owners of Malaysian family-
controlled firms require close to half or more than half of the ownership in the 
company to maximise family firm value. Contrast to other counterparts, US family firms 
only need to acquire one third of the company to maximise firm value. Similar to family 
firms in Switzerland (Pindado et al. 2013), the controlling families in Malaysia need to 
own larger stakes in the family firms for an effective decision-making process. Such a 
difference is consistent with the past findings on the concentrated ownership level of 
Asian families, in comparison with their counterparts from developed countries (Carney 
and Child 2012; La Porta et al. 1999).  Concentrated level of family ownership is 
especially necessary for Asian family firms. Concentrated family ownership is an 
internal control mechanism, which serves as a substitute for scarce institutional 
governance mechanisms (Lins 2003).  Controlling family owners, while filling up these 
monitoring roles to overcome the lack of investor protection system, also reduce their 
incentives for expropriations, leading to increase in firm value (Lins 2003; Denis and 
McConnell 2003).  
 
 
Based on these results in Table 6.5 as presented in this section, further light is shed on 
the conflicting theoretical predictions112 of the effect of concentrated family ownership 
                                                          
112
 This has been discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2 on Interest Alignment Hypothesis and Expropriation 
Hypothesis. 
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on family firm value. These overall findings imply that Malaysian family-controlled firms 
are associated with better firm value with the increase of family ownership. This 
supports the notion of interest alignment hypothesis. Few inherent features of family 
firms 113 (ownership and managerial role) naturally mitigate the conflict of interests 
between the principals and the agents, leading to the alignment of interest between 
both parties (Dalton et al. 2007; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Agrawal and Knoeber 2012; 
La Porta et al. 2000). However, results also indicate that when family ownership 
reaches a certain concentrated level, the relation between family ownership and family 
firm value becomes inversely related.  In this case, family opportunism increases with 
the increasing family ownership (Maury 2006). This finding is also consistent with past 
findings which showed a nonlinear relation between family ownership and family firm 
value for family firms from the developed economies (Anderson and Reeb 2003c; 
Kowalewski et al. 2010; Ben-Amar and André 2006; Pindado et al. 2013; Isakov and 
Weisskopf 2014).  
 
 
Overall, the findings provide few implications. First, the results enhance our 
understanding of the behavioural differences among family owners in an emerging 
economy. These create awareness among policy makers that findings in one country 
may not necessarily be applicable to another country. Policy makers need to be aware 
that when applying new policies (or even planning to), supporting facts from country-
specific research and evidence need to be taken into consideration. Second, the 
findings also provide important contributions to the conflicting theoretical argument of 
Agency Problem I and Agency Problem II within the context of Malaysian family-
controlled firms. Findings reveal that within the context of Malaysia, increasing family 
ownership is beneficial to family firms and the shareholders. However, when Malaysian 
family owners obtain highly concentrated ownership (close to 50% or more in 
ownership stake), entrenchment behaviour from the family owners emerge. Third, the 
findings reveal an important policy implication for Malaysia policy makers. The 
concentrated level of family ownership stake in publicly listed firms in Malaysia needs 
                                                          
113
 As discussed in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.1 on family’s incentives to monitor, family’s long-term goal, wealth 
transfer through generations, family sustainable competitive advantage, and family reputations, which are tied 
to well-being of family-controlled firms. 
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to be restricted. Evidence reveals that concentrated family ownership in Malaysian 
family-controlled firms is recommended to be capped at 50% for optimum firm 
performance. Fourth, findings in Section 6.2 and Section 6.5.2 overall suggest that the 
establishment of an organizational form such as the family-controlled firm in Malaysia 
should be encouraged. Results documented that Malaysian family-controlled firms, in 
general, perform value-enhancing corporate acquisitions, which benefit the shareholders of 
the family firms. However, a restriction should be imposed on the family ownership stakes 
in Malaysian family-controlled firms, which should not exceed 50%. 
 
  
6.5.3 Robustness Analysis 
 
 
To ensure the results are robust, the model as specified in Equation 6.1 is re-estimated 
using robust regression technique (the iterative weighted least squares technique as 
discussed in Chapter 5). As mentioned in Chapter 5 Methodology,  robust regression 
can help justify the use of ordinary least squares results (Verardi and Croux 2009). 
Results for the robust regression run on Equation 6.1 are reported in Table 6.6 as 
below. 
 
 
Table 6.6 reports the results generated from Equation 6.1 using robust regressions. 
Column (1)-(3) and Column (4)-(6) report the results of the robust regressions that 
regress the dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  on the explanatory variables, across the three-day 
event window (-1, +1), five-day event window (-2, +2) and seven-day event window (-3, 
+3), respectively. The dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Column (1)-(3) is estimated from the 
market model.  The dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Column (4)-(6) is estimated from the 
market-adjusted model.   
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Table 6.6 
Robust Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR)  
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 Own
2
i + βi3 FamilyCEOi + βi4 Fam_Indi + βi5 F_Duali + βi6 DualCEOi + βi7 Ind_Directori 
+ βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 non_relatedi + βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 LN_RMi + βi15 
Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + β17 Equityi + β18 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
       
Own 0.1761** 0.0545 0.0530 0.1842** 0.0200 0.1218 
 (2.10) (0.45) (0.39) (2.22) (0.17) (0.99) 
Own
2
 -0.0017** -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0018** -0.0000 -0.0012 
 (-2.00) (-0.29) (-0.38) (-2.09) (-0.03) (-0.95) 
FamilyCEO 1.0296* 1.8635** 1.4632 0.8203 1.5911* 1.5483* 
 (1.76) (2.22) (1.56) (1.41) (1.91) (1.79) 
Fam_Ind -0.9122** -1.0656 0.2246 -0.9322** -1.0408 0.2078 
 (-2.01) (-1.64) (0.31) (-2.06) (-1.61) (0.31) 
F_Dual -0.7649 -1.7409** -1.9352** -0.6854 -1.8246*** -2.2783*** 
 (-1.56) (-2.48) (-2.47) (-1.42) (-2.64) (-3.17) 
DualCEO -0.3720 -0.5065 -0.6914 -0.3225 -0.7315 -0.9233 
 (-0.76) (-0.73) (-0.89) (-0.67) (-1.06) (-1.29) 
Ind_Director -0.0803*** -0.1064*** -0.0801** -0.0765*** -0.0969*** -0.0595** 
 (-4.12) (-3.81) (-2.57) (-3.95) (-3.51) (-2.07) 
Rpa -0.3753 -0.8020 -0.4747 -0.5733 -0.9615* -0.5725 
 (-0.92) (-1.37) (-0.73) (-1.41) (-1.66) (-0.95) 
Firmyear 0.0348*** 0.0372** 0.0569*** 0.0335*** 0.0204 0.0370** 
 (3.06) (2.28) (3.12) (2.96) (1.27) (2.21) 
Pre_CAR 0.0020 -0.0014 0.0113 0.0091** 0.0078 0.0061 
 (0.18) (-0.09) (0.62) (2.11) (1.25) (0.94) 
non_related -0.9879* -0.6436 -0.4379 -0.8572 -0.6945 -0.5691 
 (-1.76) (-0.80) (-0.49) (-1.54) (-0.87) (-0.69) 
FCF 0.9226 6.6745 9.6863 -0.9983 5.3927 4.9803 
 (0.21) (1.07) (1.39) (-0.23) (0.87) (0.77) 
LN_MVE -0.0903 -0.0598 -0.0133 -0.0709 0.1266 0.0472 
 (-0.67) (-0.31) (-0.06) (-0.53) (0.66) (0.24) 
LN_RM -0.2670** -0.2162 -0.2340 -0.2122* -0.1604 -0.1746 
 (-2.35) (-1.33) (-1.29) (-1.88) (-0.99) (-1.04) 
Crossborder -0.9877** -1.0657* -0.7602 -0.9020** -0.9091 -0.6172 
 (-2.48) (-1.87) (-1.19) (-2.28) (-1.61) (-1.05) 
Public 2.5155* 4.2225** 0.7333 2.0995 2.7191 2.0227 
 (1.87) (2.19) (0.34) (1.57) (1.43) (1.02) 
Equity 1.8370* 2.6198* 3.4771** 1.5096 2.5659* 3.5178** 
 (1.78) (1.77) (2.10) (1.47) (1.75) (2.31) 
Yr08_11 -0.5901* -0.6158 -0.1976 -0.4496 -0.3587 0.0128 
 (-1.67) (-1.22) (-0.35) (-1.28) (-0.72) (0.02) 
Constant 4.9378 6.6101 4.2452 3.5743 3.2401 0.5426 
 (1.64) (1.54) (0.88) (1.20) (0.76) (0.12) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.184 0.142 0.116 0.171 0.124 0.110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.124 0.0797 0.0519 0.111 0.0607 0.0452 
F-Test 3.098*** 2.280*** 1.809** 2.851*** 1.956** 1.699** 
 (0.0000) (0.0027) (0.0248) (0.0001) (0.0127) (0.0399) 
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The sample comprises 267 observations. The observations denote 267 corporate acquisition announcements 
made by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa across the sample period 
of 2002 to 2011. The reported dependent variable – CAR is regressed against the independent variables and 
control variables for each model from Column (1)-(6). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the CAR that is estimated 
using market model. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the CAR that is estimated from market adjusted model. The 
CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns over an event window for each observation. The reported CAR 
estimated from both the market model and market adjusted model are cumulated over the three-day event 
window (-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. 
Day 0 denotes the day of corporate acquisition announcement release. The variable Own denotes total 
family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity ownership in the company. The variable 
Own
2
 denotes squared Own. The variable FamilyCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when 
family member of the controlling family is the CEO, zero otherwise. The variable Fam_Ind denotes a dummy 
variable that equals to one when the ratio of total number of family members on the board over total 
number of independent directors on the board is more than 1, zero otherwise. The variable F_Dual denotes 
a dummy variable that equals to one when two related family members hold the positions of CEO and 
chairman, zero otherwise. The variable DualCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the 
position of CEO and chairman are both held by the same individual, zero otherwise. The variable 
Ind_Director denotes the total percentage of independent directors on the board. The variable Rpa denotes 
a dummy variable that equals to one when the acquisition is a related party corporate acquisition, zero 
otherwise. The variable Firmyear denotes the firm age of the company. The variable Pre_CAR denotes an 
acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up, which is measured by cumulative abnormal returns over 
the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is estimated using market model. The variable 
non_related denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when target is not within the same industry as the 
industry of the acquirer, zero otherwise. The variable FCF denotes free cash flow ratio, which is measured by 
[(Operating Income + Depreciation – Interest expense – Taxes – Preferred dividend – Common dividend) / 
Total Assets]. The variable LN_MVE denotes firm size that is measured by log of market capitalisation. The 
variable LN_RM denotes transaction size that is measured by the log of transaction dollar value of the 
acquisition in Malaysia Ringgit currency.  The variable Crossborder denotes a dummy variable that equals to 
one for the acquisition of a non-domestic target, zero otherwise. The variable Public denotes a dummy 
variable that equals to one for acquisition of a public target, zero otherwise. The variable Equity denotes a 
dummy variable that equals to one for equity-financed acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Yr08_11 
denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the year of the event is during the period of 2008 to 
2011, zero otherwise. The *,**, and *** stand for statistical significance based on two-wide tests at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses denote the standard error. 
Table 6. 6  Robust Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR)  
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Results in Columns (1) and (3) again support Hypothesis 2, which states there is a 
nonlinear relation between family ownership and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  Columns (1) and (3) report 5% 
significance level for the coefficients of Own and Own2 respectively, consistent with 
earlier results in Table 6.5 above. The results indicate that there is a significant 
nonlinear relation between family ownership and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .   
 
 
The analysis is repeated using piecewise linear regression (Morck et al. 1988) to further 
investigate the nonlinear relation between family ownership and family firm value in 
support of Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 hypothesises that there is a significant nonlinear 
relation between family ownership and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . This provides further robust affirmation 
on the nonlinear relation between family ownership and family firm value.  
 
 
The piecewise linear regression is estimated using the explanatory variables of 
Equation 5.6. The variable Own is excluded from the explanatory variables of Equation 
5.6 and is replaced by two new variables — Own≤50% and Own>50%, which follows 
the following equation: 
 
 
CARi =     + βi1 Own≤50%i + βi2 Own>50%i + βi3 FamilyCEOi + βi4 Fam_Indi + βi5 F_Duali + 
βi6 DualCEOi + βi7 Ind_Directori + βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 
non_relatedi + βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 LN_RMi + βi15 Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + 
β17 Equityi + β18 Yr08_11i +    
         Equation 6.2 
 
 
The piecewise linear regression — Equation 6.2 is estimated for the dependent variable 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . For results sensitivity, the    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   is estimated from both the market model and 
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market-adjusted model, across the examined event windows. The new variables 
Own<50% and Own≥50% allow change of slopes at 50%. The cut-off point at 50% family 
ownership is used based on the overall estimates of the nonlinear relation between 
family ownership and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  reported in Table 6.6 above. The following new variables 
are used to estimate and report the results of piecewise linear regressions: 
 
 
Own≤50% = family ownership   if family ownership ≤ 50%; and 
  = 50     if family ownership > 50% 
Own>50% = 0     if family ownership ≤ 50%; and 
  = (family ownership – 50)   if family ownership > 50% 
 
 
Results are reported in Table 6.7 as below. Results from Columns (1) and (3) again 
support Hypothesis 2, which states there is a nonlinear relation between family 
ownership and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  Columns (1) and (3) report 5% significance level for the coefficient 
of Own<50% and Own≥50%, respectively. The results indicate that there is a significant 
nonlinear relation between family ownership and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  The benefits of concentrated 
family ownership taper off when family ownership reaches a concentrated level of 
equity shareholdings in Malaysian family-controlled firms.  
 
 
In general, the reported findings of Table 6.5, Table 6.6 and Table 6.7 provide weak 
support to Hypothesis 2. Results show that the reported nonlinear relation between 
family ownership and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  does not remain significant over other examined event 
windows in column (2), (3), (5) and (6) of Table 6.5, Table 6.6 and Table 6.7, respectively.   
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Table 6.7 
Non-Linearity Between Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) and Family Ownership: Piecewise Regression Model 
CARi =     + βi1 Own<50%i + βi2 Own≥50%i + βi3 FamilyCEOi + βi4 Fam_Indi + βi5 F_Duali + βi6 DualCEOi + βi7 
Ind_Directori + βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 non_relatedi + βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 
LN_RMi + βi15 Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + β17 Equityi + β18 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
       
Own ≤ 50%  0.0411 0.0833* 0.0221 0.0343 0.0748 0.0198 
 (1.25) (1.79) (0.45) (1.03) (1.61) (0.40) 
Own
 
> 50% -0.0641** -0.0530 -0.0384 -0.0637** -0.0506 -0.0384 
 (-2.13) (-0.99) (-0.67) (-2.03) (-0.88) (-0.67) 
FamilyCEO 1.0684 1.4444 1.3575 0.7726 1.2928 1.1564 
 (1.50) (1.41) (1.33) (1.03) (1.21) (1.17) 
Fam_Ind -1.3008** -1.2747 -0.3154 -1.2428** -1.2542 -0.2834 
 (-2.43) (-1.59) (-0.32) (-2.30) (-1.58) (-0.30) 
F_Dual -0.5602 -1.8941** -1.5426 -0.4484 -1.8662** -1.4139 
 (-0.96) (-2.40) (-1.64) (-0.76) (-2.38) (-1.51) 
DualCEO -0.7867 -0.2044 -0.3068 -0.8108 -0.2706 -0.4383 
 (-1.35) (-0.22) (-0.30) (-1.38) (-0.29) (-0.42) 
Ind_Director -0.0843*** -0.1162*** -0.1207*** -0.0788*** -0.1050*** -0.1032*** 
 (-4.15) (-4.86) (-3.73) (-3.79) (-4.55) (-3.38) 
Rpa -1.0197** -1.6336** -1.6555** -1.1867** -1.8694*** -1.9710*** 
 (-2.17) (-2.57) (-2.35) (-2.42) (-2.89) (-2.86) 
Firmyear 0.0258** 0.0340* 0.0483** 0.0189 0.0225 0.0339* 
 (2.11) (1.96) (2.27) (1.48) (1.26) (1.71) 
Pre_CAR 0.0151 0.0132 0.0140 0.0138** 0.0157* 0.0178* 
 (0.90) (0.69) (0.61) (2.23) (1.92) (1.95) 
non_related -1.3934* -0.6024 -0.9693 -1.4438* -0.7905 -1.2203 
 (-1.95) (-0.70) (-0.90) (-1.96) (-0.90) (-1.14) 
FCF -1.0020 2.4113 8.6282 -2.1375 0.1883 5.9926 
 (-0.19) (0.33) (1.06) (-0.41) (0.03) (0.76) 
LN_MVE -0.0885 -0.1182 0.0384 -0.0400 -0.0725 0.0702 
 (-0.59) (-0.47) (0.15) (-0.26) (-0.27) (0.26) 
LN_RM -0.3290** -0.3615* -0.4011* -0.3051** -0.2836 -0.2975 
 (-2.57) (-1.92) (-1.67) (-2.45) (-1.58) (-1.27) 
Crossborder -1.4044*** -1.7211*** -1.2540 -1.3242*** -1.5868** -0.9736 
 (-3.14) (-2.65) (-1.54) (-2.94) (-2.49) (-1.19) 
Public 2.7502* 0.6188 0.8096 2.5898 1.0983 1.6565 
 (1.72) (0.17) (0.30) (1.56) (0.26) (0.55) 
Equity 2.3147** 2.8810* 3.4167** 2.0865* 2.7151** 3.0524* 
 (1.98) (1.96) (2.03) (1.76) (2.04) (1.92) 
Yr08_11 -0.8765** -0.6992 -0.4000 -0.7364* -0.5742 -0.3133 
 (-2.11) (-1.21) (-0.60) (-1.76) (-0.99) (-0.48) 
Constant 9.9934*** 10.3420*** 9.4258** 9.1517*** 8.7532** 7.4156* 
 (3.67) (2.75) (2.09) (3.29) (2.29) (1.65) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.198 0.154 0.122 0.190 0.146 0.112 
Adjusted R-squared 0.140 0.0929 0.0581 0.131 0.0842 0.0476 
F-Test 3.560*** 3.063*** 2.360*** 2.943*** 2.669*** 1.992*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0018) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0108) 
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The sample comprises 267 observations. The observations denote 267 corporate acquisition announcements 
made by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa across the sample period 
of 2002 to 2011. The reported dependent variable – CAR is regressed against the independent variables and 
control variables for each model from Column (1)-(6). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the CAR that is estimated 
using market model. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the CAR that is estimated from market adjusted model. The 
CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns over an event window for each observation. The reported CAR 
estimated from both the market model and market adjusted model are cumulated over the three-day event 
window (-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. 
Day 0 denotes the day of corporate acquisition announcement release. The variable Own ≤ 50% equals 
family ownership if family ownership ≤ 50%; and equals 50 if family ownership > 50%. The variable Own>50% 
equals 0 if family ownership ≤ 50%; and equals family ownership minus 50 if family ownership > 50%. The 
term family ownership denotes total family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity 
ownership in the company. The variable FamilyCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when 
family member of the controlling family is the CEO, zero otherwise. The variable Fam_Ind denotes a dummy 
variable that equals to one when the ratio of total number of family members on the board over total 
number of independent directors on the board is more than 1, zero otherwise. The variable DualCEO 
denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the position of CEO and chairman are both held by the 
same individual, zero otherwise. The variable Ind_Director denotes the total percentage of independent 
directors on the board. The variable Rpa denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the acquisition 
is a related party corporate acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Firmyear denotes the firm age of the 
company. The variable Pre_CAR denotes an acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up, which is 
measured by cumulative abnormal returns over the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is 
estimated using market model. The variable non_related denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when 
target is not within the same industry as the industry of the acquirer, zero otherwise. The variable FCF 
denotes free cash flow ratio, which is measured by [(Operating Income + Depreciation – Interest expense – 
Taxes – Preferred dividend – Common dividend) / Total Assets]. The variable LN_MVE denotes firm size that 
is measured by log of market capitalisation. The variable LN_RM denotes transaction size that is measured 
by the log of transaction dollar value of the acquisition in Malaysia Ringgit currency.  The variable 
Crossborder denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for the acquisition of a non-domestic target, zero 
otherwise. The variable Public denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for acquisition of a public target, 
zero otherwise. The variable Equity denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for equity-financed 
acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Yr08_11 denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the 
year of the event is during the period of 2008 to 2011, zero otherwise. The *,**, and *** stand for statistical 
significance based on two-wide tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses denote the standard error. 
 
Table 6. 7 Non-Linearity Between Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
and Family Ownership: Piecewise Regression Model 
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6.6 H3 Family Management Regime: Family CEO and 
Professional CEO 
6.6.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
 
Table 6.8 
Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-
Controlled Firms for Subsamples Categorised by Family Management Regime 
The sample comprises mean cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    from the sample 267 corporate acquisition 
announcements of 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 267 corporate acquisition announcements are 
categorised by announcements with acquirers under the management of family CEO and professional CEO, 
across the sample period 2002 to 2011. The term Family CEO denotes that the CEO positions of the acquirers 
are held by family members of the controlling family. The term Professional CEO denotes that the CEO 
positions of the acquirers are held by professionals who are not family-related to the controlling family. The 
term Founder CEO denotes that the CEO positions of the acquirers are held by founders. The term 
Descendant CEO denotes that the CEO positions of the acquirers are held by the descendants of the 
controlling family. The average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of each categorised corporate acquisition announcement is expressed in 
percentage of returns. N and % of Column 1 report the frequencies and percentage of the categorised 
sample corporate acquisition announcements, respectively. Columns 2, 3 and 4 display the average 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  estimated using the market model. Columns 5, 6 and 7 present the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    estimated from the 
market adjusted model. The    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is reported over the three-day event window (-1,+1), the five-day event 
window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3,+3). The statistical test employs Kolari and 
Pynnonen’s (2011) generalised rank test (GRANK) to examine if     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   are significantly different from zero. 
The numbers in parentheses denote the standard error. *,**, and *** stand for statistical significance of 
GRANK at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
N 
(%) 
Market Model 
CAR 
Market Adjusted Model 
CAR 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
Samples grouped by Family CEO or Professional CEO 
Family CEO 224 
(84%) 
0.5005** 
(2.2386) 
0.7610*** 
(2.8367) 
0.9272*** 
(3.2672) 
0.6377** 
(2.5161) 
1.0609*** 
(3.4826) 
1.3558*** 
(3.7242) 
Professional CEO 43 
(16%) 
-0.0008 
(0.0744) 
-0.2550 
(0.3860) 
-0.3883 
(0.3919) 
0.4051 
(0.2373) 
0.3103 
(0.4969) 
0.3692 
(0.3603) 
Total 267 
(100%) 
      
Table 6. 8 Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-Controlled Firms for 
Subsamples Categorised by Family Management Regime 
 
 
Table 6.8 tabulates the announcement-period mean cumulative abnormal returns 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    for the 267 sample corporate acquisition announcements over the period 2002 
to 2011, which are grouped according to different family management regimes in 
Malaysian family-controlled firms. Results of Table 6.8 provide preliminary evidence of 
the relation between different family management regimes and announcement period 
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   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . This also allows prima facie evidence on the testing of Hypothesis 3.  The 
announcement period     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅     for the Malaysian family-controlled acquirers are 
reported over the three-day event window (-1, +1), five-day event window (-2, +2) and 
seven-day event window (-3, +3) and are represented by    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        ,    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         
and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        , respectively.  
 
 
Table 6.8 tabulates    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  according to two groups: the Malaysian family-controlled 
acquirers are managed by family CEO or non-family-related professional CEO. Family 
CEO infers that the CEO positions of the Malaysian family-controlled acquirers are held 
by family members of the controlling family owners. Non-family-related professional 
CEO infers that the CEO positions of the Malaysian family-controlled acquirers are held 
by professionals who are not family-related to the controlling family owners. Table 6.8 
reveals that, overall, there are significant positive relation between family management 
(as measured by Family CEO) and the announcement-period wealth effect of corporate 
acquisitions (as measured by    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). When Malaysian family-controlled acquirers are 
managed by a CEO who is family-related to the controlling family owners, the 
significance of the market model (market-adjusted model)     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         is at 5% (5%) 
with an average of 0.50% (0.64%) cumulated abnormal returns over Day-1 to Day+1114. 
The significance of the announcement effect remains the same across different event 
windows for both    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  that are measured by the market model and market-adjusted 
model.  
 
 
Table 6.8 also reveals the significance of positive announcement wealth effect 
experienced by Malaysian family-controlled acquirers diminishes when Malaysian 
family-controlled acquirers are managed by a CEO, who is not family-related to the 
controlling family.  There is a mixture of positive or negative average cumulated 
abnormal returns     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   across various event windows, for both    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   that are 
generated from the market model or market-adjusted model. 
                                                          
114
  Day 0 is the day the announcement is released. 
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Results from Table 6.8 provide preliminary evidence supporting Hypothesis 3 that there 
is a positive relation between family CEO and wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
announcements experienced by Malaysian family-controlled firms. The result also 
supports the advocate of agency theory. Advocate of agency theory argues that family 
CEOs are beneficial to increasing family firm value.  This is attributed to the fact that 
family members are able to exchange their knowledge and skills from different 
dimensions with one another over a long horizon, which leads to better monitoring and 
disciplining (Fama and Jensen 1983b). In comparison with professional managers, 
family CEO also has better access to resources, which can be acquired through informal 
and private networks (such as business groups). This is especially the case for family 
firms of emerging economies with weak market-supporting institutional settings, 
where access to resources is often not through normal channels (such as banks) (Peng 
and Jiang 2010). Empirical evidence supports the beneficial effect of active family 
management through the role of CEO on family firm value (Maury 2006; Sraer and 
Thesmar 2007).  
 
 
However, results in Table 6.8 is inconsistent with the studies that documented the 
negative impact of family CEO on family firm value, for the case of Danish family firms 
(Bennedsen et al. 2007).  This is also inconsistent with another notion that 
transgenerational control of ownership and management may be detrimental to the 
long-term prosperity of family-controlled firms (Chrisman et al. 2012; Schulze et al. 
2003). Particularly, the altruistic behaviour of family owners or the Fredo effect (Kidwell 
et al. 2013) may be detrimental to the company when incompetent family members 
are chosen to take over the management position (Chua et al. 2009; Anderson and 
Reeb 2004; Bertrand and Schoar 2006). When corporate control transfers from highly 
able entrepreneurs to the next generation, the heirs are likely to be less competent 
than their successors (Morck and Yeung 2003). Similar arguments have been offered. 
When the strategic goal of the controlling families is to continue maintain the company 
under family control instead of transferring control to professional outsider managers, 
successions in the management of family-controlled firms are less effective (Burkart et 
al. 2003; Chua et al. 2009; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Smith and Amoako-Adu 1999).  
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6.6.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
The baseline regression results in Section 6.3.1 (Table 6.2) indicate a weak significant 
positive relation between FamilyCEO and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   across different event windows and 
measures of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  The significance of the positive relation between FamilyCEO and 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  does not stay persistent for     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   that are estimated from the market-adjusted 
model.  There is an overall weak support for Hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 hypothesises a 
positive relation between family CEO and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Results in Section 6.3.1 (Table 6.2) 
provide weak support for the beneficial effect of family management on family firm 
value. The insignificant relation between FamilyCEO and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  can be an artefact of no 
consideration due to the effect of founder CEO or the descendant CEO.  As discussed in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, one of the specific features of family firms is the holding of 
CEO position by either the founder or the descendant, other than by the professional 
CEO (who is not family related to the controlling family owners). This family-specific 
feature is commonly observable in Malaysian family-controlled firms. Hence, further 
investigation is performed to delve deeper into the relation between this family-
specific management feature (founder-CEO or descendant-CEO) and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in subsection 
6.7.  
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6.6.3 Robustness Analysis 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5 Methodology,  robust regression can help justify the use of 
ordinary least squares results (Verardi and Croux 2009). When robust regression results 
are similar to those of ordinary least squares, there is a reassurance that results of the 
ordinary least squares are not influenced by the outliers (Abell et al. 1999).  The robust 
regression results in Section 6.3.3 (Table 6.3) again provide weak support for 
Hypothesis 3. The significance of the positive relation between FamilyCEO and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
does not stay persistent for     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   that are either estimated from the market model or 
market-adjusted model across different event windows.  
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6.7 H4 and H5 Family Management Regime: Founder CEO and 
Descendant CEO 
6.7.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
 
Table 6.9 
Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-
Controlled Firms for Subsamples Categorised by Family Management Regime 
The sample comprises mean cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    from the sample 267 corporate acquisition 
announcements of 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 267 corporate acquisition announcements are 
categorised by announcements with acquirers under the management of family CEO and professional CEO, 
across the sample period 2002 and 2011. The term Founder CEO denotes family CEO who is the founder. The 
term Descendant CEO denotes family CEO who is the descendant. The average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of each categorised 
corporate acquisition announcement is expressed in percentage of returns. N and % of Column 1 report the 
frequencies and percentage of the categorised sample corporate acquisition announcements, respectively. 
Columns 2, 3 and 4 display the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  estimated using the market model. Columns 5, 6 and 7 present 
the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    estimated from the market adjusted model. The    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is reported over the three-day event 
window (-1,+1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3,+3). The statistical 
test employs Kolari and Pynnonen’s (2011) generalised rank test (GRANK) to examine if     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   are 
significantly different from zero. The numbers in parentheses denote the standard error. *,**, and *** stand 
for statistical significance of GRANK at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
N 
(%) 
Market Model 
CAR 
Market Adjusted Model 
CAR 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
Samples grouped by Family CEO: Founder CEO or Descendant CEO 
Founder CEO 125 
(56%) 
0.5815** 
(2.3918) 
0.9119*** 
(3.0326) 
0.9122*** 
(3.0981) 
0.7644*** 
(2.6444) 
1.3244*** 
(3.7379) 
3.7379*** 
(3.3558) 
Descendant CEO 98 
(44%) 
0.4142 
(0.8139) 
0.5985 
(1.0214) 
0.9715 
(1.5618) 
0.5001 
(1.0068) 
0.7662 
(1.2412) 
1.3650** 
(2.0013) 
Total 223
115
       
Table 6. 9 Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-Controlled Firms for 
Subsamples Categorised by Family Management Regime 
 
 
Table 6.9 tabulates    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  according to two groups: (i) Malaysian family-controlled 
acquirers that are managed by family CEO who is the founder; and (ii) Malaysian 
family-controlled acquirers that are managed by family CEO who is the descendant. 
                                                          
115
 There is one observation of corporate acquisition announcements of Malaysian family-controlled firms that 
were under the active management of the controlling family via the CEO position. However, it was neither the 
founder nor the descendant who took the role of CEO. The CEO position was held by the brother of the 
founder.  The sample corporate acquisition announcement was on 30 August 2006, which was performed by 
Classic Scenic Bhd. 
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Results show preliminary support for the positive relation between founder CEO and 
firm value. When Malaysian family-controlled acquirers are managed by a CEO who is 
the founder, the significance of the market model (market-adjusted model) 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         is at 5% (1%) with an average of 0.58% (0.76%) cumulated abnormal 
returns over Day-1 to Day+1, where Day 0 is the day the announcement is released. 
The    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   remains significant in other examined event windows for both measures of 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (from market model and market-adjusted model). The significance of the market 
model (market-adjusted model)     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         is at 1% (1%) with an average of 0.91% 
(3.74%) cumulated abnormal returns over Day-3 to Day+3.   
 
 
This is consistent with past findings on the positive effect of founder on firm value 
(Adams et al. 2009; Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Villalonga and Amit 2006). 116 Founders 
add value to the company corollary to their specialised knowledge, long-term 
ownership and non-pecuniary ties to the company in terms of reputational and 
emotional ties (James 1999; Demsetz and Lehn 1985).  Additionally, founder is 
inherently a careful steward of the company. The inherent incentive to monitor the 
business closely is due to the great deal of their fortune and family future prosperity 
invested in the company (Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Villalonga and Amit 2006). The 
investment behaviour of founder which differs from others may be one of the artefacts 
inducing good performance of the family firm. Specifically, a study found that founder 
prefers investment with high risk and high return (Block 2012). Overall, Table 6.9 
provides preliminary evidence supporting Hypothesis 4 that there is a positive relation 
between founder CEO and wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcements 
experienced by Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
 
 
                                                          
116
 Other than the documented founder effect for the US and Canada, founder effect is also reported for family 
firms in Germany (Andres 2008), Italy (Cucculelli and Micucci 2008), Japan (Saito 2008) and France (Sraer and 
Thesmar 2007). 
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Table 6.9 also reports support for the positive relation between descendant CEO and 
firm value for Hypothesis 5.  When the CEO of Malaysian family-controlled firms is  the 
descendant, Table 6.9 reports positive    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  across all the event windows for both the 
market-model estimated    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and market-adjusted-model estimated    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The relation 
between descendant CEO and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is positive, but insignificant in many instances as 
shown in Table 6.9. The preliminary evidence provides insight into answering current 
unwavering issues in family firms concerning whether to pass ownership (or managerial 
role) to descendants or to the professional outsiders (Deloitte Growth Enterprise 
Services 2013; Poutziouris et al. 2013; KPMG 2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012).  
However, it is still too early to make any inferences without controlling the effect of 
other factors within a multivariate setting. 
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6.7.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
Table 6.10 
Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
(CAR): Founder CEO and Descendant CEO 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 F_CEOi + βi3 H_CEOi + βi4 Fam_Indi + βi5 F_Duali + βi6 DualCEOi + βi7 Ind_Directori + 
βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 non_relatedi + βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 LN_RMi + βi15 
Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + β17 Equityi + β18 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
       
Own  -0.0019 0.0278 -0.0012 -0.0056 0.0238 -0.0021 
 (-0.11) (1.07) (-0.04) (-0.33) (0.95) (-0.08) 
F_CEO 1.1183* 1.5020 1.2196 0.8558 1.4105 1.0842 
 (1.65) (1.52) (1.30) (1.20) (1.36) (1.17) 
H_CEO 2.0047** 2.7171** 2.5358* 1.6629* 2.4170* 2.3931* 
 (2.36) (2.19) (1.79) (1.87) (1.88) (1.67) 
Fam_Ind -1.4328** -1.4600* -0.5572 -1.3685** -1.4083* -0.5336 
 (-2.56) (-1.76) (-0.54) (-2.42) (-1.71) (-0.52) 
F_Dual -0.8716 -2.3228*** -2.0006* -0.7518 -2.2430** -1.8897* 
 (-1.43) (-2.64) (-1.85) (-1.21) (-2.58) (-1.73) 
DualCEO -0.7863 -0.2131 -0.3956 -0.8209 -0.2822 -0.5469 
 (-1.33) (-0.22) (-0.38) (-1.38) (-0.29) (-0.52) 
Ind_Director -0.0893*** -0.1229*** -0.1264*** -0.0834*** -0.1108*** -0.1086*** 
 (-4.28) (-5.04) (-3.77) (-3.92) (-4.68) (-3.41) 
Rpa -1.0430** -1.6739*** -1.7942** -1.2053** -1.8907*** -2.1099*** 
 (-2.21) (-2.63) (-2.47) (-2.47) (-2.94) (-2.98) 
Firmyear 0.0269** 0.0354** 0.0491** 0.0198 0.0236 0.0351* 
 (2.24) (2.03) (2.32) (1.60) (1.34) (1.79) 
Pre_CAR 0.0153 0.0134 0.0130 0.0133** 0.0151* 0.0177* 
 (0.94) (0.67) (0.55) (2.07) (1.83) (1.89) 
non_related -1.4828** -0.7222 -1.0706 -1.5272** -0.8952 -1.3176 
 (-2.09) (-0.83) (-1.01) (-2.09) (-1.01) (-1.24) 
FCF 0.5575 4.4287 9.5851 -0.8454 1.8793 6.8310 
 (0.10) (0.64) (1.24) (-0.16) (0.27) (0.92) 
LN_MVE -0.0486 -0.0665 0.0648 -0.0035 -0.0259 0.0942 
 (-0.33) (-0.27) (0.25) (-0.02) (-0.10) (0.36) 
LN_RM -0.3832*** -0.4338** -0.4594* -0.3529*** -0.3449* -0.3531 
 (-2.97) (-2.27) (-1.85) (-2.79) (-1.89) (-1.44) 
Crossborder -1.4578*** -1.7975*** -1.3714 -1.3703*** -1.6445** -1.0920 
 (-3.19) (-2.73) (-1.63) (-2.97) (-2.54) (-1.29) 
Public 2.9441* 0.8826 1.0473 2.7752 1.3368 1.9173 
 (1.70) (0.22) (0.37) (1.54) (0.30) (0.61) 
Equity 2.2933** 2.8606* 3.4891** 2.0656* 2.6857** 3.1330* 
 (1.99) (1.93) (1.98) (1.77) (2.00) (1.88) 
Yr08_11 -1.0607** -0.9510 -0.6616 -0.9042** -0.7871 -0.5751 
 (-2.45) (-1.56) (-0.90) (-2.06) (-1.28) (-0.80) 
Constant 11.6439*** 12.5211*** 10.9227** 10.6463*** 10.6563*** 8.8115* 
 (4.07) (3.23) (2.38) (3.61) (2.63) (1.93) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.198 0.156 0.131 0.190 0.146 0.121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.140 0.0945 0.0675 0.131 0.0844 0.0577 
F-Test 3.544*** 3.109*** 2.350*** 3.022*** 2.779*** 2.022*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0019) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0093) 
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The sample comprises 267 observations. The observations denote 267 corporate acquisition announcements 
made by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa across the sample period 
of 2002 to 2011. The reported dependent variable – CAR is regressed against the independent variables and 
control variables for each model from Column (1)-(6). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the CAR that is estimated 
using market model. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the CAR that is estimated from market adjusted model. The 
CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns over an event window for each observation. The reported CAR 
estimated from both the market model and market adjusted model are cumulated over the three-day event 
window (-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. 
Day 0 denotes the day of corporate acquisition announcement release. The variable Own denotes total 
family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity ownership in the company. The variable 
F_CEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when founder is the CEO, zero otherwise. The variable 
Descendant CEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the descendant is the CEO, zero 
otherwise. The variable Fam_Ind denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the ratio of total 
number of family members on the board over total number of independent directors on the board is more 
than 1, zero otherwise. The variable F_Dual denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when two related 
family members hold the positions of CEO and chairman, zero otherwise. The variable DualCEO denotes a 
dummy variable that equals to one when the position of CEO and chairman are both held by the same 
individual, zero otherwise. The variable Ind_Director denotes the total percentage of independent directors 
on the board. The variable Rpa denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the acquisition is a 
related party corporate acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Firmyear denotes the firm age of the 
company. The variable Pre_CAR denotes an acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up, which is 
measured by cumulative abnormal returns over the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is 
estimated using market model. The variable non_related denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when 
target is not within the same industry as the industry of the acquirer, zero otherwise. The variable FCF 
denotes free cash flow ratio, which is measured by [(Operating Income + Depreciation – Interest expense – 
Taxes – Preferred dividend – Common dividend) / Total Assets]. The variable LN_MVE denotes firm size that 
is measured by log of market capitalisation. The variable LN_RM denotes transaction size that is measured 
by the log of transaction dollar value of the acquisition in Malaysia Ringgit currency.  The variable 
Crossborder denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for the acquisition of a non-domestic target, zero 
otherwise. The variable Public denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for acquisition of a public target, 
zero otherwise. The variable Equity denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for equity-financed 
acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Yr08_11 denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the 
year of the event is during the period of 2008 to 2011, zero otherwise. The *,**, and *** stand for statistical 
significance based on two-wide tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses denote the standard error. 
Table 6. 10 Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR): Founder 
CEO and Descendant CEO 
 
To examine Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5, the baseline model Equation 5.6 is 
expanded by replacing the variable FamilyCEO with two new variables of concern—
F_CEO and H_CEO, which follows the following equation: 
 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 F_CEOi + βi3 H_CEOi + βi4 Fam_Indi + βi5 F_Duali + βi6 DualCEOi 
+ βi7 Rpai + βi8 Firmyeari + βi9 Pre_CARi + βi10 non_relatedi + βi11 Ind_Directori + βi12 FCFi 
+ βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 LN_RMi + βi15 Crossborderi + βi16 Publici17 + β17 Equityi + β18 
Yr08_11i +    
Equation 6.3 
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The variable of interest F_CEO, which is a dummy variable that equals to one when 
founder is the CEO of the family-controlled acquirers, zero otherwise. The variable of 
interest H_CEO, which is a dummy variable that equals to one when descendant is the 
CEO of the family-controlled acquirers, zero otherwise. The results from the new 
extended model are reported in Table 6.10 above.  Table 6.10 reports the results using 
OLS regressions. Column (1)-(3) and Column (4)-(6) report the results of the 
multivariate regressions that regress the dependent variable     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   on the explanatory 
variables, across the three-day event window (-1, +1), five-day event window (-2, +2) 
and seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. The dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of 
Column (1)-(3) is estimated from the market model.  The dependent variable    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of 
Column (4)-(6) is estimated from the market-adjusted model.   
 
 
After controlling for the effect of other explanatory factors, results in Table 6.10 show 
that the existence of founder CEO does not significantly affect    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  during the 
announcement period. This is exhibited by the variable of interest F_CEO.  F_CEO 
exhibits positive relation with    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   across all the examined event windows and 
different measure of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . There is weak support for Hypothesis 4 on the beneficial 
association between founder CEO and family firm value. There is only a 10% significant 
positive relation between F_CEO and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ (-1,+1). Table 6.10 also shows the existence 
of descendant CEO, which positively and significantly affects family bidder stock returns 
during the announcement period. This is exhibited by the variable of interest H_CEO. 
H_CEO exhibits significant positive relation with    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  across all the examined event 
windows and different measures of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The results support Hypothesis 5 on the 
beneficial association between descendant CEO and family firm value. For family firms 
managed solely by descendants, it actually induces positive effect on family bidder’s 
stock returns during the announcement period.  
 
 
The above result implies that descendants are actually capable of making good 
investment decisions that bring positive effect to stock reactions compared with their 
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formal predecessors, within the context of Malaysia. Such finding is consistent with 
previous findings that descendant-managed family firms also induce positive effect on 
family firm performance (Sraer and Thesmar 2007). However, it is inconsistent with 
Miller et al.’s (2007) inferences that the good performance of family firms is solely due 
to founder effect, based on their observations on U.S. family firms. The result is also 
inconsistent with the preliminary evidence reported in Section 3.2 univariate analysis, 
where descendant effect is found to experience positive stock returns during 
announcement period, but at an insignificant level.  This discovery shows that drawing 
of inferences cannot depend solely on univariate analysis due to the limitation of 
univariate analysis not controlling the effect of other possible determinants (Masulis et 
al. 2007). The significant positive    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  found for the examined event firms with founder 
on the board can be due to other uncontrolled factors inducing significant positive  
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The discovery also shows that findings based on the observations of one economy 
may not be applicable in other economies (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012).  Family owners 
affect family firm value differently depending on the legal environment, culture and 
regulation of the region (Faccio et al. 2001; Maury 2006).  It is important to conduct 
focused-country studies, which allow  unknown country specific factors to be 
controlled (Fan, Wei, et al. 2011).  
 
 
The results overall provide important implications to the family firms and investors. 
First, the findings shed further lights on the existing dilemma of family owners 
worldwide on whether to pass down their business to descendants (Deloitte Growth 
Enterprise Services, 2013; KPMG, 2011; Poutziouris, et al., 2013; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2012). In Malaysia, Malaysian family-controlled firms are 
highly concentrated, with strong control by the founder families and descendants 
(Mallin, 2011). A national survey of Grant Thornton (Grant Thornton, 2002a) with 
Malaysian Institute of Management (MIM) highlighted that at an almost equivalent 
basis, one third of Malaysian family owners see that management succession should be 
maintained within the family and another one third see that management succession 
need not be maintained within the family.  Results overall imply that active managerial 
role of the controlling family in managing Malaysian family-controlled firms should be 
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encouraged, for both founders and the descendants. The findings in this paper reveal 
that descendent managed firms induce significant positive effect on family firm stock 
returns during announcement period. Second, the findings also have implication to the 
sustainability of family businesses where transfer of control and ownership of 
corporate resources from generation to generation is inevitable for family businesses. 
The inabilities of later generations to manage family firms not only pose threats to 
family businesses, but also indirectly affect society economies. However, results 
suggest that Malaysian family owners are encouraged to transfer their control and 
ownership of corporate to their next generations. Third, results also provide implication 
to investors that descendants are value-added assets to Malaysian family-controlled 
firms. Malaysian descendants are actually capable of making good investment decisions 
that create value for Malaysian family-controlled firms. This is in contrast to the 
generally known Fredo effect (Kidwell et al. 2013) that descendants are not good 
managers of the family firms. 
 
6.7.3 Robustness Analysis  
 
As discussed in Chapter 5, to ensure the result is robust, the expanded model (Equation 
6.3) is re-estimated through robust regressions using iterative weighted least squares 
(Blanchard and Leigh 2013). Results in Table 6.11 below show improved significance 
and correlations between variable of interests and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . None of the observations are 
excluded from the observations of the robust regression analysis by Stata. This means 
that there are no influential observations (outliers) with Cook’s distance of more than 
1. The results in Table 6.11 provide further support for results reported in Table 6.10 
above, after considering the influence of influential observations. The significant 
positive relation between F_CEO and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   persists across different event windows and 
different measures of the    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (for market model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and market-adjusted model  
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   at 5% or 10% significance level), supporting Hypothesis 4. Additionally, the 
significant positive correlation between H_CEO and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   also persists across different 
event windows and different measures of the    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (for market model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and market-
adjusted model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  at 5% or 10% significance level), supporting Hypothesis 5. 
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Table 6.11 
Robust Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR): Founder CEO and Descendant CEO 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 F_CEOi + βi3 H_CEOi + βi4 Fam_Indi + βi5 F_Duali + βi6 DualCEOi + βi7 Ind_Directori + 
βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 non_relatedi + βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 LN_RMi + βi15 
Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + β17 Equityi + β18 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
Own  0.0092 0.0213 0.0094 0.0114 0.0171 0.0137 
 (0.65) (1.05) (0.42) (0.80) (0.86) (0.65) 
F_CEO 1.1853** 1.8546** 1.5096 0.9823* 1.6479** 1.6221* 
 (2.05) (2.26) (1.65) (1.70) (2.04) (1.90) 
H_CEO 1.5308** 2.2885** 1.9318* 1.2445* 1.7869** 2.1347** 
 (2.37) (2.49) (1.89) (1.92) (1.98) (2.24) 
Fam_Ind -0.8313* -1.1429* 0.0993 -0.8327* -1.0708 0.1336 
 (-1.79) (-1.73) (0.14) (-1.79) (-1.65) (0.19) 
F_Dual -0.9028* -1.9058*** -2.2151*** -0.7732 -1.9045*** -2.4911*** 
 (-1.78) (-2.64) (-2.75) (-1.53) (-2.70) (-3.34) 
DualCEO -0.3569 -0.5520 -0.7995 -0.2911 -0.8162 -1.0072 
 (-0.73) (-0.80) (-1.03) (-0.59) (-1.19) (-1.39) 
Ind_Director -0.0832*** -0.1091*** -0.0830*** -0.0783*** -0.0978*** -0.0630** 
 (-4.24) (-3.91) (-2.67) (-3.98) (-3.57) (-2.17) 
Rpa -0.3457 -0.8636 -0.4505 -0.5379 -0.9546 -0.6097 
 (-0.84) (-1.47) (-0.69) (-1.29) (-1.65) (-1.00) 
Firmyear 0.0344*** 0.0370** 0.0556*** 0.0309*** 0.0191 0.0349** 
 (3.01) (2.27) (3.06) (2.70) (1.20) (2.07) 
Pre_CAR 0.0047 -0.0016 0.0100 0.0086* 0.0069 0.0065 
 (0.41) (-0.10) (0.55) (1.94) (1.13) (1.00) 
non_related -1.1069* -0.6656 -0.4604 -0.9864* -0.6637 -0.6715 
 (-1.96) (-0.83) (-0.51) (-1.74) (-0.84) (-0.80) 
FCF 2.1951 6.9777 9.5096 0.1391 5.5791 5.2164 
 (0.51) (1.13) (1.39) (0.03) (0.91) (0.81) 
LN_MVE -0.0345 -0.0446 0.0100 -0.0059 0.1462 0.0824 
 (-0.26) (-0.23) (0.05) (-0.04) (0.78) (0.41) 
LN_RM -0.3139*** -0.2443 -0.2669 -0.2558** -0.1647 -0.2080 
 (-2.74) (-1.50) (-1.47) (-2.22) (-1.03) (-1.23) 
Crossborder -1.0297** -1.1271* -0.8478 -0.9198** -0.9142 -0.6865 
 (-2.55) (-1.97) (-1.33) (-2.27) (-1.62) (-1.15) 
Public 3.0782** 4.3757** 1.4603 2.7498** 2.0745 3.5829* 
 (2.27) (2.27) (0.68) (2.02) (1.10) (1.79) 
Equity 1.7358* 2.6510* 3.4859** 1.3791 2.5766* 3.2827** 
 (1.67) (1.80) (2.12) (1.32) (1.77) (2.14) 
Yr08_11 -0.6784* -0.7190 -0.3299 -0.5111 -0.3892 -0.1524 
 (-1.87) (-1.39) (-0.57) (-1.40) (-0.77) (-0.28) 
Constant 8.1991*** 7.5885** 5.3419 6.7350** 3.0076 2.8187 
 (3.14) (2.04) (1.29) (2.58) (0.83) (0.73) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.178 0.147 0.118 0.155 0.126 0.110 
Adjusted R-squared 0.118 0.0850 0.0535 0.0941 0.0624 0.0458 
F-Test 2.983*** 2.372*** 1.835** 2.535*** 1.983** 1.709** 
 (0.0001) (0.0017) (0.0220) (0.0007) (0.0112) (0.0382) 
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The sample comprises 267 observations. The observations denote 267 corporate acquisition announcements 
made by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa across the sample period 
of 2002 to 2011. The reported dependent variable – CAR is regressed against the independent variables and 
control variables for each model from Column (1)-(6). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the CAR that is estimated 
using market model. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the CAR that is estimated from market adjusted model. The 
CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns over an event window for each observation. The reported CAR 
estimated from both the market model and market adjusted model are cumulated over the three-day event 
window (-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. 
Day 0 denotes the day of corporate acquisition announcement release. The variable Own denotes total 
family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity ownership in the company. The variable 
F_CEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when founder is the CEO, zero otherwise. The variable 
H_CEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when descendant is the CEO, zero otherwise. The 
variable Fam_Ind denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the ratio of total number of family 
members on the board over total number of independent directors on the board is more than 1, zero 
otherwise. The variable DualCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the position of CEO and 
chairman are both held by the same individual, zero otherwise. The variable Ind_Director denotes the total 
percentage of independent directors on the board. The variable Rpa denotes a dummy variable that equals 
to one when the acquisition is a related party corporate acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Firmyear 
denotes the firm age of the company. The variable Pre_CAR denotes an acquirer’s pre-announcement stock 
price run-up, which is measured by cumulative abnormal returns over the 200-day window (event day -210 
to day -11) and is estimated using market model. The variable non_related denotes a dummy variable that 
equals to one when target is not within the same industry as the industry of the acquirer, zero otherwise. 
The variable FCF denotes free cash flow ratio, which is measured by [(Operating Income + Depreciation – 
Interest expense – Taxes – Preferred dividend – Common dividend) / Total Assets]. The variable LN_MVE 
denotes firm size that is measured by log of market capitalisation. The variable LN_RM denotes transaction 
size that is measured by the log of transaction dollar value of the acquisition in Malaysia Ringgit currency.  
The variable Crossborder denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for the acquisition of a non-domestic 
target, zero otherwise. The variable Public denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for acquisition of a 
public target, zero otherwise. The variable Equity denotes a dummy variable that equals to one for equity-
financed acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Yr08_11 denotes a dummy variable that equals to one 
when the year of the event is during the period of 2008 to 2011, zero otherwise. The *,**, and *** stand for 
statistical significance based on two-wide tests at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers in 
parentheses denote the standard error. 
Table 6. 11  Robust Regression of Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR): 
Founder CEO and Descendant CEO 
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6.8 H6 Family Representatives on Board 
6.8.1 Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
Baseline regression in Section 6.3.1 (Table 6.2) reports significant negative relation 
between Fam_Ind 117 and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  at 5% significance level for Columns (1) and (4). The 
variable Fam_Ind measures the relation between family representatives (relative to 
independent directors on the board) and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Results in the robust regression in 
Section 6.3.3 (Table 6.3) also report significant relation between Fam_Ind and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  at 
10% significance level for Columns (1) and (4). Overall, the results from both tables 
provide weak support for Hypothesis 6, which hypothesises significant negative relation 
between the presence of family directors on the board (relative to independent 
directors on the board) and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .   
 
 
The significant negative relation between Fam_Ind and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         supports the 
inferences of previous studies that showed the poorer performance of family firms 
when the number of family directors on the board exceeded those of the independent 
directors on the board (Anderson and Reeb 2004). This also supports previous finding 
for Hong Kong family firms that higher numbers of family directors on the board are 
detrimental to family firm value (Cheung et al. 2013).  
 
 
However, interpretation of these results needs to be viewed with care as the results 
are not robust across other event windows. Hence, this brings to the attention on the 
study of Anderson and Reeb (2004) which found a significant nonlinear relation 
between the proportion of family directors relative to independent directors on the 
board and family firm performance. This may explain the non-consistent result in Table 
                                                          
117
 The term Fam_Ind denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the number of family directors on the 
board exceed the number of independent directors on the board, zero otherwise.  
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6.2 and Table 6.3 on the relation between Fam_Ind and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for the event window 
        and        . To explore further the possibility of this nonlinear relation, the 
baseline model Equation 5.6 is expanded by replacing the variable Fam_Ind with the 
new variables Fam_Ind(≤1) and Fam_Ind(>1) 118, which follows the following equation: 
 
 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 FamilyCEOi + βi3 Fam_Indi(≤1) + βi4 Fam_Indi(>1) + βi5 F_Duali + 
βi6 DualCEOi + βi7 Ind_Directori + βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 
non_relatedi + βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 LN_RMi + βi15 Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + 
β17 Equityi + β18 Yr08_11i +          
 Equation 6.4 
 
 
The new Equation 6.4 above is estimated using piecewise linear regressions, with the 
two new variables Fam_Ind(≤1) and Fam_Ind(>1)  denoting the following: 
 
Fam_Ind(≤1) = Fam/Ind  if Fam/Ind is ≤ 1; and 
  = 1    if Fam/Ind is > 1 
Fam_Ind(>1) = 0    if Fam/Ind ≤1; and 
  = (Fam/Ind – 1)  if Fam/Ind > 1 
 
, where Fam/Ind equals to the ratio of total number of family directors on the board to 
total number of independent directors on the board.  
 
The purpose of estimating Equation 6.4 is to examine if there is a nonlinear relation 
between Fam_Ind and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , which may explain the non-consistent relation between 
Fam_Ind and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . Results in Table 6.12 below indicate strong support for the 
                                                          
118
 With reference to Anderson and Reeb (2004). 
  
247 
 
  
nonlinear relation between Fam_Ind and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , which strongly rejects Hypothesis 6.  The 
variables of concern are Fam_Ind(≤1) and Fam_Ind(>1).  
 
 
Both variables of concern (Fam_Ind(≤1) and Fam_Ind(>1)) report significant nonlinear 
relation between family representatives on the board (relative to independent 
directors on the board) and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  across all event windows for     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  The results 
indicate that when the number of family representatives on the board is less than that 
of the independent directors, positive family firm value can be upheld. However, when 
the number of family representatives increases and exceeds the total number of 
independent directors on the board, such board structure negatively affects family firm 
value. In simpler terms, in the case when the number of family members on the board 
is 4, the total number of independent directors on the board should be more than 4 to 
improve Malaysian family firm value. The significant positive relation between 
Fam_Ind(≤1) and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  suggests that increase in the number of family members on the 
board is beneficial to family firms. However, the significant negative relation between 
Fam_Ind(>1) and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   also suggests that in the case when the total number of family 
members on the board exceeds the total number of independent directors on the 
board, the value of Malaysian family-controlled firms deteriorate.  
 
 
The results imply that within the context of Malaysian family-controlled firms, when 
the balancing power between the controlling family members on the board and 
independent directors on the board is obstructed, decision-making process on the 
board may be impeded (Anderson and Reeb 2004).  Results also indicate that decision 
for corporate acquisitions can either be value-adding or value-destroying, under the 
influence of the family board structure within the context of Malaysian family-
controlled firms. Value-added corporate acquisitions are encouraged when the number 
of family representatives on the board does not exceed the number of independent 
directors on the board. Value-destroying corporate acquisitions are possible when the 
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power of family representatives on the board exceeds that of the independent 
directors.  
 
 
The results support assertions and findings of Anderson and Reeb (2004) that too much 
family voice on the board may increase the likelihood of expropriation by the 
controlling family. Anderson and Reeb (2004) mentioned limited level of family 
involvement on the board is value-enhancing to family firms. They suggested that a 
balance between the number of family representatives on the board and independent 
directors on the board is required in family firms.  However, when the power of voice 
for the family representatives on the board increases (when total number of family 
members on the board is more than total number of independent directors on the 
board), costs can be incurred, which hinder increase in value of family firm. Consistent 
with agency theory, the influence of independent directors on the board is an 
important corporate governance measure to protect the interests of shareholders 
against opportunistic large shareholders (Anderson and Reeb 2004). 
 
 
The findings also provide an important policy implication for the corporate governance 
practices in Malaysia for family-controlled firms. The current recommended corporate 
governance practices in Malaysia mandates a one third of the total number of directors on 
the board of publicly listed firms as independent directors. Evidence in this study suggests a 
benchmark applicable specifically for Malaysian family-controlled firms. Evidence reveal 
that the proportion of family members on the board relative to the proportion of 
independent directors on the board is an important factor when considering the required 
proportion of independent directors on the board. Policy makers are recommended to 
consider a ratio of 1:1 is the ideal ratio of independent directors on the board to family 
representatives on the board. For example, if there are 3 family representatives on the 
board, there should also be 3 independent directors on the board.  This ratio, as suggested 
by the findings in this study, encourages the optimum functioning of the board of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms and also the optimization of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms’ value.  
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Table 6.12 
Non-Linearity Between Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CAR) and Family Directors Relative to Independent Directors on Board: 
Piecewise Regression Model 
CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 FamilyCEOi + βi3 Fam_Indi(0,1) + βi4 Fam_Indi(>1) + βi5 F_Duali + βi6 DualCEOi + βi7 
Ind_Directori + βi8 Rpai + βi9 Firmyeari + βi10 Pre_CARi + βi11 non_relatedi + βi12 FCFi + βi13 LN_MVEi + βi14 
LN_RMi + βi15 Crossborderi + βi16 Publici + β17 Equityi + β18 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  
     (1)     (2)     (3)     (4)     (5)     (6) 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
       
Own  -0.0056 0.0231 -0.0053 -0.0097 0.0231 -0.0073 
 (-0.33) (0.92) (-0.20) (-0.57) (0.92) (-0.27) 
FamilyCEO 1.0625 1.5306 1.2688 0.7503 1.5306 1.0650 
 (1.53) (1.51) (1.30) (1.03) (1.51) (1.10) 
Fam_Ind (≤1)  2.1247** 2.9546* 3.3082* 2.2202** 2.9546* 3.0815* 
 (1.98) (1.87) (1.80) (2.07) (1.87) (1.74) 
Fam_Ind (>1) -1.0578* -1.8506* -0.4538 -1.0394* -1.8506* -0.2561 
 (-1.72) (-1.91) (-0.37) (-1.71) (-1.91) (-0.21) 
F_Dual -0.9626 -2.3308*** -2.0232** -0.8727 -2.3308*** -1.8981* 
 (-1.59) (-2.96) (-2.05) (-1.41) (-2.96) (-1.92) 
DualCEO -0.8827 -0.3598 -0.5647 -0.9271 -0.3598 -0.6789 
 (-1.43) (-0.38) (-0.53) (-1.50) (-0.38) (-0.63) 
Ind_Director -0.0496** -0.0829*** -0.0776** -0.0435* -0.0829*** -0.0610* 
 (-1.99) (-2.99) (-2.04) (-1.74) (-2.99) (-1.75) 
Rpa -0.9787** -1.5103** -1.4952** -1.1365** -1.5103** -1.8067** 
 (-2.11) (-2.43) (-2.09) (-2.35) (-2.43) (-2.59) 
Firmyear 0.0328*** 0.0431** 0.0566*** 0.0255* 0.0431** 0.0411** 
 (2.67) (2.49) (2.84) (1.95) (2.49) (2.18) 
Pre_CAR 0.0181 0.0172 0.0194 0.0139** 0.0172 0.0185** 
 (1.14) (0.90) (0.85) (2.16) (0.90) (2.07) 
non_related -1.4003* -0.7214 -1.0932 -1.4634** -0.7214 -1.3314 
 (-1.96) (-0.83) (-1.03) (-1.98) (-0.83) (-1.25) 
FCF -0.5669 3.2680 8.7374 -1.8960 3.2680 6.0026 
 (-0.11) (0.45) (1.09) (-0.35) (0.45) (0.77) 
LN_MVE -0.0282 -0.0234 0.1037 0.0188 -0.0234 0.1273 
 (-0.19) (-0.09) (0.39) (0.12) (-0.09) (0.47) 
LN_RM -0.3195** -0.3557** -0.3859 -0.2943** -0.3557** -0.2847 
 (-2.59) (-2.00) (-1.64) (-2.46) (-2.00) (-1.25) 
Crossborder -1.2095*** -1.5751** -1.1360 -1.1329** -1.5751** -0.8434 
 (-2.74) (-2.50) (-1.42) (-2.56) (-2.50) (-1.05) 
Public 3.0757* 1.0173 1.1399 2.8990* 1.0173 1.9382 
 (1.92) (0.27) (0.44) (1.74) (0.27) (0.67) 
Equity 2.1360* 2.6168* 3.3088* 1.9059 2.6168* 2.9429* 
 (1.83) (1.86) (1.92) (1.60) (1.86) (1.80) 
Yr08_11 -0.7797* -0.6089 -0.3933 -0.6426 -0.6089 -0.3058 
 (-1.88) (-1.10) (-0.60) (-1.54) (-1.10) (-0.48) 
Constant 6.9077** 6.5815 4.4818 5.9448* 6.5815 2.8864 
 (2.14) (1.49) (0.79) (1.86) (1.49) (0.53) 
Observations 267 267 267 267 267 267 
R-squared 0.185 0.156 0.132 0.181 0.156 0.121 
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 0.0946 0.0688 0.121 0.0946 0.0571 
F-Test 3.278*** 3.011*** 2.662*** 2.834*** 3.011*** 2.197*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0040) 
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The sample comprises 267 observations. The observations denote 267 corporate acquisition announcements 
made by 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms listed on the Main Board of Bursa across the sample period 
of 2002 to 2011. The reported dependent variable – CAR is regressed against the independent variables and 
control variables for each model from Column (1)-(6). Columns 1, 2 and 3 report the CAR that is estimated 
using market model. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report the CAR that is estimated from market adjusted model. The 
CAR denotes cumulative abnormal returns over an event window for each observation. The reported CAR 
estimated from both the market model and market adjusted model are cumulated over the three-day event 
window (-1, +1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3, +3), respectively. 
Day 0 denotes the day of corporate acquisition announcement release. The variable Own denotes total 
family equity ownership as measured by total percentage of equity ownership in the company. The variable 
FamilyCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when family member of the controlling family is 
the CEO, zero otherwise. Fam/Ind equals to the ratio of family directors to independent directors on the 
board. The variable Fam_Ind(≤1) equals to  Fam/Ind if Fam/Ind is ≤ 1; and equals to 1 if Fam/Ind is > 1. The 
variable Fam_Ind(>1) equals to 0 if Fam/Ind ≤1; and equals to (Fam/Ind – 1) if Fam/Ind > 1. The variable 
F_Dual denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when two related family members hold the positions 
of CEO and chairman, zero otherwise. The variable DualCEO denotes a dummy variable that equals to one 
when the position of CEO and chairman are both held by the same individual, zero otherwise. The variable 
Ind_Director denotes the total percentage of independent directors on the board. The variable Rpa denotes 
a dummy variable that equals to one when the acquisition is a related party corporate acquisition, zero 
otherwise. The variable Firmyear denotes the firm age of the company. The variable Pre_CAR denotes an 
acquirer’s pre-announcement stock price run-up, which is measured by cumulative abnormal returns over 
the 200-day window (event day -210 to day -11) and is estimated using market model. The variable 
non_related denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when target is not within the same industry as the 
industry of the acquirer, zero otherwise. The variable FCF denotes free cash flow ratio, which is measured by 
[(Operating Income + Depreciation – Interest expense – Taxes – Preferred dividend – Common dividend) / 
Total Assets]. The variable LN_MVE denotes firm size that is measured by log of market capitalisation. The 
variable LN_RM denotes transaction size that is measured by the log of transaction dollar value of the 
acquisition in Malaysia Ringgit currency.  The variable Crossborder denotes a dummy variable that equals to 
one for the acquisition of a non-domestic target, zero otherwise. The variable Public denotes a dummy 
variable that equals to one for acquisition of a public target, zero otherwise. The variable Equity denotes a 
dummy variable that equals to one for equity-financed acquisition, zero otherwise. The variable Yr08_11 
denotes a dummy variable that equals to one when the year of the event is during the period of 2008 to 
2011, zero otherwise. The *,**, and *** stand for statistical significance based on two-wide tests at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The numbers in parentheses denote the standard error. 
Table 6. 12 Non-Linearity Between Malaysian Family-Controlled Acquirers Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
and Family Directors Relative to Independent Directors on Board: Piecewise Regression Model 
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6.9 H7 Board Leadership Structure 
6.9.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
 
Table 6.13 
Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-
Controlled Firms for Subsamples Categorised by Board Leadership Structure 
The sample comprises mean cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    from the sample 267 corporate 
acquisition announcements of 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 267 corporate acquisition 
announcements are categorised by announcements with acquirers under the board structure of 
Independent CEO, Dual CEO and Family-related CEO, across the sample period 2002 to 2011. The term 
Independent CEO denotes that both positions of CEO and chairman are held by independent individuals. 
The term Dual CEO denotes that both positions of CEO and chairman are held by the same person. The 
term Family-related CEO denotes that both positions of CEO and chairman are held by two separate 
individuals who are family-related. The average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of each categorised corporate acquisition 
announcement is expressed in percentage of returns. N and % of Column 1 report the frequencies and 
percentage of the categorised sample corporate acquisition announcements, respectively. Columns 2, 3 
and 4 display the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  estimated using the market model. Columns 5, 6 and 7 present the average 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    estimated from the market adjusted model. The    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is reported over the three-day event window (-
1,+1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the seven-day event window (-3,+3). The statistical test 
employs Kolari and Pynnonen’s (2011) generalised rank test (GRANK) to examine if     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   are significantly 
different from zero. The numbers in parentheses denote the standard error. *,**, and *** stand for 
statistical significance of GRANK at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively. 
 
N 
(%) 
Market Model 
CAR 
Market Adjusted Model 
CAR 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
Subsamples grouped by board leadership structure 
Independent 
CEO 
127 
(47%) 
0.7887*** 
(2.6059) 
1.0363*** 
(3.3055) 
1.0660*** 
(3.6679) 
0.9777*** 
(2.6297) 
1.3988*** 
(3.5937) 
1.5565*** 
(3.5914) 
Family-related 
CEO 
71 
(27%) 
0.3313 
(0.6391) 
-0.2859 
(-0.5004) 
0.0923 
(0.0412) 
0.5052 
(0.9204) 
-0.0296 
(-0.2995) 
0.5463 
(0.3477) 
Dual CEO 69 
(26%) 
-0.1681 
(-0.2543) 
0.6984 
(1.0299) 
0.7109 
(0.9258) 
0.0032 
(0.0714) 
1.0935 
(1.6037) 
1.2043 
(1.4135) 
Total 267 
(100%) 
      
Table 6. 13 Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-Controlled Firms 
for Subsamples Categorised by Board Leadership Structure 
 
 
Table 6.13 tabulates the announcement-period mean cumulative abnormal returns 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    for the 267 sample corporate acquisition announcements over the period 2002 
to 2011, which are grouped according to different board leadership structures of 
Malaysian family-controlled acquirers. This allows the examination of Hypothesis 7 at a 
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preliminary stage on the relation between board leadership structure of family firms 
and announcement period    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  
 
 
Table 6.13 reveals significant positive wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
announcements     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   experienced by Malaysian family-controlled acquirers when an 
independent board structure (independent CEO and chairman on the board) is in place. 
Specifically, the significance of the market model (market-adjusted model) 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         is at 1% (1%) with an average of 0.79% (0.98%) cumulated abnormal 
returns over Day-1 to Day+1, where Day 0 is the day the announcement is released. 
The significance level increases when event window is expanded. The significance of 
the market model (market-adjusted model)     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         is at 1% (1%) with an 
average of 1.06% (1.56%) cumulated abnormal returns over Day-3 to Day+3.   
 
 
On the other hand, the     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   that are tabulated for Family-related CEO, exhibit 
insignificant positive or negative wealth effect experienced by Malaysian family-
controlled acquirers. Family-related CEO refers to a board leadership structure where 
the positions of CEO and chairman are held by two separate individuals, who are 
family-related.  This allows the examination of Hypothesis 7 at a preliminary stage on 
the relation between Family-related CEO and announcement period    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  
 
 
Overall, results of Table 6.13 are consistent with past notion that splitting the titles of 
CEO and chairman between two people improves firm performance as the board of 
directors can better monitor the CEO (Harris and Helfat 1998; Worrell et al. 1997; 
Finkelstein and D'Aveni 1994; Brickley et al. 1997; Fama and Jensen 1983b).  In 
consequence of maintaining a unitary leadership structure (separation of CEO and 
chairman positions), agency costs in large organisations are reduced by separation of 
management from control (Boyd 1995).  Table 6.13 also provides support for the 
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findings of earlier family firm study (Braun and Sharma 2007), which asserts the 
governance effect of separating the role of CEO and chairman in family-controlled firms 
is beneficial to firm value, especially when the family owners are entrenched. 
 
 
6.9.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
Within a multivariate setting, results reported by the baseline regression in Section 
6.3.1 as presented in Table 6.2 reveal a significant negative relation between F_Dual 
and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  from the baseline model across almost all event windows. F_Dual denotes a 
dummy variable that equals to one when the positions of CEO and chairman are held 
by two separate individuals, who are family-related.  This is in support of Hypothesis 7. 
Hypothesis 7 hypothesises a negative relation between F_Dual and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The practice 
of having both positions of chairman and CEO held by two separate but family-related 
individuals is detrimental to family firm value.  The coefficient of F_Dual remains in the 
same direction across all the examined event windows and for both measures of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  
119 
 
 
Based on the results, this paper provides the first evidence of the relation between 
family-related chairman and CEO on the board and family firm value, within the context 
of corporate acquisition literature, corporate governance literature and family firm 
literature.  This paper also reports the first evidence in family firm literature that there 
are family firms upholding the practices of having family-related CEO and chairman on 
the board.  
 
                                                          
119
 The significance of the coefficient for F_Dual remains significant, based on the results reported from the 
robust regression of the baseline model in Table 6.3 of Section 6.3.3, as discussed in the forthcoming Section 
6.9.3. 
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Our observations (sample) reveals that such practice of appointing family-related CEO 
and chairman is one of the family-specific characteristics that is observable among the 
board structures of Malaysian family-controlled firms, which has yet to be empirically 
examined in current family firm literature (Jameson et al. 2014).  The practice of 
appointing two independent CEO and chairman in family firms complies with the 
generally accepted best practices of separating the role of CEO and chairman. However, 
the independence of the CEO and chairman is somehow lost when the CEO and 
chairman are family-related.  These findings drawn based on sample of Malaysian 
family-controlled firms provide the first new evidence and support for the detrimental 
effect of family-related CEO and chairman on family firm value. This new discovery 
raises awareness of the good practices of corporate governance for Malaysian family 
firms and other nations’ family firms among policy makers, which require further 
scrutinize and improvement. 
 
 
Studies have constantly indicated that the composition and structure of the board of 
directors is an important element affecting the strategic direction and performance of 
the company, which ultimately affects the wealth of the shareholders (Arena and 
Braga-Alves 2013; Black et al. 2012; Li and Srinivasan 2011; Rosenstein and Wyatt 
1997). Decision to uphold the separation of CEO role from chairman position on the 
board has been a recurring concern (Byrd et al. 2012; Dey et al. 2011; Braun and 
Sharma 2007; Brickley et al. 1997; Boyd 1995). In addition, family firms are a common 
organisational form, especially in Asia (Carney and Child 2012). Their prevalent 
presence in Malaysia is also well documented.  Compliance with the existing good 
practices of corporate governance, specifically on CEO status (independent CEO and 
independent Chairman) for publicly listed firms is recommended in Malaysia.  However, 
when both positions of CEO and chairman are held by separate individuals who are 
family-related, the purpose of maintaining the independence of CEO and chairman is 
lost (even though both positions are held by separate individuals). Findings in Table 6.2 
show that allowing the positions of CEO and chairman to be held by related family 
members is detrimental to the value of Malaysian family-controlled firms. The results 
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also suggest that such board leadership structure may entrench the dominant 
controlling family owners of the Malaysian family-controlled firms, leading to bad 
choice of corporate acquisition decisions.  
 
 
6.9.3 Robustness Analysis 
 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 5 Methodology,  robust regression can help justify the use of 
ordinary least squares results (Verardi and Croux 2009). When robust regression results 
are similar to those of ordinary least squares, there is reassurance that results of the 
ordinary least squares are not influenced by the outliers (Abell et al. 1999).  The robust 
regression results in Section 6.3.3 (Table 6.3) again provide support for Hypothesis 7. 
The significance of the negative relation between F_Dual and     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   similar to those 
reported in Table 6.2 for    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  that are either estimated from the market model or 
market-adjusted model across the observed event windows.  Overall, results support 
Hypothesis 7. 
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6.10  H8 Related Party Corporate Acquisitions  
6.10.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
 
Table 6.14 
Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-
Controlled Firms for Subsamples Categorised by Related and Non-Related Party 
Corporate Acquisitions 
The sample comprises mean cumulative abnormal returns (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    from the sample 267 corporate 
acquisition announcements of 129 Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 267 corporate acquisition 
announcements are categorised by related-party corporate acquisitions or non-related-party corporate 
acquisitions across the sample period 2002 to 2011. The term rpa denotes related party corporate 
acquisitions. The term non rpa denotes corporate acquisitions that do not involve any related party.  The 
average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of each categorised corporate acquisition announcement is expressed in percentage of 
returns. N and % of Column 1 report the frequencies and percentage of the categorised sample corporate 
acquisition announcements, respectively. Columns 2, 3 and 4 display the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  estimated using the 
market model. Columns 5, 6 and 7 present the average    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    estimated from the market adjusted model. 
The    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is reported over the three-day event window (-1,+1), the five-day event window (-2, +2) and the 
seven-day event window (-3,+3). The statistical test employs Kolari and Pynnonen’s (2011) generalised rank 
test (GRANK) to examine if     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   are significantly different from zero. The numbers in parentheses denote 
the standard error. *,**, and *** stand for statistical significance of GRANK at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
respectively. 
 
N 
(%) 
Market Model 
CAR 
Market Adjusted Model 
CAR 
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
 
(-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
Subsamples grouped by related or non-related party corporate acquisitions 
rpa 75 
(28%) 
-0.0745 
(-0.1572) 
-0.3580 
(0.2238) 
-0.3574 
(0.3690) 
-0.0889 
(-0.3093) 
-0.2621 
(0.0917) 
-0.1856 
(0.3180) 
Non rpa 192 
(72%) 
0.6129** 
(2.5325) 
0.9706*** 
(3.0175) 
1.1344*** 
(3.4158) 
0.8695*** 
(2.9847) 
1.4096*** 
(3.8743) 
1.7370*** 
(3.8610) 
Total 267 
(100%) 
      
Table 6. 14 Announcement Period Mean Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Malaysian Family-Controlled Firms 
for Subsamples Categorised by Related and Non-Related Party Corporate Acquisitions 
 
Table 6.14 reports the announcement-period mean cumulative abnormal returns 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    for the 267 sample corporate acquisition announcements over the period 2002 
to 2011, which tabulate    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  according to two groups: the corporate acquisitions are 
related-party corporate acquisitions (rpa) or non-related-party corporate acquisitions 
(Non rpa). Results of Table 6.14 provide preliminary evidence of the relation between 
related-party corporate acquisitions and announcement period     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . This also allows 
prima facie evidence of the testing of Hypothesis 8.  The announcement period 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    for the Malaysian family-controlled acquirers are reported over the three-day 
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event window (-1, +1), five-day event window (-2, +2) and seven-day event window (-3, 
+3) and are represented by    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        ,    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        , 
respectively.  
 
 
Table 6.14 reveals that there is a significant positive announcement wealth effect 
(   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) experienced by Malaysian family-controlled acquirers when the corporate 
acquisitions do not involve any related party. More precisely, the owners or directors of 
both the acquiring firms and the acquired firms (targets) are not family-related in the 
case of non-related-party corporate acquisitions. The significance of the market model 
(market-adjusted model)     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         is at 5% (1%) with an average of 0.61% (0.87%) 
cumulated abnormal returns over Day-1 to Day+1, where Day 0 is the day the 
announcement is released. The significance level increases when the event window is 
expanded. The significance of the market model (market-adjusted model) 
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         is at 1% (1%) with an average of 1.113% (1.73%) cumulated abnormal 
returns over Day-3 to Day+3.   
 
 
Table 6.14 further reveals that there is a negative announcement wealth effect (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) 
(though not significant) experienced by Malaysian family-controlled acquirers when the 
corporate acquisitions involve related parties. In simpler terms, the owners or directors 
of both the acquiring firms and the acquired firms (targets) are family-related in the 
case of related-party corporate acquisitions. The negative sign of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  remains 
persistent across different event windows and measures of     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . This provides further 
possible support for Hypothesis 8 that Malaysian family-controlled firms may be 
involved in value-destroying corporate acquisitions when involving family-related 
parties. 
 
 
Studies have examined possible expropriation behaviour of controlling owners through 
related-party corporate acquisitions, which offer non-consensus findings (Bae et al. 
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2002; Buysschaert et al. 2004). As mentioned in past literature, in the case of 
companies with concentrated ownership, controlling shareholders can expropriate 
wealth from the minority shareholders (Johnson et al. 2000; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, there have been recurring events, which are related party 
transactions performed by public-listed Malaysian family firms with controlling owners. 
However, beyond these anecdotes, there are little empirical evidence on the relevance 
of minority expropriation activities to Malaysian family-controlled firms and family firm 
value. Results shown in Table 6.14 shed further light on past literature that there is 
weak support for the possibility of Malaysian family-controlled firms being involved in 
value-destroying corporate acquisition activities when family-related parties are 
involved in these corporate activities.  
 
 
The results also reinforce past inferences that activities of expropriating the minority 
shareholders by owners with large ownership stake can be extensive, especially in 
emerging countries with low investor protection and weak corporate governance (La 
Porta et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Dyck and Zingales 2004). In this case, Table 6.14 
reports the minority shareholder expropriation behaviour by Malaysian family-
controlled firms through related-party corporate acquisition activities. However, this 
notion must be viewed with scepticism since the results have been insignificant. 
Hypothesis 8 is further examined within a multivariate setting.  
 
 
6.10.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
 
Results from the baseline model in Section 6.3.1 (Table 6.2) reveal a negative relation 
between rpa and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The magnitude is in support of Hypothesis 8 of a negative 
relation between related party corporate acquisitions and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Malaysian family-
controlled acquirers. However, the results are not robust when the influences of 
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outliers are considered, as reported in Table 6.3 in Section 6.3.3.  Results in Table 6.3 
in Section 6.3.3 show that the significance of a negative relation between rpa and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  
(across different event windows and different measures of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ) is induced by 
influential observations.  
 
 
Since Stata is used to perform estimation of the models using robust regression (the 
command rreg), any influential observations (outliers) with Cook’s distance of more 
than 1 will be omitted from observations when performing estimation for the robust 
regression.  However, Table 6.3 in Section 6.3.3 reveals that none of the observations 
are dropped from the observations of the robust regression. This implies that there 
may be some observations that are influential, while not exceeding the Cook’s distance 
of more than 1. Even though the significance of the relation diminishes in Table 6.3, the 
direction of the relation remains the same.  There is still support for the value-
destroying behaviour of Malaysian family-controlled acquirers when they choose 
corporate acquisitions that involve a related party. The insignificant negative relation 
between rpa and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  in Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 supports the univariate results in 
Table 6.14, which reveal the negative but insignificant relation between related-party 
corporate acquisition and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  across all event windows of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for both the market-
model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and market-adjusted model    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ .  
 
 
Hypothesis 8 hypothesises a negative relation between related party corporate 
acquisitions and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  of Malaysian family-controlled acquirers. The results in general 
provide only weak support for Hypothesis 8. However, the findings shed further light 
that there are weak evidence that Malaysian family-controlled acquirers may be 
involved in corporate acquisitions that are value-destroying to shareholders’ wealth.  
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6.11 Additional Robustness Analysis 
 
 
Due to the nature of pooled dataset in this study, the residuals may be correlated 
across firms, time or industry. As a result, the OLS standard errors can be over- or 
underestimated.  Tests are performed for firm effects, time effect and industry effect 
to ensure that the interpretation and analyses of the results are not influenced by firm 
fixed effect, time effect or industry effect. The tests performed provide further 
justification whether adjustments need to be made to the standard errors for possible 
dependence of the  residuals (Peterson 2009).  Stata is used to perform the tests for 
firm, time and industry effect using the command test.  
 
 
Table A6.1 in Appendix A6 reveals the probability that F-test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of common intercept for all firms. The F-test in this case is insignificant. 
Therefore, there is no firm fixed effect presence in this study dataset. Table A6.1 in 
Appendix A6 reveals the probability that F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of 
common intercept for all firms. The F-test in this case is insignificant. Therefore, there is 
no time effect presence in this study dataset. Table A6.1 in Appendix A6 reveals the 
probability that F-test fails to reject the null hypothesis of common intercept for all 
firms. The F-test in this case is insignificant. Therefore, there is no industry effect 
presence in this study dataset.   
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6.12 Summary 
 
 
Based on the results from univariate analysis in Section 6.2, it can be deduced that the 
positive wealth effect experienced by Malaysian family-controlled firms overall is 
inconsistent with the generally accepted notion of insignificant or negative wealth 
effect experienced by the acquirers (the acquiring firms) (Campa and Hernando 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog 2008; Tuch and O'Sullivan 2007; Alexandridis et al. 2010). 
However, this is consistent with previous family firm studies on the significant positive 
wealth effect experienced by family firms from other countries (Bouzgarrou and 
Navatte 2013; Holmen and Knopf 2004; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012). The evidence in 
Section 6.2 provides further contribution to international evidence that regardless of 
the economy or institutional background in which the family firms reside in, overall, 
family firms are good performers, within the context of corporate acquisition activities.  
 
 
Section 6.3 examines the announcement returns to Malaysian family-controlled 
acquirers in a multivariate regression setting based on the baseline model Equation 
5.6. To control for known determinants of acquirer returns within the context of 
Malaysian family firm studies, the determinants are recognised based on past empirical 
evidence in the literature of family firms and corporate acquisitions. Overall, the 
reported relation between the control variables and the dependent variable -    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is 
consistent with existing findings. Further discussion and analyses on the relation 
between variable of interests and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are presented in Section 6.4 to Section 6.10.  
The robustness test and regression diagnostic test on the baseline regression model 
(Equation 5.6) are reported in Section 6.3.2 and Section 6.3.3, respectively. These tests 
are performed to ensure the robustness of the inferences drawn from the reported 
results of the baseline regressions in Section 6.3.1 earlier. The tests overall reveal that 
the results and analyses made from Equation 5.6 are reliable and robust, across 
different measures of    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and across different examined event windows. 
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Section 6.4 and Section 6.5 jointly support the notion of nonlinear relation between 
family ownership and wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcement 
experienced by Malaysian family-controlled acquirers, which support Hypothesis 2 and 
reject Hypothesis 1.  This is also consistent with empirical findings of existing family 
firm studies that there is a nonlinear relation between family ownership and family firm 
value (Anderson and Reeb 2003b; Pindado et al. 2013; Maury 2006).  
 
 
Discussions in Section 6.6 suggest that there is only weak support for Hypothesis 3, 
which postulates a positive relation between family CEO and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . There is weak 
support for the beneficial effect of family management on family firm value. However, 
it is noteworthy that results show a consistent positive relation (however insignificant) 
between family CEO and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . There is still weak support on the beneficial effect of 
having family members actively managing family-controlled firms (Maury 2006; Sraer 
and Thesmar 2007). Section 6.7 further reveals that the beneficial effect of family CEO 
on firm value needs to specifically control the specific effect of founder CEO and 
descendant CEO separately.  
 
 
Results in Section 6.7 report positive corporate acquisition announcement wealth 
effect experienced by Malaysian family-controlled firms that are under active 
management of founder— founder CEO. The findings support Hypothesis 4, which is 
consistent with past findings (Miller et al. 2007). In addition, results in Section 6.7 show 
that descendant management (descendant CEO) is not detrimental to firm value, 
within the context of Malaysian family-controlled firms, which support Hypothesis 5. 
This implies that descendants are actually capable of making good investment decisions 
that create value to Malaysian family-controlled firms. The findings are inconsistent 
with previous studies that inherited control is linked to poor family firm performance 
(Kidwell et al. 2013; Bertrand et al 2008). However, the findings provide useful insight 
into current unwavering issues in family firms of whether to pass ownership (and 
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managerial role) to descendants (Deloitte Growth Enterprise Services 2013; Poutziouris 
et al. 2013; KPMG 2011; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). Section 6.7 also provides 
further clarification on the common dilemma of transgenerational management, which 
may be detrimental to the long-term prosperity of family-controlled firms (Chrisman et 
al. 2012; Schulze et al. 2003). In this case, within the context of Malaysia, there is a 
found positive association between descendant-managed Malaysian family-controlled 
firms and firm value. 
 
 
Discussions in Section 6.8 provide weak support for Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 predicts 
that a higher number of family members on the board (relative to total number of 
independent directors on the board) is detrimental to the value of Malaysian family-
controlled firms. This study investigates further and discovers a significant nonlinear 
relation between family members on the board (relative to independent directors on 
the board).   In general, the results indicate that within the context of Malaysian family-
controlled firms, the presence of family members on the board is beneficial to family 
firms as long as the total number of family members on the board does not exceed the 
total number of independent directors on the board. The findings provide further 
policy implications for Malaysian policy makers that there may be a need for 
regulations to restrict the number of family members on the board, relative to the 
number of independent directors on the board.      
 
 
Results obtained in Section 6.9 support Hypothesis 7, which predict a negative relation 
between family-related CEO-Chairman and wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
announcements experienced by Malaysian family-controlled acquirers. These findings 
provide the first ever evidence in family firm studies that family-controlled firms uphold 
the practices of having family-related CEO and chairman on the board, for Malaysia. 
Such practices still comply with the existing generally accepted corporate governance 
practices of having separation of chairman role from CEO role. However, the 
independence of the CEO and chairman is somehow lost when both chairman and CEO 
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are family-related. It is unknown whether such practices are upheld in family firms 
from other nations. However, this finding raises concerns that if such practices are 
upheld elsewhere outside of Malaysia, are they a significant determinant of family firm 
performance? This study also provides the first ever empirical evidence reporting the 
detrimental effect of family-related CEO and chairman on family firm value within the 
literature of firm performance and board corporate governance.  The findings have 
policy implications for the existing generally accepted corporate governance practices 
on separating the role of CEO from chairman on the board. Evidence reveals that 
consideration is needed to improve current corporate governance practices that the 
family relation between CEO and chairman on the board should be avoided for 
Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
 
 
Results obtained in Section 6.10 provide weak support for Hypothesis 8 that related-
party corporate acquisitions are value-destroying to Malaysian family-controlled 
acquirers. Results show an insignificant negative relation between related-party 
corporate acquisitions and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  within a multivariate setting. However, it is noted that 
the relation remains negative but insignificant across the entire examined event 
window and the examined    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . This shows that there is still some support for the fact 
that related-party corporate acquisitions by Malaysian family-controlled acquirers on 
average are not favourable and may be value-destroying.   
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
 
 
Among numerous types of ownership structure, family owners, as a unique form of 
corporate governance structure, are found to be prevalent in the global capital markets 
worldwide, instead of the version of widely held corporation by Berle and Means 
(1932). These family ownership structures dominate the ownership structure of 
publicly traded firms not only in the US (Anderson and Reeb 2003b) and Western 
Europe (Faccio and Lang 2002; Maury 2006) but also in the emerging economies (La 
Porta et al. 1999; Claessens et al. 2000; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Carney and Child 
2012); in fact, they are found to exert substantial influence over the economic 
landscapes of most nations (Astrachan and Shanker 2003; Alderson 2011; Poza 2009; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). 
 
 
The inherent feature of owner-manager position and concentrated family ownership in 
family firms intrinsically mitigate conflicts between the owner and the manager 
(interest alignment hypothesis), which leads to better firm value (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). On the other hand, there is a possibility that this group of family owners would 
treat themselves preferentially at the expense of the minority shareholders 
(expropriation hypothesis), which leads to deterioration in firm value (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997; Fama and Jensen 1983b; Maury 2006). The negative impact of 
concentrated ownership on the firm value is well publicized, especially for economies 
with weak external corporate governance (poor market for corporate control) and lack 
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of legal protection for shareholders and creditors (Lins 2003; Claessens and Yurtoglu 
2013; Claessens et al. 2002; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Consequently, to be concerned 
with the design of a corporate governance framework that can protect minority 
investors from the misbehaved and self-interested controlling shareholders and 
managers of the company has been a continuous effort from policymakers and 
regulators worldwide (McCahery and Vermeulen 2013). Previous studies have also 
emphasised the importance of conducting focused-country studies for family firms 
(Miller et al. 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; Fan, Wei, et al. 2011), as family owners 
are found to affect family firm value differently, depending on the legal environment, 
culture, and regulation of the region (Faccio et al. 2001; Maury 2006). 
 
 
Malaysia offers a suitable setting for studies to be conducted to provide further 
understanding of family firms and family firm behaviour. Malaysian family-controlled 
firms are both prevalent and notable among Malaysian publicly listed companies 
(World Bank Group 1999; Claessens et al. 2000; Carney and Child 2012) that wield 
considerable economic power in the country (Ngui 2002; Fan, Tan, et al. 2011; 
Claessens et al. 2000; Forbes 2012). Concentrated family ownership in addition to 
involvement in the management of the company is a common feature of Malaysian 
family-controlled firms. Minority shareholders under such conditions have little say in 
the management, ethics, and practices of these types of organisations (Reed 2002). 
Given that the ownership structure of the majority of Malaysian publicly listed firms is 
characterised by concentrated shareholdings of controlling owners, the protection of 
minority shareholders becomes inherently critical. However, the act of expropriation is 
scarcely investigated for the case of Malaysia. 
 
 
The Malaysian government has been continuously putting in effort to set up an 
effective investor protection system and corporate governance system for the 
country’s capital market. As a result, Malaysia has proven to be a regional leader in 
corporate governance within the Asian region, as reported in Corporate Governance 
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Report on Observance of Standards and Codes 2012 (World Bank 2012). In terms of 
investor protection regime, Malaysia continues to receive positive reports on its 
corporate governance practices through its fourth position in terms of investor 
protection for the sixth consecutive year (World Bank 2009, 2011, 2012). Different 
from those in other East Asian countries, the Malaysian market has been the only 
emerging market of East Asia in which the government has institutionalised 
shareholder activism, through the establishment of Minority Shareholder Watchdog 
Group (MSWG) in the year 2001 (Azizan and Ameer 2012). 
 
 
Overall, Malaysia has strongly defined formal legal rights, creditor rights, minority 
shareholders’ legal protection, and disclosure requirements of listing corporations that 
exceed those of most advanced countries (Claessens and Yurtoglu 2013). In view of the 
Malaysian government’s continuous effort in improving the corporate governance 
system of Malaysia, such effort may hinder the controlling families of Malaysian family-
controlled firms from engaging in minority shareholder expropriation activities. An 
empirical question naturally arises as to whether the current corporate governance 
framework in Malaysia and the government’s effort (with the formation of the MSWG) 
is effective to hinder Malaysian family firms from activities that expropriate the 
minority shareholders. 
 
 
Corporate acquisition activities provide the advantage as a measure for evidence of 
agency problem (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Faccio and Stolin 2006) through observation 
of the market performance of family firms when family firms execute corporate 
acquisitions (Bhaumik and Selarka 2012; Caprio et al. 2011; Shim and Okamuro 2011; 
Bauguess and Stegemoller 2008; Bouzgarrou and Navatte 2013). Malaysia is in an 
active position with corporate acquisition activities, accounting for the highest 
percentage of the total deals and transaction value in the Southeast Asian region since 
the year 1990 among other Southeast Asian countries (Metwalli and Tang 2009, 2002). 
However, there have been no significant studies conducted to find out if corporate 
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acquisition activities are subject to misappropriation and abusive behaviour specifically 
among Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
 
 
The motivation to conduct this study stems from this literature gap. Consequently, the 
main research objective of this study is to identify family-related traits that are 
important determinants of the market value changes in Malaysian family-controlled 
firms during corporate acquisitions. 
 
 
To achieve the research objective, the following research questions are constructed in 
this study: 
 
Research Question 1:  Do Malaysian family-controlled firms undertake value-enhancing 
or value-decreasing corporate acquisitions? 
 
Research Question 2:  Is family ownership an important corporate governance 
characteristic to determine whether Malaysian family-controlled firms perform value-
enhancing or value-decreasing corporate acquisitions? 
 
Research Question 3:  Are family-related traits important determinants of the market 
value changes in Malaysian family-controlled firms when undertaking corporate 
acquisitions? 
 
 
Based on the review of the existing family firm literature and corporate acquisition 
literature, 8 hypotheses are constructed in Chapter 4 to address the research objective 
and research questions. These 8 hypotheses predict a significant relation between the 
announcement-period stock performance of Malaysian family-controlled firms and 
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various tested family-related traits. These family-related traits include family 
ownership, family management regime (family-CEO or nonfamily professional CEO), 
founder-CEO or descendant-CEO, family-related chairman and CEO on the board, family 
representatives on the board, and related party corporate acquisitions. 
 
 
Overall, in this study, the announcement-period wealth effect of corporate acquisitions 
(cumulative abnormal returns – CAR) experienced by Malaysian family-controlled firms 
is investigated. Investigations are performed to examine if family-specific traits are 
significant determinants of the announcement-period wealth effect of the corporate 
acquisitions for Malaysian family-controlled firms. Inferences are drawn based on 267 
sample corporate acquisition announcements made by Malaysian family-controlled 
firms across a 10-year sample period from the years 2002 to 2011. 
 
 
The overall results in Section 6.2 have empirically revealed results supporting the 
notion that Malaysian family-controlled firms, on average, perform value-enhancing 
corporate acquisitions. The findings answer Research Question 1:  Do Malaysian 
family-controlled firms undertake value-enhancing or value-decreasing corporate 
acquisitions? Evidence reveals that Malaysian family-controlled firms, on average, 
perform value-enhancing corporate acquisitions. As discussed earlier, expropriation 
activities by controlling owners with large ownership stake can be extensive, especially 
in emerging countries (La Porta et al. 2000, Johnson et al., 2000). In addition, other 
than being high-profile corporate investments, corporate acquisitions are also a direct 
measure for possible minority shareholder expropriation activities (Shleifer and Vishny 
1997). Given that the ownership structure of most Malaysian publicly listed firms is 
characterised by concentrated shareholdings of controlling owners, the overall 
behaviour of the Malaysian family firm owners becomes inherently critical. 
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Beyond these anecdotes, there is little empirical evidence on the relevance of minority 
shareholder expropriation activities to Malaysian family-controlled firms and family 
firm value through corporate acquisitions. Section 6.2 clarifies these anecdotes, where, 
unlike its counterparts in Asia (Bae et al. 2002; Bhaumik and Selarka 2012), the 
interests of the controlling owners of Malaysian family-controlled firms, on average, 
are well aligned with those of the shareholders. In addition, the evidence in Section 6.2 
fills the literature gap in corporate acquisition literature for Malaysia. Overall, the 
findings enhance our understanding of the behavioural differences among family 
owners in an emerging economy. The findings in this study create awareness among 
policy makers that findings in one country may not necessarily be applicable to another 
country (Fan et al. 2011; Faccio et al. 2001). Policy makers need to be aware that when 
applying new policies (or when planning to), supporting facts from country-specific 
research and evidence need to be taken into consideration. Forthcoming discussions 
reveal various family-specific traits that need to be considered to safeguard the 
interests of the shareholders of Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
 
 
Overall, Section 6.3 until Section 6.10 addresses Research Question 3— Are family-
related traits important determinants of the market value changes in Malaysian family-
controlled firms when undertaking corporate acquisitions? Results reported in Section 
6.3 show which specific family-firm traits exhibit significant relation with 
announcement-period firm value of Malaysian family-controlled firms—the CAR. The 
examinations are performed under multivariate settings to control for the known 
effects of other determinants. Overall, these findings show that family-specific features 
are important determinants of announcement-period stock market returns of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms, which raise further concerns for policy makers and 
investors as discussed below. 
 
 
Sections 6.4 and 6.5 jointly support the notion of a nonlinear relation between family 
ownership and wealth effect of corporate acquisition announcement experienced by 
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Malaysian family-controlled acquirers. Other than addressing Research Question 3, the 
findings in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 also answer Research Question 2— Is family ownership 
an important corporate governance characteristic to determine whether Malaysian 
family-controlled firms perform value-enhancing or value-decreasing corporate 
acquisitions? Family ownership in Malaysian family-controlled firms is an important 
corporate governance mechanism in determining family owners’ strategic directions in 
corporate acquisitions. Evidence in this study reveals that when owning close to 50% or 
more of the ownership stake, Malaysian family-controlled firms would invest in value-
destroying corporate acquisitions. In addition, the findings in Sections 6.4 and 6.5 also 
provide important contributions to the conflicting theoretical argument of Agency 
Problem I and Agency Problem II within the context of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms and corporate acquisitions. From a theoretical viewpoint, whether concentrated 
family ownership induces interest alignment between principal-agent or induces family 
entrenchment for Malaysian family-controlled firms is not clear. Findings reveal that 
increasing family ownership is beneficial to family firms. However, when Malaysian 
family owners obtain highly concentrated ownership (close to 50% or more in 
ownership stake), evidence reveals entrenchment behaviour of Malaysian family 
owners. Overall, the findings reveal an important policy implication for Malaysian 
policy makers. The concentrated level of family ownership stake in publicly listed firms 
in Malaysia needs to be restricted. Evidence reveals that concentrated family 
ownership in Malaysian family-controlled firms needs to be capped at 50% for 
optimum performance of Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
 
 
Sections 6.6 and 6.7 extend our understanding about the effect of active family 
management on family firm value. An existing study implies that the main contributor 
to positive family firm value is due to the effect of founder (Miller, 2007). Past studies 
find that transferring the managerial role and ownership to descendants is detrimental 
to family firms (Kidwell et al., 2013). Sections 6.6 and 6.7 present in-depth findings 
within the context of an emerging economy that active management role of 
descendant should be encouraged for Malaysian family-controlled firms, consistent 
with findings for other Asian countries (Bunkanwanicha et al. 2013; Mehrotra et al. 
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2013). Results obtained from the analysis show that descendant-CEO is an important 
determinant of the wealth effect of corporate acquisitions for Malaysian family firms. 
Different from family firms from non-Asian countries (Cucculelli and Micucci 2008), 
descendant CEOs are good managers who create value in the case of Malaysian family-
controlled firms. The findings shed further light on the existing dilemma of family 
owners worldwide on whether to pass down their business to descendants (Deloitte 
Growth Enterprise Services 2013; Poutziouris et al. 2013; KPMG 2011; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers 2012). 
 
 
Section 6.8 shows that family members on the board are important determinants of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms’ value. This is a new finding and has not yet been 
documented within the literature of corporate acquisitions that this family-specific trait 
is an important determinant of the wealth effect of corporate acquisition 
announcements. Findings reveal that there is a significant nonlinear relation between 
total number of family members on the board (relative to total number of independent 
directors) and announcement-period stock performance of Malaysian family-controlled 
firms. Results suggest that having family members on the board is value enhancing to 
Malaysian family-controlled firms. However, when the total number of family members 
on the board exceeds the total number of independent directors on the board, it 
becomes detrimental to family firm value. Consistent with findings of Anderson and 
Reeb (2004) for US family firms, too much family voice on the board relative to the 
voice of independent directors on the board increases the likelihood of expropriation 
by the controlling family. The findings have policy implications that existing corporate 
governance frameworks need to consider restricting the participation of family 
members (relative to independent directors) on the board of Malaysian family-
controlled firms. 
 
 
Furthermore, findings in Section 6.8 provide important policy implications for the 
existing corporate governance practices in Malaysia. According to the current 
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recommended corporate governance practices in Malaysia (the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance - MCCG), to have one third of the total number of directors on 
the board of publicly listed firms as independent directors is mandatory. Whether this 
proportion of independent directors on the board is considered high in the context of 
Malaysian family-controlled firms is unknown. However, considering the evidence in 
Section 6.8, a feasible benchmark applicable specifically to Malaysian family-controlled 
firms becomes clear. For Malaysian family firms, evidence reveals that the proportion 
of family members on the board relative to the proportion of independent directors on 
the board is an important factor when considering the proportions of independent 
directors on the board. Policy makers should consider that there must be a balance 
between the number of independent directors on the board and the number of family 
representatives on the board, for Malaysian family-controlled firms. Results suggest 
that a ratio of 1:1 is the ideal ratio of independent directors on the board to family 
representatives on the board. For example, if there are 3 family representatives on the 
board, there should also be 3 independent directors on the board. 
 
 
Section 6.9 provides the first-ever evidence within family firm literature and the 
corporate governance literature that family-related chairman and CEO on the board is 
an important determinant of family firm value. Such family-specific feature has never 
been raised and documented in any family firm literature so far. Conventional best 
practices of corporate governance encourage the independent role of CEO and 
chairman on the board. However, when such practice is upheld by family firms through 
the appointment of family-related CEO and chairman, the corporate governance 
function of having a separate CEO and chairman is somewhat lost. The practices of 
appointing family-related CEO and chairman on the board are commonly observable in 
Malaysian family-controlled firms. This study has been the first in documenting the 
existence of such practices upheld in Malaysian family-controlled firms. This study also 
provides the first empirical evidence that appointing family-related CEO and chairman 
contributes negatively to the firm value of Malaysian family-controlled firms. The 
evidence provides further knowledge to policy makers that existing generally accepted 
corporate governance practices on the separate role of CEO and chairman on the board 
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requires further scrutiny and improvement to safeguard the interests of the investors. 
Restrictions are needed to deter the appointment of family-related CEO and chairman 
on the board, as evidence reveals that such family-specific practices are detrimental to 
the family firm value. 
 
 
Section 6.10 presents only weak support for the notion that related party corporate 
acquisitions are detrimental to the value of Malaysian family-controlled firms. Again, 
this finding supports earlier evidence in Section 6.2 that the interests of Malaysian 
family owners, based on the sample, are well aligned with those of other shareholders. 
Malaysian family-controlled firms do not, on average, perform significant value-
destroying corporate acquisitions, even when the acquisitions involve related parties. 
 
 
Key contributions derived from this study are summarised as follows. First, findings in 
this study provide the first-ever evidence for Malaysia that Malaysian family-controlled 
firms, on average, do not create value-decreasing corporate acquisitions. Second, this 
study is the first that has documented a nonlinear relation between Malaysian family 
ownership and firm performance, within the context of Malaysia and corporate 
acquisition studies. Third, this study is the first to hypothesize family-related traits as 
important determinants of the announcement-period stock returns of family firms, 
which have been understudied within the literature of corporate acquisitions. Fourth, 
this study is the first to have empirical evidence that family-related CEO and chairman 
on the board (CEO and chairman on the board who are both family related) are an 
important determinant of the announcement-period stock returns of family firms, 
within the literature of family firms. Fifth, this study is the first to document this unique 
family-specific trait—family-related chairman and CEO on the board, within the family 
firm literature. Sixth, the findings demonstrate that descendants are good managers for 
Malaysian family firms. This finding sheds further light on the unwavering issues in 
family firms and in practice worldwide of whether to pass the managerial role to 
descendants. Last but not least, this study is the first to show a nonlinear relation 
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between family representatives on the board (relative to independent directors on the 
board) and announcement-period stock returns of family firms, for Malaysia.  
 
 
7.2 Limitations 
 
 
One of the limitations of this study is that the inferences are made based on 
observations of past data. Whether inferences made based on this 10-year sample 
period are applicable to the future periods is unknown. Furthermore, another 
limitation is the small amount of data used in this study; the employment of a larger 
data set across a wider sample period to increase the number of observations may 
allow better fit of the model. It has been in the literature that inferences are drawn 
based on studies with sample period that is 10 years or less (Holmen and Knopf 2004, 
Basu et al. 2009, Bouzgarrou and Navatte 2013).  Hence, a possible remedy for the 
small sample size is to conduct a comparative international study. This will also provide 
further insights whether the results found within the Malaysian context are also 
applicable to other economy.  
 
 
Another limitation is the inability to incorporate cash flow right and voting right into 
this study, which has been done in the earlier study of Ben-Amar and André (2006) for 
Canadian family firms. Specific to the case of Malaysia, the employment of cash flow 
right and voting right is not feasible. As discussed in Chapter 2, ownership by a 
controlling family in publicly listed Malaysian family-controlled firms is commonly 
achieved through multiple private firms (Song et al. 2007; Lee et al. 2012), which 
causes difficulties in deriving the precise quantum of a controlling family’s control rights 
in Malaysian family-controlled firms (Lemmon and Lins 2003; Claessens et al. 2000; 
Carney and Child 2012). The concerns over deriving accurate control rights are also 
raised in another study (Edwards and Weichenrieder 2009). A possible remedy for the 
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derivation of control rights has been suggested by Edwards and Weichenrieder (2009), 
by using the voting power indices as an alternative measure of the control rights. 
However,  such measure has so far been empirically tested  only in Germany (Edwards 
and Weichenrieder 2009) and Israel (Aminadav et al. 2011). There is a need for new 
avenues of empirical research focused on the use of voting power indices as an 
alternative measure of the control rights in other economies and of its economic 
impact on firm value. 
 
 
Last, results in this study may not be applicable to other economies. As highlighted by 
previous authors, family owners affect family firm value differently, depending on the 
legal environment, culture, and regulation of the region (Faccio et al. 2001; Maury 
2006). Consequently, previous authors emphasised the importance of conducting 
focused-country studies for family firms (Miller et al. 2007; Cucculelli and Micucci 2008; 
Fan, Wei, et al. 2011). In comparison with cross-country studies, focused-country 
studies allow researchers to analyse the impacts of key institutional factors on various 
issues, while holding constant other factors that might be difficult to disentangle in 
cross-country studies (Fan, Wei, et al. 2011). 
 
 
7.3 Future Work 
 
 
To perform a similar study by employing both family and nonfamily firms in the 
observation for comparison purpose would be interesting. There will be some 
limitations when including nonfamily firms in a similar study as some of the family-firm 
specific features may not exist or be practised in nonfamily firms. Furthermore, a 
comparative study involving countries in Asia will shed further light whether findings in 
this study are applicable to family firms in other Asian countries. 
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In addition, a new discovery is reported in this study for Malaysian family-controlled 
firms. Results consistently support robust and significant negative relation between the 
proportion of independent directors on the board and the announcement-period stock 
performance of Malaysian family-controlled firms across all the examined models in 
this study. This is not consistent with the generally accepted notion on the positive 
relation between proportion of independent directors on the board and firm value. 
However, the reported negative relation between the proportion of independent 
directors and family firm value in this study support the notion of Jonovic (1989) that 
the presence of outside directors on the board does not necessarily contribute positive 
effect to the family-controlled firm as a whole. Empirical study also supports that a 
classical board structure may only suit a few family firms (Hwang and Kim 2009; 
Jameson et al. 2014).  The reasons for this type of negative relationship can be 
considered in future study for Malaysian family-controlled firms. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
A1 Top 100 Malaysia Public Listed Companies by Market 
Capitalization 
 
Table A1.1 
Top 100 Malaysia Public Listed Companies by Market Capitalization as at 31
st
 October 2012 
(Data sourced from Database Capital IQ) 
Company 
* Malaysian family-controlled firms are with the highlighted column 
Market 
Capitalization 
(MYRmm) 
1 Malayan Banking Bhd (KLSE:MAYBANK) 76,210.9  
2 Sime Darby Berhad (KLSE:SIME) 58,772.9  
3 CIMB Group Holdings Berhad (KLSE:CIMB) 56,712.1  
4 Public Bank Berhad (KLSE:PBBANK) 55,683.8  
5 Axiata Group Berhad (KLSE:AXIATA) 55,553.4  
6 Maxis Berhad (KLSE:MAXIS) 52,203.6  
7 Petronas Chemicals Group Berhad (KLSE:PCHEM) 52,000.0  
8 DiGi.Com Berhad (KLSE:DIGI) 41,285.3  
9 Petronas Gas Bhd (KLSE:PETGAS) 38,783.2  
10 Tenaga Nasional Bhd (KLSE:TENAGA) 38,390.2  
11 Genting Berhad (KLSE:GENTING) 32,698.6  
12 IOI Corp.Bhd (KLSE:IOICORP) 32,339.4  
13 Hong Leong Bank Berhad (KLSE:HLBANK) 26,435.8  
14 IHH Healthcare Berhad (KLSE:IHH) 26,341.3  
15 Kuala Lumpur Kepong Bhd (KLSE:KLK) 22,811.6  
16 Petronas Dagangan Bhd (KLSE:PETDAG) 21,935.5  
17 Telekom Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:TM) 21,392.9  
18 Genting Malaysia Berhad (KLSE:GENM) 20,369.9  
19 AMMB Holdings Berhad (KLSE:AMBANK) 19,230.9  
20 MISC Berhad (KLSE:MISC) 18,926.5  
21 YTL Corporation Berhad (KLSE:YTL) 18,081.7  
22 British American Tobacco Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:BAT) 18,056.9  
23 RHB Capital Bhd (KLSE:RHBCAP) 16,768.2  
24 Nestle Malaysia Bhd. (KLSE:NESTLE) 16,340.0  
25 PPB Group Berhad (KLSE:PPB) 15,956.8  
26 Hong Leong Financial Group Berhad (KLSE:HLFG) 13,412.9  
27 Astro Malaysia Holdings Berhad (KLSE:ASTRO) 12,799.3  
28 SapuraKencana Petroleum Berhad (KLSE:SKPETRO) 12,561.0  
29 Felda Global Ventures Holdings Berhad (KLSE:FGV) 12,487.0  
30 YTL Power International Berhad (KLSE:YTLPOWR) 11,863.8  
31 UMW Holdings Bhd (KLSE:UMW) 11,659.6  
32 Bumi Armada Berhad (KLSE:ARMADA) 11,482.2  
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33 UEM Land Holdings Berhad (KLSE:UEMLAND) 9,175.1  
34 AirAsia Berhad (KLSE:AIRASIA) 8,423.3  
35 Lafarge Malayan Cement Berhad (KLSE:LMCEMNT) 8,284.5  
36 MMC Corporation Bhd (KLSE:MMCCORP) 7,947.6  
37 Malaysia Marine and Heavy Engineering Holdings Berhad  7,728.0  
38 Gamuda Bhd (KLSE:GAMUDA) 7,515.1  
39 Batu Kawan Berhad (KLSE:BKAWAN) 7,472.8  
40 S P Setia Berhad (KLSE:SPSETIA) 7,257.7  
41 Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd (KLSE:F&N) 7,189.2  
42 Malaysia Airports Holdings Bhd (KLSE:AIRPORT) 7,030.1  
43 IJM Corporation Berhad (KLSE:IJM) 6,922.2  
44 Genting Plantations Berhad (KLSE:GENP) 6,813.7  
45 Kulim Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KULIM) 6,409.7  
46 Alliance Financial Group Berhad. (KLSE:AFG) 6,201.2  
47 Berjaya Sports Toto Berhad (KLSE:BJTOTO) 5,863.9  
48 Dialog Group Berhad (KLSE:DIALOG) 5,721.8  
49 KLCC Property Holdings Bhd (KLSE:KLCCP) 5,539.1  
50 Parkson Holdings Berhad (KLSE:PARKSON) 5,259.3  
51 United Plantations Bhd (KLSE:UTDPLT) 5,236.7  
52 Boustead Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BSTEAD) 5,181.2  
53 Multi-Purpose Holdings Bhd (KLSE:MPHB) 5,181.2  
54 Affin Holdings Bhd (KLSE:AFFIN) 5,066.6  
55 Guinness Anchor Berhad (KLSE:GAB) 5,014.8  
56 Oriental Holdings Bhd (KLSE:ORIENT) 4,838.8  
57 DRB-HICOM Berhad (KLSE:DRBHCOM) 4,794.4  
58 Aeon Co. (M) Bhd (KLSE:AEON) 4,380.5  
59 Berjaya Land Berhad (KLSE:BJLAND) 4,030.8  
60 Carlsberg Brewery Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:CARLSBG) 4,005.3  
61 KPJ Healthcare Bhd (KLSE:KPJ) 3,876.8  
62 MSM Malaysia Holdings Berhad (KLSE:MSM) 3,521.9  
63 Hap Seng Consolidated Berhad (KLSE:HAPSENG) 3,488.4  
64 IGB Corp. Bhd (KLSE:IGB) 3,474.2  
65 Malaysian Airline System Bhd (KLSE:MAS) 3,442.4  
66 Hartalega Sdn Bhd (KLSE:HARTA) 3,410.0  
67 Bursa Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:BURSA) 3,357.1  
68 Gas Malaysia Berhad (KLSE:GASMSIA) 3,351.2  
69 Top Glove Corp. Bhd (KLSE:TOPGLOV) 3,311.7  
70 BIMB Holdings Berhad (KLSE:BIMB) 3,232.4  
71 Dutch Lady Milk Industries Bhd (KLSE:DLADY) 3,197.4  
72 IJM Land Berhad (KLSE:IJMLAND) 3,102.2  
73 LPI Capital Bhd (KLSE:LPI) 3,093.1  
74 KFC Holdings Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:KFC) 3,085.6  
75 Sunway Berhad (KLSE:SUNWAY) 3,050.3  
76 Malaysia Building Society Bhd (KLSE:MBSB) 2,914.1  
77 Tan Chong Motor Holdings Bhd (KLSE:TCHONG) 2,892.0  
78 Bintulu Port Holdings Bhd (KLSE:BIPORT) 2,832.0  
79 Sarawak Oil Palms Bhd (KLSE:SOP) 2,721.9  
80 Berjaya Corporation (KLSE:BJCORP) 2,702.9  
81 Shell Refining Company Berhad (KLSE:SHELL) 2,640.0  
82 QL Resources Berhad (KLSE:QL) 2,637.4  
83 IJM Plantations Berhad (KLSE:IJMPLNT) 2,509.4  
84 Media Prima Bhd (KLSE:MEDIA) 2,460.7  
85 Malaysian Resources Corp. Bhd (KLSE:MRCB) 2,441.8  
86 Hap Seng Plantations Holdings Bhd (KLSE:HSPLANT) 2,351.9  
  
301 
 
  
87 Star Publications Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:STAR) 2,311.5  
88 WCT Berhad (KLSE:WCT) 2,272.3  
89 Tradewinds Plantation Berhad (KLSE:TWSPLNT) 2,264.8  
90 Jaya Tiasa Holdings Berhad (KLSE:JTIASA) 2,227.6  
91 Tradewinds Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:TWS) 2,173.1  
92 UOA Development Bhd (KLSE:UOADEV) 2,147.6  
93 NCB Holdings Bhd (KLSE:NCB) 2,073.8  
94 Time Dotcom Bhd. (KLSE:TIMECOM) 2,002.2  
95 Amway Malaysia Holdings Bhd (KLSE:AMWAY) 1,995.6  
96 Lingkaran Trans Kota Holdings Berhad (KLSE:LITRAK) 1,995.0  
97 TSH Resources Berhad (KLSE:TSH) 1,985.8  
98 QSR Brands Bhd (KLSE:QSR) 1,894.3  
99 Mah Sing Group Bhd (KLSE:MAHSING) 1,893.6  
100 Shangri-La Hotels Malaysia Bhd (KLSE:SHANG) 1,865.6  
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A2 Ownership of the Loh Family in Oriental Holdings Berhad 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
The Loh Family 
Loh Boon Siew Holdings Sdn Bhd 
Loh Kar Bee Holdings Sdn Bhd 
Boon Siew Sdn Bhd 
Penang Yellow Bus Company Bhd 
Bayview Hotel Sdn Bhd 
Boon Siew Development Sdn Bhd 
Boon Tong Estates Sdn Bhd 
Oriental Holdings Berhad 
1.56% 
9.92% 
43% 
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Figure A2. 1:  Illustration of the Loh Family Ownership in Oriental Holdings Bhd 
 
 
 
 
 
….. continued from above 
 
For the purpose of illustrating the infeasibility of deriving cash flow rights deviation 
from voting rights, the figure in Appendix II above illustrate the ownership structure 
of one of the Malaysian family-controlled firm – the Oriental Holdings Berhad (OHB - 
a public listed Malaysian family-controlled firm on Malaysia Stock Exchange – Main 
Board) that is owned and managed by the Loh family via multiple private firms.  
 
The ownership data is derived from the fiscal year end 2010 annual report, based on 
all the reported ownership figures. The firms in the second and third tiers of the 
hierarchical structure are all private firms in which the Loh family have interests in. 
These private firms hold a total of 54.58% = (1.56+9.92+43) interests in OHB.  
 
As shown from the figure above, some of the shareholdings of The Loh family in the 
private firms are not disclosed. This is due to the fact that these figures are also not 
disclosed in the annual report. First, this has induced one of the issues of infeasibility 
of deriving precise cash flow rights and voting rights of the The Loh family in OHB. 
Second, separated ownership of each private firm in OHB is also not reported, which 
further demonstrates the infeasibility of cash flow rights and voting rights precise 
measurements. 
 
Such scenario does not only apply to OHB, but also applies to other public-listed 
Malaysian family-controlled firms that are owned by the controlling families via 
multiple private firms in a structure similar to pyramiding as well. 
 
Overall, the illustration has demonstrated the impossibility of deriving precise cash 
flow rights and voting rights of the controlling family in a public listed Malaysian 
family-controlled firm when the ownership structure of the family-controlled firm 
involves multiple private firms in a structure similar to pyramiding. The two issues as 
mentioned above also are observable in other public listed Malaysian family-
controlled firms in this study.  
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A3 Lists of 267 Sample Corporate Acquisition Announcements 
 
 
TABLE A3.1 
LISTS OF 267 SAMPLE CORPORATE ACQUISITION ANNOUNCEMENTS 
NO. 
MALAYSIAN FAMILY-CONTROLLED FIRMS - THE 
BIDDERS 
EVENT DATE 
TRANSACTION 
VALUE (RM) 
1 GENTING BERHAD 31/1/2011 2.10E+09 
2 GENTING BERHAD 2/6/2003 1.05E+08 
3 GENTING MALAYSIA BERHAD 24/11/2011 38260000 
4 GENTING MALAYSIA BERHAD 24/10/2011 50000000 
5 GENTING MALAYSIA BERHAD 1/7/2010 1.67E+09 
6 GENTING MALAYSIA BERHAD 8/12/2009 2.29E+08 
7 GENTING MALAYSIA BERHAD 26/11/2008 2.50E+08 
8 GENTING PLANTATION BERHAD 18/5/2011 40350000 
9 TAN CHONG MOTOR HOLDINGS BHD  22/9/2010 22900000 
10 TAN CHONG MOTOR HOLDINGS BHD  17/1/2005 7600000 
11 ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BERHAD 22/6/2004 1470000 
12 ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BERHAD 22/12/2006 19790000 
13 ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BERHAD 19/9/2011 79130000 
14 ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BERHAD 8/6/2011 900000 
15 ORIENTAL HOLDINGS BERHAD 31/1/2011 19160000 
16 THE STORE CORPORATION BERHAD 13/12/2007 1.30E+08 
17 THE STORE CORPORATION BERHAD 28/4/2006 43585433 
18 THE STORE CORPORATION BERHAD 15/12/2004 20166500 
19 PRESS METAL BERHAD 28/11/2006 1.67E+08 
20 PRESS METAL BERHAD 18/8/2003 8000000 
21 KNM GROUP BERHAD 29/11/2004 5800000 
22 KNM GROUP BERHAD 30/12/2005 11253000 
23 KNM GROUP BERHAD 3/1/2006 7881061 
24 KNM GROUP BERHAD 5/7/2006 27500000 
25 KNM GROUP BERHAD 7/12/2007 51010000 
26 KNM GROUP BERHAD 4/9/2007 50000000 
27 KNM GROUP BERHAD 3/3/2008 1.70E+09 
28 KNM GROUP BERHAD 5/12/2011 952855.5 
29 MALAYAN FLOUR MILLS BHD 20/4/2010 10186446 
30 BLD PLANTATION BERHAD 23/12/2009 2880000 
31 BINA PURI HOLDINGS BHD 5/1/2011 1174796 
32 BINA PURI HOLDINGS BHD 11/8/2010 807581 
33 KWANTAS CORPORATION BERHAD 22/6/2005 9400000 
34 KWANTAS CORPORATION BERHAD 29/11/2004 90649956 
35 KOSSAN RUBBER INDUSTRIES BERHAD 23/3/2011 10880000 
36 KOSSAN RUBBER INDUSTRIES BERHAD 22/8/2003 835000 
37 KOSSAN RUBBER INDUSTRIES BERHAD 19/7/2002 3500000 
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38 SUPERMAX CORPORATION BERHAD 10/3/2006 1.11E+08 
39 EVERGREEN FIBREBOARD BERHAD 12/8/2011 37837800 
40 EVERGREEN FIBREBOARD BERHAD 23/6/2008 2.13E+08 
41 EVERGREEN FIBREBOARD BERHAD 13/2/2007 13700000 
42 CAHYA MATA SARAWAK BERHAD 28/2/2011 8007766 
43 CAHYA MATA SARAWAK BERHAD 3/9/2007 1.10E+08 
44 CAHYA MATA SARAWAK BERHAD 21/3/2005 22654861 
45 TSH RESOURCES BERHAD 13/5/2011 12600000 
46 TSH RESOURCES BERHAD 8/1/2010 17000000 
47 TSH RESOURCES BERHAD 15/4/2009 21532368 
48 TSH RESOURCES BERHAD 4/6/2008 18532125 
49 TSH RESOURCES BERHAD 19/6/2007 16205474 
50 TSH RESOURCES BERHAD 16/1/2007 88704000 
51 TSH RESOURCES BERHAD 26/4/2006 33900000 
52 TSH RESOURCES BERHAD 1/3/2006 9790000 
53 WTK HOLDINGS BERHAD 26/1/2011 11821264 
54 WTK HOLDINGS BERHAD 10/12/2007 34000000 
55 WTK HOLDINGS BERHAD 4/12/2007 33000000 
56 WTK HOLDINGS BERHAD 27/7/2006 1.50E+08 
57 MELEWAR INDUSTRIAL GROUP BERHAD 21/10/2005 83050208 
58 ENGTEX GROUP BERHAD 3/4/2007 1437617.8 
59 SCIENTEX BERHAD 16/12/2011 46389000 
60 SCIENTEX BERHAD  19/10/2009 65313864 
61 SCIENTEX BERHAD  6/8/2009 1145046 
62 SCIENTEX BERHAD  8/9/2008 9252468 
63 SCIENTEX BERHAD  30/1/2003 6250000 
64 SUBUR TIASA HOLDINGS BERHAD 16/11/2009 17500000 
65 SUBUR TIASA HOLDINGS BERHAD 28/4/2008 3706500 
66 SUBUR TIASA HOLDINGS BERHAD 3/5/2007 8000000 
67 RIMBUNAN SAWIT BHD 23/5/2011 1020000 
68 RIMBUNAN SAWIT BHD 11/9/2009 58594000 
69 RIMBUNAN SAWIT BHD 31/7/2009 58594000 
70 RIMBUNAN SAWIT BHD 12/10/2007 50667000 
71 IPMUDA BERHAD 29/9/2010 799998 
72 IPMUDA BERHAD 19/12/2006 5000000 
73 IPMUDA BERHAD 1/6/2006 1350000 
74 EP MANUFACTURING BERHAD 27/4/2007 38500000 
75 MEGA FIRST CORPORATION BERHAD 27/1/2005 2569166 
76 D&O GREEN TECHNOLOGIES BHD 13/5/2010 72802695 
77 ROCK CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 2/2/2007 4600000 
78 RELIANCE PACIFIC BERHAD 5/2/2008 49000000 
79 DELLOYD VENTURES BERHAD 5/1/2007 499998 
80 DELLOYD VENTURES BERHAD 19/1/2005 68000000 
81 DELLOYD VENTURES BERHAD 18/9/2003 6000000 
82 CAB CAKARAN CORPORATION BERHAD 27/10/2005 2805000 
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83 MAMEE-DOUBLE DECKER (M) BERHAD 23/6/2008 450000 
84 MAMEE-DOUBLE DECKER (M) BERHAD 6/6/2008 10705200 
85 TSM GLOBAL BERHAD 3/3/2010 15080000 
86 MAGNI-TECH INDUSTRIES BERHAD 29/12/2005 42000000 
87 TOMEI CONSOLIDATED BERHAD 6/10/2011 3585260 
88 TOMEI CONSOLIDATED BERHAD 7/9/2011 3998974 
89 TOMEI CONSOLIDATED BERHAD 8/3/2011 2749999 
90 SELANGOR DREDGING BERHAD 9/7/2008 48000000 
91 CB INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT HOLDINGS BERHAD 9/12/2009 4000000 
92 CB INDUSTRIAL PRODUCT HOLDINGS BERHAD 23/10/2007 13230000 
93 TONG HERR RESOURCES BERHAD 14/5/2010 35132880 
94 WING TAI MALAYSIA BERHAD 2/11/2004 1520000 
95 FARM'S BEST BERHAD 6/8/2009 4077390 
96 FARM'S BEST BERHAD 3/8/2007 805000 
97 FARM'S BEST BERHAD 14/4/2006 863000 
98 GUH HOLDINGS BERHAD 1/7/2011 8972473 
99 WEIDA (M) BERHAD 25/2/2008 6000000 
100 WEIDA (M) BERHAD 12/10/2004 1500000 
101 MKH BERHAD 24/12/2007 24000000 
102 MKH BERHAD 26/5/2006 10200000 
103 EASTERN & ORIENTAL BHD 12/4/2007 3060000 
104 EASTERN & ORIENTAL BHD 10/11/2005 9250000 
105 PENSONIC HOLDINGS BHD 24/2/2006 2009551 
106 PENSONIC HOLDINGS BHD 6/12/2004 6069000 
107 PW CONSOLIDATED BERHAD 26/1/2004 10000000 
108 GOLDIS BERHAD 24/3/2006 3620000 
109 IGB CORPORATION BHD 19/12/2011 2.78E+08 
110 WAH SEONG CORPORATION BHD 5/6/2007 1454228.1 
111 WAH SEONG CORPORATION BHD 1/7/2005 39925000 
112 KRISASSETS HOLDINGS BERHAD 14/2/2011 2.16E+08 
113 LII HEN INDUSTRIES BHD 8/3/2005 2000000 
114 SKP RESOURCES BHD 27/4/2006 30000000 
115 GADANG HOLDINGS BERHAD 10/7/2007 12000000 
116 GADANG HOLDINGS BERHAD 27/4/2006 2800000 
117 ADVANCE SYNERGY BHD 15/9/2011 600000 
118 TRINITY CORPORATION BERHAD 24/5/2004 12200000 
119 NOTION VTEC BERHAD 27/4/2010 3400000 
120 EDEN INC. BERHAD 5/12/2007 3500000 
121 PMB TECHNOLOGY BERHAD 1/12/2006 7000000 
122 GOLDEN LAND BERHAD 21/12/2009 7957348 
123 GOLDEN LAND BERHAD 28/9/2009 23523746 
124 GOLDEN LAND BERHAD 28/4/2009 6300000 
125 GOLDEN LAND BERHAD 11/9/2008 15640000 
126 GOLDEN LAND BERHAD 4/11/2003 3185000 
127 SUCCESS TRANSFORMER CORPORATION BERHAD 21/6/2011 6438000 
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128 SUCCESS TRANSFORMER CORPORATION BERHAD 18/1/2011 6000000 
129 SUCCESS TRANSFORMER CORPORATION BERHAD 11/6/2010 2490842 
130 SUCCESS TRANSFORMER CORPORATION BERHAD 10/5/2006 14628000 
131 FIAMMA HOLDINGS BHD 4/5/2007 1996400 
132 TALIWORKS CORPORATION BERHAD 16/7/2007 1.08E+08 
133 TALIWORKS CORPORATION BERHAD 27/12/2006 7700000 
134 TEK SENG HOLDINGS BERHAD 21/1/2011 1800000 
135 PERMAJU INDUSTRIES BERHAD 8/3/2010 33680000 
136 BOON KOON GROUP BERHAD 10/4/2006 11000000 
137 UNIMECH GROUP BERHAD 11/9/2008 4486700 
138 SEE HUP CONSOLIDATED BHD 28/10/2005 1397999 
139 A & M REALTY BHD 8/5/2007 75000000 
140 A & M REALTY BHD 19/7/2004 21123000 
141 DPS RESOURCES BERHAD 6/5/2008 11500000 
142 DPS RESOURCES BERHAD 10/4/2008 4900000 
143 DPS RESOURCES BERHAD 18/11/2005 4600000 
144 UZMA BERHAD 31/3/2010 8175000 
145 CHEE WAH CORPORATION 24/3/2011 11008915 
146 ECOFIRST CONSOLIDATED BERHAD 11/3/2011 4500000 
147 MINTYE INUDSTRIES BHD 1/6/2010 1040013 
148 TAHPS GROUP BHD 12/10/2011 1.08E+08 
149 MALAYAN UNITED INDUSTRIES BHD 31/10/2006 2.73E+08 
150 ADVENTA BHD  3/8/2009 800000 
151 ASIA FILE CORP. BHD  21/9/2007 66360000 
152 BATU KAWAN BHD  22/11/2004 5700000 
153 BATU KAWAN BHD  4/9/2002 10013000 
154 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD  1/11/2010 4717000 
155 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 21/10/2010 8830000 
156 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 14/7/2009 2295000 
157 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD  8/5/2009 19193000 
158 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 10/2/2009 1155510 
159 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 16/11/2007 12578000 
160 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD  28/9/2007 67671400 
161 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 2/2/2007 12393000 
162 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 18/12/2006 3.77E+08 
163 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD  26/6/2006 2753991 
164 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 12/6/2006 7496000 
165 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 11/1/2006 22000000 
166 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 6/12/2005 12316500 
167 KUALA LUMPUR KEPONG BHD 22/11/2004 5700000 
168 BERJAYA CORPORATION BHD 29/7/2011 77910000 
169 BERJAYA CORPORATION BHD 10/8/2010 3500000 
170 BERJAYA CORPORATION BHD 12/5/2010 5.25E+08 
171 BERJAYA CORPORATION BHD 18/9/2009 794067 
172 BERJAYA CORPORATION BHD 4/5/2009 19530000 
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173 BERJAYA CORPORATION BHD 23/5/2008 2880000 
174 BERJAYA CORPORATION BHD 24/4/2008 12800000 
175 BERJAYA LAND BHD 10/12/2007 2.29E+08 
176 BERJAYA LAND BHD 7/11/2007 2.54E+08 
177 BERJAYA LAND BHD 24/2/2006 22780000 
178 COASTAL CONTRACTS BHD  14/8/2006 2000000 
179 CYMAO HOLDINGS BHD  29/12/2009 4000000 
180 CYMAO HOLDINGS BHD  6/6/2005 16000000 
181 FREIGHT MANAGEMENT HOLDINGS BHD 28/5/2007 2240993.3 
182 HARN LEN CORPORATION BHD 8/12/2009 13999000 
183 HARN LEN CORPORATION BHD 19/9/2006 9993160 
184 KECK SENG MALAYSIA BHD  2/10/2009 20829930 
185 LB ALUMINIUM BHD  9/10/2008 6000000 
186 MAHAJAYA BHD  19/10/2005 10200000 
187 MAHAJAYA BHD  10/6/2005 3500000 
188 CEPATWAWASAN GROUP BHD  26/12/2006 14157000 
189 NPC RESOURCES BHD  1/11/2010 8909280 
190 NPC RESOURCES BHD 23/8/2010 15660000 
191 NPC RESOURCES BHD  21/12/2009 10857963 
192 NPC RESOURCES BHD  25/9/2008 16422943 
193 NPC RESOURCES BHD  5/12/2006 21000000 
194 PADINI HOLDINGS BHD  22/6/2004 2972127.4 
195 SUPERLON HOLDINGS BHD 27/7/2011 2700000 
196 TOP GLOVE CORP. BHD  8/5/2006 26800000 
197 AHMAD ZAKI RESOURCES BHD  6/5/2003 4000000 
198 ANN JOO RESOURCES BHD  25/4/2008 11905762 
199 ANN JOO RESOURCES BHD  3/10/2005 2.05E+08 
200 ATURMAJU RESOURCES BHD  18/8/2009 23000000 
201 ATURMAJU RESOURCES BHD  29/1/2007 20000000 
202 CLASSIC SCENIC BHD  30/8/2006 1000000 
203 DXN HOLDINGS BHD  21/12/2010 2500000 
204 DXN HOLDINGS BHD 17/12/2007 1009780 
205 DXN HOLDINGS BHD 12/10/2005 1500000 
206 LEONG HUP HOLDINGS BHD 9/2/2007 2826007 
207 LEONG HUP HOLDINGS BHD 26/7/2005 1540000 
208 EWEIN BERHAD  21/2/2011 2250000 
209 GSB GROUP BERHAD  30/7/2009 5000000 
210 HONG LEONG INDUSTRIES BHD  17/11/2010 4.10E+08 
211 HONG LEONG INDUSTRIES BHD  26/3/2010 17479812 
212 GUOCOLAND (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 8/11/2011 30043000 
213 GUOCOLAND (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 24/4/2008 1666000 
214 GUOCOLAND (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 8/8/2007 71000000 
215 GUOCOLAND (MALAYSIA) BERHAD 3/11/2006 82990000 
216 TASEK CORPORATION BERHAD  23/12/2009 24800000 
217 TASEK CORPORATION BERHAD  29/3/2006 2000000 
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218 HUAT LAI RESOURCES BHD  24/12/2008 6100000 
219 IOI CORP.BHD  29/8/2008 5.87E+08 
220 IOI CORP.BHD  18/3/2008 4.40E+08 
221 IOI CORP.BHD  7/12/2006 4.23E+08 
222 IOI CORP.BHD 1/9/2006 21304639 
223 IOI CORP.BHD 22/7/2004 89187686 
224 JMR CONGLOMERATION BHD  30/12/2009 3380000 
225 KHIND HOLDINGS BHD  27/1/2011 8000000 
226 KIM LOONG RESOURCES BERHAD  1/12/2009 25000000 
227 KOBAY TECHNOLOGY BHD 29/10/2008 1000000 
228 MTD ACPI ENGINEERING BERHAD  16/2/2006 88000000 
229 METACORP BHD 16/11/2006 10705048 
230 METACORP BHD 20/9/2004 4155000 
231 NILAI RESOURCES GROUP BERHAD.  30/12/2010 6930000 
232 PROGRESSIVE IMPACT CORP. BHD 11/2/2008 2000000 
233 QL RESOURCES BHD  16/5/2008 6680000 
234 QL RESOURCES BHD  7/9/2005 3800000 
235 QL RESOURCES BHD  18/7/2005 6400000 
236 QL RESOURCES BHD 22/7/2002 4690121.3 
237 SAPURACREST PETROLEUM BHD 2/6/2009 8480000 
238 SARAWAK OIL PALMS BHD 11/5/2009 7000000 
239 SARAWAK OIL PALMS BHD 21/1/2003 4250000 
240 TIEN WAH PRESS HOLDINGS BHD  24/6/2009 12911875 
241 TIEN WAH PRESS HOLDINGS BHD  1/7/2008 95800000 
242 TIEN WAH PRESS HOLDINGS BHD 18/9/2007 27908000 
243 TRADEWINDS CORP. BHD  3/10/2007 1000000 
244 TRADEWINDS CORP. BHD  24/9/2007 15500000 
245 TRADEWINDS (M) BERHAD  28/8/2009 5.26E+08 
246 UNISEM M BHD  20/4/2007 2.41E+08 
247 UNISEM M BHD  3/12/2003 68400000 
248 UNITED PLANTATIONS BHD 25/4/2006 32844856 
249 UNITED PLANTATIONS BHD 23/4/2002 4.41E+08 
250 YTL CEMENT BHD  15/1/2010 1.50E+08 
251 YTL CEMENT BHD  28/8/2007 69390000 
252 YTL CEMENT BHD  12/9/2003 1.38E+08 
253 YTL CORP. BHD  19/4/2010 93288000 
254 YTL CORP. BHD  28/10/2008 6.29E+08 
255 YTL CORP. BHD  12/10/2007 17500000 
256 YTL CORP. BHD  11/6/2007 6000000 
257 YUNG KONG GALVANISING INDUSTRIES BHD  9/3/2011 5555673.6 
258 LION DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS BERHAD. 25/6/2008 61550000 
259 LION DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS BERHAD. 28/9/2006 35120000 
260 LION DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS BERHAD. 22/8/2005 2.46E+08 
261 LION DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS BERHAD. 15/9/2005 29900000 
262 LION DIVERSIFIED HOLDINGS BERHAD. 13/5/2005 5850000 
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263 LION FOREST INDUSTRIES BERHAD 27/5/2008 2.27E+09 
264 LION FOREST INDUSTRIES BERHAD 27/3/2008 2730000 
265 LION FOREST INDUSTRIES BERHAD 31/1/2005 2.25E+08 
266 LION INDUSTRIES CORP. BHD 4/5/2011 36560000 
267 PARKSON HOLDINGS BHD 28/9/2006 2.74E+08 
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A4 Regression Diagnostics on Base Model 5.6 
 
 
 
 
 
variable | N      mean        sd       p50     max       min    skewness  kurtosis 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Residuals| 267 -2.14e-09   3.16819 -.196285  15.7772 -7.718657  .9962015  6.157873 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure A4. 1:  Summary Statistics of Regression Residuals for Model 5.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A4. 2:  Kernel Density of Model 5.6 
 
 
    Number of obs =     267 
    F(  2,   264) =   31.09 
    Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    R-squared     =  0.1906 
    Adj R-squared =  0.1845 
    Root MSE      =  3.1713 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
       CARiT |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
       _hat
A
 |   .9515073   .1344179     7.08   0.000     .6868397    1.216175 
     _hatsq
B
 |   .0745703   .0614101     1.21   0.226    -.0463456    .1954862 
       _cons |  -.1632956   .2421884    -0.67   0.501    -.6401622     .313571 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
A
 _hat denotes the predicted CARiT 
B
 _hatsq denotes the squared predicted CARiT 
 
Figure A4. 3:  Link Test for Model 5.6 
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Ramsey RESET test using powers of the fitted values of CARiT 
Ho:  model has no omitted variables 
F(3, 246) =      0.78 
Prob > F =      0.5066 
 
Figure A4. 4:  RAMSEY Test for Model 5.6 
 
 
 
 
 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
      LN_MVE |      1.82    0.549088 
      F_Dual |      1.63    0.613978 
   FamilyCEO |      1.57    0.635940 
     DualCEO |      1.57    0.637281 
     Fam_Ind |      1.51    0.662433 
Ind_Director |      1.46    0.683212 
    Firmyear |      1.44    0.693338 
       LN_RM |      1.35    0.739711 
         Own |      1.24    0.806081 
         FCF |      1.19    0.837275 
 Crossborder |      1.19    0.838933 
         Rpa |      1.16    0.861514 
      Public |      1.16    0.863775 
 non_related |      1.12    0.890992 
     Pre_CAR |      1.09    0.921324 
     Yr08_11 |      1.08    0.925552 
      Equity |      1.08    0.929171 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.33 
 
Figure A4. 5:  VIF Test for Model 5.6 
 
 
 
Durbin-Watson d-statistic( 18,   267) =  1.980416 
Outcomes: No Autocorrelation Detected 
 
Figure A4. 6:  Durban-Watson Tests for Autocorrelation 
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Table A4.1  
Summary of Regression Diagnostic Results for Baseline Model 5.6  
The baseline model is represented by the equation: CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 FamilyCEOi + βi3 Fam_Indi + 
βi4 F_Duali + βi5 DualCEOi + βi6 Ind_Directori + βi7 Rpai + βi8 Firmyeari + βi9 Pre_CARi + βi10 non_relatedi + 
βi11 FCFi + βi12 LN_MVEi + βi13 LN_RMi + βi14 Crossborderi + βi15 Publici + β16 Equityi + β17 Yr08_11i +    
 Market Model  Market Adjusted Model  
CARs (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) (-1,+1) (-2,+2) (-3,+3) 
Link Test 
(on _hatsq – the  
variable of 
concern) 
√ 
Not 
significant 
 
Coefficient 
0.0745 
T-stat 
1.21    
√ 
Not 
significant 
 
Coefficient 
0.0248     
T-stat 
0.39    
√ 
Not 
significant 
 
Coefficient 
0.0288    
T-stat 
0.42    
√ 
Not 
significant 
 
Coefficient 
0.0709   
T-stat 
1.23    
√ 
Not 
significant 
 
Coefficient 
0.0715    
T-stat 
1.21    
√ 
Not 
significant 
 
Coefficient 
0.0443    
T-stat 
0.63    
Ramsey Test 
 
√ 
Not 
significant 
F= 0.78 
P-value 
=0.5066 
√ 
Not 
significant 
F= 0.12 
P-value 
=0.9492 
√ 
Not 
significant 
F= 1.56 
P-value 
=0.1992 
√ 
Not 
significant 
F= 1.34 
P-value 
=0.2609 
√ 
Not 
significant 
F= 0.76 
P-value 
=0.5150 
√ 
Not 
significant 
F= 0.46 
P-value 
=0.7092 
Multicollinearity 
√ 
Mean VIF 
1.33 
√ 
Mean VIF 
1.33 
√ 
Mean VIF 
1.33 
√ 
Mean VIF 
1.33 
√ 
Mean VIF 
1.33 
√ 
Mean VIF 
1.33 
Durbin-Watson 
statistic 
√ 
1.9804 
√ 
2.0460 
√ 
2.0934 
√ 
1.9802 
√ 
2.0551 
√ 
2.1194 
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A5 GRANK Test 
 
The GRANK test of Kolari et al. (2011) is described below. 
 
Defining estimation period and event window period 
Let day t=0 indicates the event day (corporate acquisition announcement day) 
Let t = T0+1, T0+2, ... ... , T1, refers to the estimation period. 
Let T = T1+1, T1+2, ... ... , T2, refers to event window period. 
Let L1 = T1 – T0 as the length of estimation period. 
Let L2 = T2 – T1 as the length of event window period. 
Let L1 + L2, refers to combined length of estimation period and event window period. 
Let i denotes each firm event.  
 
 
Construction of abnormal returns (     ) 
      denotes the abnormal return of event i on day t, as specified in equation 5.2.  
 
 
Construction of standardized abnormal returns (      ) 
Standardized abnormal returns are defined as 
 
       
     
    
         (A5.1)  
 
, where      is the standard deviation of       during t of each i. 
 
 
Construction of cumulative abnormal returns (     ) 
The cumulative abnormal returns of each i over T is defined  
 
      ∑      
    
      
        (A5.2) 
 
, where T1 ≤ t1 ≤ T2 – T, and 1 ≤ T ≤ L2. 
 
 
Construction of standardized cumulative abnormal returns (       ) 
The standardized cumulative abnormal returns denotes          , which equals to 
aggregated        through T. 
  
 
Construction of standardized        (     
 ) 
       denotes 
        
     
  
      
       
        (A5.3) 
 
where, 
          √
 
   
∑              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅   
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     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅     
 
 
∑       
 
    
Generalized standardized abnormal returns (      ) 
The generalized standardized abnormal returns (GSAR) denotes 
 
       {
     
                  
                                   
   (A5.4) 
 
 
Ranking the       
Rank        as 
 
                                 (A5.5) 
 
, where 
i = 1, ... ... , n 
    {           }  is the set of   during T and t=0 with the total number of   = 
      
             replaces          by rank number of 1, ... , T. 
 
 
Generating GRANK Test (      ) 
Given the null hypothesis of zero return announcement effect, the test statistic GRANK 
denotes: 
 
        (
   
      
)
   
       (A5.6) 
 
Where, 
  
  ̅̅ ̅̅
  ̅
           (A5.7) 
 
  ̅  √
 
 
∑   
 ̅̅ ̅̅
             (A5.8) 
 
 ̅  
 
 
∑     
 
           (A5.9) 
 
 
The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic GRANK is a Student-t distribution with T-2 
degrees of freedom (with T is the total number of observations). The null distribution of  
       approaches the standard normal distribution as T approaches .  
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A6 Tests for Firm, Time and Industry Effect on Base Model 5.6 
 
       
 
 
 
Table A6.1  
Summary of Test Results for Firm Effect, Year Effect and Industry Effect on 
Baseline Model 5.6 
The baseline model is represented by the equation: CARi =     + βi1 Owni + βi2 FamilyCEOi + 
βi3 Fam_Indi + βi4 F_Duali + βi5 DualCEOi + βi6 Ind_Directori + βi7 Rpai + βi8 Firmyeari + βi9 
Pre_CARi + βi10 non_relatedi + βi11 FCFi + βi12 LN_MVEi + βi13 LN_RMi + βi14 Crossborderi + βi15 
Publici + β16 Equityi + β17 Yr08_11i +   . Column 1 reports the hypotheses for the examined 
fixed effect respectively. Column 2 and Column 3 report the F-value and probability of the F-
value of the test command from Stata, respectively.  
 F-Value  Prob>F  
Firm Effect 
 
Ho: Common intercept for all 
firms 
HA: Different intercept for all 
firms 
 
 
F(128,   122) =    
0.89 
 
  0.7486  
Year Effect 
 
Ho: Common intercept for all 
years 
HA: Different intercept for all 
years 
 
 
F(  9,   241) =    
1.05 
 
  0.4012  
Industry Effect 
 
Ho: Common intercept for all 
industries 
HA: Different intercept for all 
industries 
 
 
F(  6,   243) =    
1.31 
 
  
0.2551 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
